

EXHIBIT NO. 179

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The following documents from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt have previously been placed in the Committee Record or Exhibits.

1. Memorandum entitled "Directive dated 30 November 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador General Oshima in Berlin". This appears at pages 204-206 of Exhibit 1, as messages Nos. 985 and 986 from Tokyo to Berlin.
2. Joint memorandum dated November 27, 1941, from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt—Exhibit 17.
3. The following documents, all of which are included in Exhibit 18:
 - a. Telegram dated November 24, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill.
 - b. Memorandum of conversation dated November 24, 1941, of Secretary Hull, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih, Honorable Richard G. Casey, and Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister.
 - c. Memorandum of conversation dated November 25, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Dr. Hu Shih.
 - d. Telegram dated November 25, 1941, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to Dr. T. V. Soong.
 - e. Memorandum of conversation dated November 25, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Lord Halifax.
4. Memorandum dated October 17, 1941, from Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt, enclosing proposed message from the President to the emperor of Japan—Exhibit 20.
5. Memorandum entitled "*MOST SECRET*", unsigned, which was attached to memorandum of conversation dated November 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Lord Halifax—Exhibit 21.
6. Two telegrams for Secretary Hull from President Roosevelt and draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government—Exhibit 22.
7. Telegram dated November 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt—Exhibit 23.
8. Telegram dated November 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt—Exhibit 24.
9. The following documents, which are published in Volume II, Foreign Relations of the United States and Japan, 1931-1941—Exhibit 29:
 - a. Memorandum of conversation dated February 14, 1941, between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, Vol. II, p. 387.
 - b. Memorandum of conversation dated March 8, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, Vol. II, p. 389.
 - c. Memorandum of conversation dated March 14, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 396.
 - d. Memorandum of conversation dated April 14, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 402.
 - e. Memorandum of conversation dated April 16, 1941, between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 406.
 - f. Memorandum of conversation dated July 24, 1941, between Acting Secretary Welles and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 527.
 - g. Memorandum entitled "PROPOSAL BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT", bearing handwritten notation "File lockbox. This is reply to my proposal." and accompanying two-page "oral" memorandum, both documents bearing notation "Copy of a document handled by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary on August 6, 1941"—Vol. II, p. 549.
 - h. Memorandum of conversation dated August 17, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 554.
 - i. Two-page memorandum dated August 27, 1941 entitled "TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE PRINCE PREMIER OF

JAPAN", and accompanying six-page memorandum commencing, "The Japanese Government has received the communication . . ."—Vol. II, p. 572.

j. Memorandum of conversation dated August 28, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassador Nomura—Vol. II, p. 576.

k. Memorandum of conversation dated September 3, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, together with accompanying "oral statement" and message "TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN, FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES"—Vol. II, p. 589.

l. Memorandum of conversation dated November 15, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine, Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi—Vol. II, p. 722.

m. Memorandum of conversation dated November 17, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 740.

n. Memorandum of conversation dated November 18, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 744.

o. Memorandum of conversation dated November 19, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 751.

p. Memorandum of conversation dated November 20, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 753.

q. Memorandum of conversation dated November 22, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 757.

r. Memorandum of conversation dated November 26, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine, and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 764.

s. Memorandum of conversation dated November 27, 1941, between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 770.

t. Memorandum of conversation dated December 1, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 772.

u. Memorandum of conversation dated December 5, 1941, between Secretary Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu—Vol. II, p. 778.

v. Memorandum dated December 1, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull and Undersecretary Welles—Vol. II, p. 779.

Note.—Except as indicated above, none of the foregoing copies of memoranda of conversations bear any handwritten notes; several of the memoranda have attached notes from Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt which are not published in Vol. II, of which the following is an example: "Memorandum for the President. I believe you may be interested in reading the attached copy of my conversation with Admiral Nomura on April 14. C. H."

10. G-2 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Recent Developments in the Far East"—included in Exhibit 33.

11. Telegram dated November 2, 1941, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt—included in Exhibit 47. There is attached to the telegram a copy of a memorandum dated November 11, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, as follows:

"This is the corrected telegram to me from Chiang Kai-shek. After reading it, let me know if I should make any change in the message I am to hand Hu Shih on Wednesday. F. D. R." Comparison of the "corrected telegram" with the telegram as appearing in Exhibit 47 discloses that the word "European" appearing in the next to the last line of the first incomplete paragraph on page 3 should be changed to the word "whole"; that the words omitted in the fourth line from the bottom of page 4 are the words "given a pretext"; that the word "seriously" at the end of the eighth line on page 5 should be changed to "gravely"; that the word "plea" in the twelfth line on page 5 should be changed to the word "help"; and that the following words, "as I have suggested to Mr. Churchill, I feel that success would be assured", should be inserted in the fourth line from the bottom of page 5 immediately following the words "combined operation".

12. General Marshall's Aide Memoire to the President re Defense of Hawaii—Exhibit 59.

13. General Marshall's memorandum to the President re Ground Forces—Exhibit 60.

14. Message dated August 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill—Exhibit 70.

15. Memorandum dated February 11, 1941, from Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt—included in Exhibit 106. Attached to this memorandum is a brief memorandum to President Roosevelt from Admiral D. J. Callaghan, as follows: "Admiral Stark asked me to forward this to the President since he considered the matter of some urgency."

16. Report dated December 14, 1941 by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to the President after the Secretary's visit to Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack. Printed in transcript at page 6221.

17. Memorandum for the President from General Watson transmitting from Admiral H. R. Stark the letter dated Feb. 9, 1941 from Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias to Admiral Stark. The letter concerned the interview Zacharias had with Admiral Nomura on Feb. 8, 1941. See Exhibit No. 141.

18. Dinner guest list at White House for Dec. 6, 1941. See Exhibit No. 58.

19. List of outside telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. See Exhibit No. 58.

20. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the President, memorandum for the Secretary of State, and the President's reply dated October 30, 1941 to Ambassador Grew. See Exhibit No. 178.

21. Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941 from the President to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerned with a proposed visit to Australia by Mr. Willkie. Exhibit No. 111.

22. Memorandum for the file and attached copy of the President's remarks on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9:00 with legislative leaders on December 7, 1941. Exhibit No. 160.

23. Message dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, reporting the reply of the Japanese Emperor to the President's message of December 6, 1941.

In addition to the foregoing documents, items numbered 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 14 in Exhibit No. 158, and all documents appearing in Exhibit No. 159, were obtained from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt. See tables of contents attached to those exhibits for descriptions of the individual documents.

The following documents from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt have not previously been placed in the Committee record or exhibits, and are included in this exhibit:

24. Letter dated January 7, 1941 from President Roosevelt to Francis B. Sayre, High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands.

25. Letter dated December 13, 1940 from Commissioner Sayre to the President, with attached memorandum dated December 26, 1940 enclosing copies of dispatch #966 dated Dec. 10, 1940 from Commissioner Sayre to the President, transmitted by Naval radio through the Interior Department, and comments to the Press by Sayre and President Quezon of the Philippines, and a newspaper clipping.

26. Memorandum dated January 11, 1941 for the President attaching Naval message dated Jan. 6, 1941 from Alusna Tokyo to OpNav.

27. Navy dispatch dated Jan. 11, 1941 from Alusna, Tokyo to OpNav.

28. Memorandum dated January 19, 1941 from Secretary of War Stimson for the President concerning the Philippine Scouts.

29. Letter dated Jan. 21, 1941 from the President to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew.

30. Letter dated December 14, 1940 from Ambassador Grew to the President, and attached memoranda.

31. Memorandum dated April 10, 1943 from the President for the Secretary of State.

32. Letter dated Jan. 22, 1941 from Secretary of War Stimson to the President enclosing a memorandum entitled "Resume of Situation Relative to Bill 1776."

33. Copy of memorandum dated Jan. 31, 1941 from the President for the Secretary of the Navy and attached letter dated Jan. 23, 1941 from Evans Carlson to Miss LeHand, presidential secretary.

34. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from the President for the Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

35. Memorandum dated Feb. 3 and 11, 1941 from the President and memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from Secretary of State Hull for the President, and attached letter dated Jan. 27, 1941 from Father James E. Walsh to Postmaster General Frank C. Walker.

36. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President.

37. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 for the President on proposal by Father Walsh.

38. Memorandum dated Feb. 10, 1941 from the President for the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Budget.

39. Memorandum dated Feb. 12, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President with attached suggestions for interview with the Japanese Ambassador.

40. Memorandum dated Feb. 15, 1941 from the President for Secretary Hull concerning the Spratley Islands.
41. Memorandum dated Feb. 20, 1941 from the President for Mr. Sumner Welles.
42. Memorandum dated March 11, 1941 for the President, attaching a brief of Admiral Pratt's interview with Ambassador Nomura on March 4, 1941.
43. Memorandum dated March 13, 1941 for the President attaching copy of report made by Rear Admiral R. K. Turner of his conversation with Ambassador Nomura on March 12, 1941.
44. Letter dated March 13, 1941 from Joseph E. Davies to Stephen T. Early, and attached memorandum from Mr. Davies to the State Department.
45. Memorandum dated Feb. 17, 1941 from Wilbur A. Nelson, University of Virginia, for the President, and attached memoranda, and a copy of a reply dated March 13, 1941 to Nelson on behalf of the President.
46. Memorandum dated March 14, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President concerning suggestions for an interview with the Japanese Ambassador.
47. File memorandum concerning letter dated March 21, 1941 from General Douglas MacArthur to Mr. Stephen T. Early relating to the office of High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands.
48. Copy of a letter dated March 29, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President concerning the Philippine defense.
49. Memorandum dated April 3, 1941 from the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning the Japanese government and its obligation to the Axis.
50. Letter dated April 4, 1941 from Resident Philippine Commissioner J. M. Elizalde to Secretary of the Interior, memorandum dated April 11, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President, and attached memorandum.
51. Memorandum dated April 10, 1941 from Secretary of the Interior for the President concerning Philippine defense preparations.
52. Memorandum dated April 15, 1941 from Stephen T. Early for the President and others concerning rumors of Japanese plans to delay American merchant shipping.
53. File Memorandum concerning a letter from Admiral T. C. Hart dated April 4, 1941 to Admiral H. R. Stark.
54. Memorandum dated April 28, 1941 from Secretary Knox for the President, transmitting memorandum dated April 22, 1941 from Joseph B. Phillips for Admiral Pratt, and memorandum dated April 30, 1941 by Admiral Pratt concerning his interview with Admiral Nomura on April 28, 1941.
55. Memorandum dated May 6, 1941 from the President for Secretary Hull concerning letter from Commissioner Sayre dated April 23, 1941.
56. Letter dated May 7, 1941 from the Secretary of the Interior to the President concerning the Philippines.
57. Memorandum dated May 6, 1941 from Gen. E. M. Watson, presidential aide, for the President concerning Japanese insurance firms in the U. S.
58. Letter dated May 10, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President and attached dispatch #120 dated April 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the State Department.
59. Letter dated April 23, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President and a cover letter to Brig. Gen. Watson, and memorandum dated May 15, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President suggesting a reply.
60. Letter dated June 20, 1941 from Secretary Ickes to the President, and the President's memorandum dated June 23, 1941 to Secretary Ickes, concerning suggestion made by Edwin W. Pauley relating to the Japanese situation.
61. Memoranda and letters dated June 6, 9, 13, 14 and 17, concerning sugar exports and political matters in the Philippines.
62. Navy Department reports to the President dated June 17, 18; July 2, 3, 7, 8, 16, 22. on the general intelligence available.
63. Letter dated June 25, 1941 from Raymond Haight to the President and reply dated July 11, 1941 on behalf of the President.
64. Memorandum dated July 15, 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for the President concerning a Japanese intercept relating to an ultimatum planned for Indo-China from Japan.
65. Dispatch proposed in July 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for Gen. Douglas MacArthur setting up the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, bearing approval of the President on July 26.
66. Miscellaneous correspondence in July 1941, and letter dated Dec. 11, 1940 from the Director of the Budget to the Secretary of War, between various govern-

ment offices concerning the "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the U. S., the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."

67. Draft of dispatch dated July 26, 1941 from the President to Harry L. Hopkins in London, concerning trip to Moscow proposed by Hopkins.

68. Memorandum dated July 26, 1941 from WDH for RF concerning Philippine military forces.

69. Letter dated July 18, 1941 from Ambassador Josephus Daniels to the President enclosing a memorandum from E. Stanley Jones on the Far East problem, which documents were transmitted to the President by Mr. Sumner Welles by memorandum dated July 28, 1941.

70. Information Bulletin dated July 25, 1941.

71. Letter dated July 25, 1941 from Harry Hopkins to the President.

72. Memorandum dated July 29, 1941 from the President to Sumner Welles and his reply dated July 31, 1941 concerning reports of withdrawal of Japanese troops from sections of the China front.

73. Dispatch #1131 dated July 30, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department concerning the Japanese advance on Indo-China.

74. File Memorandum dated Aug. 9, 1941 concerning proposed executive order "Establishing Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area."

75. File Memorandum dated Aug. 12, 1941 concerning proposed executive order "Transferring the U. S. Coast Guard for the District of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii . . . to . . . the Navy."

76. File Memorandum dated Aug. 18, 1941, concerning proposed executive order "Suspension of Eight-Hour Law as to mechanics and laborers employed by the War Department in the construction of public works in the Territory of Hawaii necessary for the national defense."

77. File Memorandum dated Aug. 20, 1941 concerning Navy request for authority to acquire four purse seiners to be converted into patrol vessels, for the 14th Naval District, stating Hawaii lacks adequate patrol vessels.

78. Unsigned memorandum dated Aug. 16, 1941 addressed apparently to the Secretary of State by an employee in the Far East Division of the State Department.

79. Letter dated July 31, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President and the President's reply dated Aug. 23, 1941, and attached memoranda.

80. Information Bulletins dated Aug. 6, 7, 8, 11, and 12, 1941.

81. Memorandum dated August 28, 1941, from J. W. Ballantine for the Secretary of State.

82. Memorandum of dates of three lunches with President Roosevelt, on July 8 and 11, and October 8, 1940, attended by Admiral J. O. Richardson.

83. Memorandum for the President from W. R. Smedberg, III, concerning military forces in China.

84. Dispatch No. 1384 dated Sept. 4, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department (six sections) concerning Japanese offer of suggestion for meeting between Japanese Prime Minister and President F. D. Roosevelt.

85. Memorandum dated Sept. 9, 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for the President, quoting from letter from Gen. MacArthur on the mobilizing of Philippine army units.

86. Letter from the President dated Sept. 26, 1941 for President Quezon of the Philippines.

87. Letter dated September 26, 1941 from the President to Commissioner Sayre, Manila, in reply to Sayre's letter of September 15, 1941.

88. Letter dated Sept. 15, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President reporting on the political situation in the Philippines.

89. Memorandum from the President to the Director of the Budget, dated September 18, 1941.

90. Memorandum dated Sept. 18, 1941 for the President from the Director of the Budget concerning purchase of a 6 month food supply for Hawaii.

91. Memorandum dated Sept. 28, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of State concerning negotiations with the Japanese.

92. Letter dated Oct. 14, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of War, dictated by HLH, referring to the Secretary's letter of Sept. 22, suggesting that subsequent to February 1942 more 4-engine bombers be allocated to the British.

93. Memorandum for the President from Harry L. Hopkins dated October 14, 1941 referring to the above letter to the Secretary of War.

94. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1941 to the President from the Secretary of War in reply to the President's letter of Sept. 18, concerning production and distribution of 4-engine bombers.
95. Schedule of Presidential appointments for October 16, 1941.
96. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 25, 1941.
97. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 26, 1941.
98. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 27, 1941.
99. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 28, 1941.
100. Confidential Bulletin dated October 20, 1941.
101. Memorandum dated December 9, 1941 from Harry Hopkins to Miss Tully, concerning letter dated October 21, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President, concerning the allocation of 4-motored bombers.
102. Memorandum dated October 25, 1941 from the President to Commissioner Sayre.
103. Memorandum dated October 22, 1941 from the Secretary of State to the President, concerning request of Commissioner Sayre to visit China.
104. Memorandum dated October 22, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of State concerning a letter dated October 8, 1941 to the President from Commissioner Sayre, regarding an invitation for him to visit China.
105. Proposed message from the President to Commissioner Sayre (not used).
106. Letter dated October 8, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President.
107. File memorandum concerning message from President Quezon to President Roosevelt, dated October 23, 1941.
108. Letter dated October 31, 1941 from the President to President Quezon.
109. Memorandum dated October 25, 1941 from the President for Secretary of the Interior, and copy of message from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde, on October 22, 1941.
110. Letter from Secretary of the Interior to the President dated October 23, 1941, transmitting message from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde on October 22, 1941.
111. Translation of radiogram dated October 22, 1941 from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde.
112. Letter dated October 31, 1941 from President Quezon to President Roosevelt, replying to the President's letter of September 26, 1941.
113. Letter dated November 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President.
114. Memorandum from Commissioner Sayre to General Watson.
115. Confidential Bulletin dated November 3, 1941.
116. Confidential Bulletin dated November 4, 1941.
117. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from the Secretary of State for the President.
118. Letter dated October 18, 1941 from President Quezon to the President.
119. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from Secretary of State for the President, and draft of suggested reply to message from British Prime Minister concerning Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid.
120. Message dated November 7, 1941 from the President to Prime Minister Churchill, in reply to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid.
121. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from the President for the Secretary of War.
122. Letter dated November 15, 1941 from the President to President Quezon.
123. Letter dated October 18, 1941 from President Quezon to the President.
124. Memorandum dated November 15, 1941 from the Secretary of State for the President.
125. Memorandum dated November 15, 1941 from State Department for the President, concerning proposed remarks to Japanese Ambassadors.
126. Letter dated November 17, 1941 from Stephen Early to David Sarnoff.
127. November 13, 1941 message from David Sarnoff to the President.
128. File memorandum dated November 19, 1941 concerning legislation affecting martial law in Puerto Rico and Hawaii.
129. Memorandum dated November 21, 1941 from the Secretary of State for the President, and attached memorandum dated November 13 from Colonel Donovan.
130. November 15, 1941 memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, transmitting memorandum from Colonel William J. Donovan dated November 13, 1941, concerning substance of remarks made by Hans Thomsen on November 6, 1941.

131. Memorandum dated November 22, 1941 concerning allocation of funds for calling up the military forces of the Philippines.
132. Memorandum dated November 24, 1941 from Admiral Stark for the President.
133. Memorandum dated November 25, 1941 from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, to Lauchlin Currie, concerning Chinese reaction to the proposed *modus vivendi*.
134. Confidential Bulletin dated November 25, 1941.
135. Confidential Bulletin dated November 26, 1941.
136. Letter dated November 26, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President concerning Japanese movement to the south from Shanghai.
137. Memorandum dated November 26, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President concerning Japanese convoy movements toward Indo-China.
138. Memorandum from the State Department for the President dated November 27, 1941 concerning proposed remarks during call of Japanese Ambassadors.
139. Undated message from Commissioner Sayre to the President.
140. Letter dated November 28, 1941 from Secretary Ickes to Mr. McIntyre concerning suggestions of candidate for governor of the Hawaiian Islands.
141. Memorandum for the President dated November 24, 1941, from Mr. McIntyre transmitting letter from Norman Littell, Assistant Attorney General, suggesting appointee for position of governor of the Hawaiian Islands.
142. Memorandum dated November 25, 1941 from Mr. McIntyre to Secretary Ickes transmitting the above letter of Mr. Littell.
143. Letter dated December 18, 1941 from Norman Littell to Mr. McIntyre enclosing an editorial from a Honolulu newspaper.
144. Letter dated November 28, 1941 from Admiral Stark to the President, concerning Pacific bases.
145. Letter dated November 24, 1941 from James Q. Newton to Admiral Stark.
146. Letter dated December 1, 1941 to the President from Secretary Stimson concerning exchange of land in the Hawaiian Islands.
147. Letter dated December 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President.
148. Confidential Bulletin dated December 3, 1941.
149. Confidential Bulletin dated December 5, 1941.
150. Teletype sheet reflecting news bulletins on December 5, 1941.
151. Memorandum dated December 5, 1941 from the Navy Department concerning Japanese forces in Indo-China.
152. Schedule of Presidential appointments for December 6, 1941.
153. Schedule of Presidential appointments for December 7, 1941.
154. Typewritten list of all Presidential appointments for December 7, 1941.
155. Memorandum dated December 7, 1941 from General G. C. Marshall for the President, concerning the Pearl Harbor attack.
156. Memorandum dated December 3, 1941 from Secretary Morgenthau for the President concerning representatives of the Bank of Japan in New York.
157. Memorandum dated December 8, 1941 from Ferdinand Mayer and F. L. Belin, relating to conversations with Ambassador Kurusu on December 6 and 7, 1941.
158. List of outside telephone calls through White House switchboard on Nov. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1941.
159. Letter dated May 15, 1941 from the President to Lauchlin Currie, and attached memoranda relating to a tentative aircraft program for China. (See Exhibit No. 159 to which these documents were attached.)
160. Military reports dated July 25 and 27, October 12, December 2, 3 and 4, 1941 with transmittal letters to the President from the British Ambassador.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

400

Philippines

January 7, 1941

Dear Frank:

I have received your letter of December 15, 1940, and I am naturally distressed to learn further of the difficulties which you have encountered in dealing with President Quezon.

I am, of course, aware of President Quezon's somewhat impulsive disposition which can occasionally make him difficult, particularly in periods of considerable stress like the present, but I feel that everything within reason should be done to prevent head-on clashes. I am in complete agreement with you that until the completion of the program for Philippine independence American sovereignty must remain intact and unchallenged, and I find it difficult to believe that anyone interested in the Philippine problem could take a different view. If the attitude of the Philippine leaders becomes such as to make it necessary, I shall not hesitate to take any steps which seem suitable to make clear that as long as our flag flies in the Philippines all necessary and lawful authority will be retained by this Government and that we will not allow our sovereignty to be encroached upon. Except as a matter of last resort, however, it appears to me essential that every effort be made to avoid the direct posing of the issue as between American sovereignty on one hand and Philippine autonomy on the other. Neither threats nor direct action along that line can have any other effect than to intensify and to magnify the many troublesome questions which lie ahead of us in the next few years of Philippine - American relations. The resort to the ultimate open assertion of American sovereignty could only signify the breakdown of the amicable relations which have existed up to the present time and would gravely endanger the success of the entire experiment which is being undertaken.

The large degree of autonomy extended to the Philippine Commonwealth by the Independence Act may be expected to give rise to an increasing series of questions the proper solution of which will require the most delicate and judicious handling on the part of all concerned with Philippine affairs. I realize that you as High Commissioner will meet with a constant succession of pinpricks which will be trying to the soul, and that I am asking a great deal of

Copy of reply sent to Interior.
Original sent to Interior for delivery
1/7/41
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xpp7 1984

you, but I hope that through the means of friendly cooperation and informal conference it may be possible for you to iron out many of the complexities by which you are confronted. It is my ardent hope that we may be able to conclude the Philippine program without any controversies which it is humanly possible to avoid.

With warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Sayre.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

x400 Philippines - High Commissioner

Honorable Francis E. Sayre, ^{xPP7226}
United States High Commissioner
to the Philippine Islands,
Manila, P. I.

THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

BY: [Illegible]

[The remainder of the page contains several paragraphs of extremely faint, illegible text, likely representing the body of the memorandum.]

NOTE—Reverse side of this memorandum not available.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

December 13, 1940.

Personal and
Strictly confidential.*and*
12/14

My dear Mr. President:

With further reference to my radio of December tenth, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, concerning President Quezon's statements regarding the limitations of the powers of the President of the United States to approve or disapprove Philippine constitutional amendments, I am enclosing herewith copies of (1) President Quezon's original press statement of December fourth, (2) my press statement of December sixth, and (3) President Quezon's reported statement of December ninth at a press conference called specifically for the purpose. I think you will be particularly interested to glance at the latter statement of President Quezon's.

Up to now President Quezon has been entirely cordial and his attack came as a complete surprise to me. This attack was obviously motivated by something deeper than my statement of December sixth, which he had to torture out of its obvious meaning in order to find a vantage point for his assault.

President Quezon seems to be growing more and more dictatorial and arbitrary, and impatient of any restraint or of any criticism, no matter how well justified. Perhaps his basic attitude is best summed up in the remark which he made publicly a few months ago when, in speaking at the opening of a new bridge, he said:

"An American businessman had the nerve to criticize me, so I told the president of the Rotary Club to tell him to get out of the country if he did not like what I had done."

What

The President,
The White House.

- 2 -

What makes the situation particularly difficult is that, in these critical times when international complications are menacing in this quarter of the world, it is obviously of large importance to avoid unnecessary altercations. For this reason I have refrained from taking issue with President Quezon on innumerable occasions in spite of considerable pressure on the part of the American community who deeply resent President Quezon's attitude. On the other hand, when President Quezon presumes to dictate what the President of the United States can or cannot do and deliberately misstates the law, I feel that I cannot remain silent. If American official representatives do not resolutely defend American sovereignty here until the date of independence, I am confident that our difficulties will be greatly multiplied. The very fact of the critical nature of the international situation makes it all the more necessary to protect and uphold American sovereignty here.

Another complicating factor is the politicians who are constantly intriguing and plotting to secure additional Philippine powers and favors from the United States. One way of gaining their ends is to play off the American officials concerned in Philippine matters, one against the other.

For all these reasons it seems to me of the largest importance, if American interests are to be protected, that more than ever all of us stand firmly together, - particularly you and Secretary Ickes and myself. If the Filipino politicians are given any reason to believe that they can play one of us off against another there can be no resolute American policy here and we are in for trouble.

It may be that at some time or other in the future, when President Quezon again jumps the traces, you will desire yourself to make a public statement making clear to President Quezon that as long as America remains responsible for Philippine defense and until independence is achieved you intend to back up the enforcement of American sovereignty in the Islands. I believe that some such statement, if made public and coming from you, would have an exceedingly healthy effect throughout the Philippines.

My effort out here is faithfully and loyally to interpret and carry out the policies you desire. It would be a great help to me, as well as a tremendous encouragement, if I could
have

have a personal line from you, letting me know if you see the situation as I do or giving me some idea as to the fundamental policy you desire to have followed.

Very sincerely yours,

Frank

Serial No. 966
DECEMBER 10, 1940.

Radio Sent: Navy
Code B
No. 901

HAMPTON,
Department of Interior, Washington, D. C.
Rush. Confidential for the President.

QUOTE See attached radio No. 884 December sixth from me to Hampton. I made statement of December sixth quoted therein in order to defend position and powers of President and because of the inappropriateness of President Quezon's undertaking to attempt to dictate the limits within which President of the United States may act. See my confidential letter to you of September 16, 1940.

President Quezon yesterday morning at a press conference called specifically for the purpose bitterly and with unconcealed emotion criticized and attacked my statement of December sixth, reiterating the view previously expressed in his press statement of December fourth. The issue of course is at present a purely academic one and I hope the incident will be closed with President Quezon's outburst. In answer to requests from the press for a further statement I have told the press I have nothing to add to my original statement.

Please refer to my radio No. 538 of August second to Department of Interior and my confidential letter to you of September twelfth in regard to emergency powers act. President Quezon is manifesting increasing irritation and impatience whenever anything is said or done which tends to impair his full freedom of action and resents restraints resulting from American sovereignty. I am doing my best to avoid difficulties but I believe that unless American sovereignty is resolutely upheld until the date when independence is granted we will be faced with increasing difficulties here. UNQUOTE

To Hampton. Please send to President with this message copy of my radio to you No. 884, December sixth concerning press statements. SAYRE.

[ENCLOSURE No. 1]

In proclaiming President's approval of Philippine Constitutional Amendments President Quezon on December 4 issued following statement:

"We should be, and in fact are, happy and grateful over the approval by President Roosevelt of the constitutional amendments. There should never have been any doubts in our minds as to what action the President would take. Under the independence act, the President of the United States may only disapprove the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines if they do not conform with the provisions of the said independence act. On no other ground may the President disapprove amendments to the Philippine constitution. Furthermore, President Roosevelt, being a progressive and a liberal, would naturally incline to let our people assume responsibility for our own government.

"I have telegraphed the President our thanks."

ENCLOSURE No. 2

At a press conference on December 6, when questioned in regard to President Quezon's statement of December 4, the High Commissioner read Section 7, paragraph 1 of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and said:

"It is clear from that language that it is exclusively for the President of the United States to approve or disapprove such amendments as may be proposed to the Constitution of the Philippines, and I know of nothing in the Independence Act or in the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution restricting his right or power to do either."

[Daily Bulletin—Manila, Dec. 10, 1940]

QUEZON HITS BACK AT HIGH COMMISSIONER

When questioned last night, Woodbury Willoughby, executive assistant to High Commissioner Sayre, stated that the Commissioner had nothing to add to what he had said at the press conference last Friday.

(By Cipriano Cid)

President Quezon, at a press conference yesterday morning, openly and vigorously criticized a statement attributed to United States High Commissioner

Francis B. Sayre that the President of the United States may veto any amendment to the Philippine constitution on any ground since his veto powers are not limited.

President Quezon declared that the view expressed by the High Commissioner at his press conference last Friday was a shock to him because, he intimated, it not only was not called for but it showed clearly that Mr. Sayre has failed to grasp the true philosophy of the Tydings-McDuffie independence law and the history of the progress of Philippine-American relations.

He expressed surprise over the High Commissioner's hearing on the constitutional amendments since in his opinion there was nothing in them which could have given cause for their disapproval by President Roosevelt. He reiterated his view that the American President may reject changes to the constitution of the Commonwealth government only upon the grounds specified in the Tydings-McDuffie law and upon no others unless, he said, the President wants to be arbitrary and ignore altogether those moral and political restraints which have made possible the smooth progress in the relationship between the United States and the Philippines.

For after all, the President confessed, the ultimate power in the relationship between any nations is that of physical force, and the United States, he stated, has all the power necessary to suppress every vestige of liberty in the Philippines.

President Quezon was commenting on a statement of High Commissioner Sayre reported in the Bulletin last Friday. The High Commissioner was quoted as having said that he knew of "nothing in the Tydings-McDuffie act which restricts the power of the President of the United States to approve or disapprove any amendments to the constitution as he sees fit."

High Commissioner Sayre was then commenting directly on a statement of President Quezon issued in connection with the approval by President Roosevelt of the Philippine constitutional amendments which was the object of a trip to the United States by Speaker Jose Yulo. The Quezon statement, in part, said: "There should never have been any doubt in our minds as to what action the President would take. Under the independence act, the President of the United States may only disapprove the proposed amendments to the constitution of the Philippines if they do not conform with the provisions of the independence act. On no other ground may the President disapprove the amendments to the Philippine constitution."

President Quezon told his press conference he objected to the construction by High Commissioner of the extent of the powers of the American President regarding the acts of the Commonwealth affecting their internal government and to the High Commissioner's using his press conferences as a means of expressing his disagreement over acts of the National Assembly and the views of the officials of the executive department of the Commonwealth.

He frankly stated that he called the conference yesterday for the purpose of replying to the High Commissioner, explaining that if the Commissioner, in contrast with his predecessors, is going to continue utilizing his press conferences to disagree with Commonwealth officials, he would find him a willing "cooperator" because he would love to argue with the High Commissioner or with anybody.

After stating the purpose of the conference and saying that he would not waste time by waiting for the reporters to ask him questions as usual, the President went on to say that although he has been aware for sometime of the position of the High Commissioner regarding the extent of the President's powers to veto or approve Philippine constitutional amendments, Mr. Sayre's public statement of them has been a painful surprise to him. "I have not recovered from the shock yet," he said.

Mr. Sayre's views, he said, surprised him because the High Commissioner is apparently such a lover of democracy. He said he writes and talks of democracy to lead people to believe he not only preaches democracy but would practice it.

But the views expressed by the High Commissioner regarding the legal and political aspects of Philippine-American relationship as reported in the press are wholly contrary and so at variance with the principles of a democratic government that to advocate them would be to advocate a reactionary policy.

The President undertook to show the High Commissioner's error by stating that he cited only Section 7 of the constitution to bolster his position that the American President's powers over rejection or approval of the amendments are

not restricted by law. He admitted that this section of the constitution placed no limitations upon the powers of the American President but asserted that it is not right to construe the scope and extent of the veto powers of the American President upon one section of the constitution.

In order to fully understand the limitations placed upon those powers, he argued, one must look to other provisions of the constitution and the law which gave power and authority to the Filipino people to draft their own constitution. He said it is elementary in law, as not only the lowest member of the judiciary but even the student of law knows, to interpret laws in their entirety, and not only so but to look to the spirit behind its enactment.

In the drafting of this constitution, congress, the President said, has placed only the following limitations upon the character of government that they would establish under it: (1) That it be republican in form; (2) that the constitution have a bill of rights, those same rights guarantee to American citizens, and (3) certain other limitations which must be appended to the constitution safeguarding the proper exercise of the sovereignty of the United States over the Islands.

Only upon an infringement of any or all these limitations placed upon the nature and power of the Philliping government may the President of the United States veto the constitutional amendments, President Quezon stated.

The Tydings-McDuffie law is the consummation of a series of acts and pronouncements of the United States government dealing with the Filipino people, the President said, the redemption of the pledge duly made by the United States government that the Americans had come to the Philippines not to subjugate its people but to teach them the art and science of self-government and to secure for them the blessings of liberty.

This law, he said, was enacted by congress in accordance with the promise made in the Jones Law that the Filipino would be granted their independence as soon as a stable government could be established by them. He added that congress found the Filipino people politically prepared for independence but due to economic policies which made the Philippines dependent upon the American market, the immediate severance of ties with the United States would result in serious consequences to the Philippines.

He said that it was for this reason that the Congress of the United States instead of enacting a law granting immediate independence—which should have been justified even then if the political ability of the Filipinos was to be considered alone—approved the Tydings-McDuffie independence act which provides for the granting of independence after a transition period of ten years.

Under this law, he said, the economic relations between the two countries would gradually change from Philippine dependence upon the United States market to that of ability to trade in the world market.

Congress had two ways of bringing about such a change, the President went on to explain. Congress could merely have continued with the Jones Law or it could have enacted laws to enable the Filipino people to readjust their economy to meet the new situation.

But congress wisely did not do so, he said, not only because there were minds in congress which were not reactionary but also because the sense of responsibility of congress counseled that the Filipino people be allowed to work out their own readjustment under a new law which vested in them the right to form a government of their own.

"They decided that the Filipinos should create their own government with sufficient powers to meet and solve the problems that should be solved in preparation for independence," he stated. "So ten years were given us by the United States government with powers which would not infringe upon the sovereignty of the United States so that we may look after our own affairs and save ourselves from ruin. That is the political philosophy behind the enactment of that law."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
JAN 11 1941 04 PM '41
THE WHITE HOUSE


January 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached despatch from our Naval
Attache at Tokyo is forwarded as being of
possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

10/16/41

2036 Z 1011 16 931 100R 1 DART F5Q 4L07 200R 48

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

RE: [Illegible]

REVEREND IN PRESIDENT'S [Illegible] CHAIR WHICH WAS FULLY REPORTED IN
 [Illegible] LANGUAGE ON [Illegible] PAPERS INDICATE ATTEMPT MINIMIZE
 [Illegible] MAKE JAPANESE PEOPLE BELIEVE PRESIDENT EXPRESSING
 [Illegible] NOT VIEW AMERICAN PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT ACCUSED [Illegible]
 [Illegible] SEE [Illegible] PRESUMPTIONS PREDICTIONS DISREGARDING ACTUAL
 [Illegible] AND OF [Illegible] AMERICA INTO WAR

For P info

Japan

17 1933

ALUSHA TOKYO

ALUSHA SHANGHAI - CINCOPAC - CONSIXTEEN.

NITE/JA

... FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDERS ...
... ALL VERNACULAR PAPERS ... TYPICAL COMMENT THAT U ...
... IN BOTH ... BY ORGANIZING THE OCEAN FLEET ...
... OLDER LESS ENERGETIC OFFICERS ... YOKIHI ...
... ADJUTANT RICHARTSON WHO ADVOCATED CAUTIONS POLICY ...
... JAPAN REPLACED BY ADMIRAL KINNEL WHO ADVOCATED STRONG ...
... AGGRESSIVE POLICY

STANX133AN

SECRET

400
Philippines

January 20, 1941.

x335

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

It is desired to increase the present enlisted strength of the Philippine Scouts from 6,415 to the 12,000 authorized. This to be accomplished by one year enlistments.

This increase will result raising some existing units to one strength, and the formation of some new units.

It is believed that this step will increase the defense capacity of the Philippine Islands, and will substantially offset the needs of the Philippine garrison.

If this matter with your approval, the increase will be authorized at once.

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War. x25

HLS
OK
FOR

1-25-41

SECRET

*Delivered to State Secretary by
pouch 1/21/41
LWS*

C. F. State

January 21, 1941

Dear Joe: *x204*

I have given careful consideration to your letter of December 14.

x3575

First, I want to say how helpful it is to have your over-all estimates and reflections--based as they are upon a rare combination of first-hand observation, long experience with our Japanese relations, and masterly judgment. I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions.

I also want you to know how much I appreciate your kind words of congratulation on my re-election and your expression of confidence in my conduct of our foreign affairs.

As to your very natural request for an indication of my views as to certain aspects of our future attitude toward developments in the Far East, I believe that the fundamental proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently, recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. We are engaged in the task of defending our way of life and our vital national interests wherever they are seriously endangered. Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front and takes advantage of every opportunity to contribute to our total security.

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the

*x197
x197-A
x463-6
x6 F State-European War
x48*

- 2 -

the chances of England's winning in her struggle with Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in these Isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by importing goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire. The British need assistance along the lines of our generally established policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the Far East is certainly well within the realm of "possibility" so far as the capacity of the United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving them assistance toward ensuring our own security must envisage both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British and be added to the assets of the other side.

You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the questions whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war. As I have indicated above, the conflict is world-wide, not merely a European war. I firmly believe, as I have recently declared publicly, that the British, with our help, will be victorious in this conflict. The conflict may well be long and we must bear in mind that when England is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed to bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the western and southern Pacific as might occur

- 3 -

during the course of the conflict if Japan is not kept within bounds. I judge from the remarks which appear at the bottom of page 4, and at the top of page 5 of your letter that you, too, attach due importance to this aspect of the problem.

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we can not lay down hard and fast plans. As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.

With warmest regards,

As ever
(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

January 21, 1941

Dear Joe:

I appreciate and I thank you for your thoughtful courtesy in sending me enclosed with your letter of December 14 four new Japanese stamps, including two commemorating the 2600th anniversary. I am, of course, delighted to have these stamps. Among other things, I have not failed to note the Imperial crest which appears on each of them.

xPP737-24

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew, ^{xPP7164}
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Original sent to State for filing, by pouch
1/21/41
JRM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1941


My dear Mr. President:

I have before me, by reference from you of January 3, Mr. Grew's letter to you of December 14, 1940.

I find attached to Mr. Grew's letter an envelope which is inscribed "New stamps". In order to avoid chance of that envelope and its contents being lost, I return the said envelope to you herewith, together with a draft of a letter in acknowledgment thereof.

I am sending to you separately a draft of a possible reply to Mr. Grew's letter under reference.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. Envelope containing four Japanese stamps.
2. Draft of letter to Mr. Grew.

The President,

The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 31, 1941

Mr. Crew for the President

In response to your memorandum
of January 3, 1941, there is attached
herewith a draft of a letter for your
signature to Mr. Crew in reply to
Mr. Crew's letter to you of December 1,
1940. Mr. Crew's letter is returned
herewith.

C.H.

220

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
TOKYO

December 14, 1940.

Dear Frank:

W.H. 11/21/41

I would give a great deal to know your mind about Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown someday, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be:

- (1) whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;
- (2) whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat; and
- (3) to what extent our own policy in the Far

The President,
The White House.

-2-

East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.

Those are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to reach across the Pacific that the United States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from attacking us permanently to seize and free

-3-

pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always swinging between extremist and moderate policies, but as things stand today we believe that the pendulum is more likely to swing still further toward extremes than to reverse its direction. Itoya, and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but under present circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive.

Our own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination in meeting every Japanese step with some step of our own has been eminently wise, and that policy has sunk deep into Japanese conscious-

-4-

ness. But while important elements among the Japanese people deplore the course which their leaders are taking, these elements are nevertheless inarticulate and powerless and are likely to remain so. Meanwhile the Germans here are working overtime to push Japan into war with us. I have told Matsuoka point blank that his country is heading for disaster. He has at least seen that his efforts to intimidate us have fallen flat and have had an effect precisely the reverse of that intended.

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw our troops and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia (including the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

A progressively firm policy on our part will entail inevitable risks -- especially risks of sudden uncalculated strokes such as the sinking of the Fleet which might reflect the

-5-

American people - but in my opinion those risks are less in degree than the far greater future dangers which we would face if we were to follow a policy* of laissez-faire.

In other words, the risks of not taking positive measures to maintain our future security are likely to be much greater than the risks of taking positive measures as the southward advance proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great majority of the American people are in a mood for vigorous action. The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program, but when.

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures "short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to

-6-

do so will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war, - the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting of Japan's present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of normal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem.

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have ^{seen} some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "New Structure" is in an awful mess and the hickering and controversy that go on within

-7-

the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

If you are willing to give me even a cue to your thoughts, either in a personal ultra-confidential letter or orally by some trustworthy person coming out here, it will be of tremendous help.

I cabled you my enthusiastic and affectionate congratulations on your re-election. You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and I am profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived of your clear vision, determination and splendid courage in piloting the old ship of state.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Joseph P. Kamp". The signature is written in dark ink on a light-colored background.

CONFIDENTIAL - "EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE"
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON
APRIL 10, 1943

C. F. State

The President said: "What do you think I should answer to Joe Drew?" - He requested (as per brief): Letter to JOF 4/7/43 from Asst. Joseph S. Drew enclosing copy of the President's letter to him of 1/21/41 (copy retained in file) which he wishes to publish in his forthcoming book "THE JAPANESE IN JAPAN".

See 4274 - 7212

Jan 22^d 1941Lind
Lace
Folde4 P
copy

"WOODLEY"
3000 CATHEDRAL AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dear Mr. President-

Here is the somber paper of which I spoke. While the composition and final suggestions and conclusions are entirely mine, both Marshall and Stark have read the paper and approved the factual statements as sound. A first draft of it was also read and approved by Knox.

Faithfully yours

H. L. S.

Jan. 22/41

ConfidentialRESUME OF SITUATION RELATIVE TO BILL 1776I.
immediate
The situation abroad.

1. The ocean supply situation of the British Isles has not been solved. It will probably grow worse during the spring and summer. New supply of ships either from here or Britain cannot relieve it for at least another ten months. Britain's American supply of munitions is constantly imperiled and her minimum food supply may be reached in a very few months. The strain on Britain for convoys is bearing harder and harder on her naval power elsewhere.

2. Britain's air situation is probably being slightly improved but she has yet no defense against a constant wearing attrition in the shape of sporadic bombardment which is diminishing her industrial capacity and straining her morale.

On the other hand, Germany undoubtedly has a large reserve of air power which she can draw upon for a heavy blow in support of an invasion. She is evidently planning such an attack possibly in the near future and probably by next summer.

3. While Britain has temporarily saved Egypt and the Canal and is probably knocking Italy out of her African possessions, she has not air control over the Central Mediterranean and her communications through the Mediterranean are likely to be interrupted by the German reenforcement of Italy. Germany is evidently reenforcing Italy and may be also planning to stop the Greek success. If she decides not to invade the British Isles, it is possible that she may move south into Egypt and Spain in furtherance of a plan to starve England, destroy her morale, and lower her prestige.

4. Japan is still pressing slowly down towards an attack on the Netherlands in which she would in all probability be successful as against the Dutch and British forces there.

II.

*immediate*The situation in the United States.

1. The comparative power of our fleet has recently been presented by Secretary Knox. In case of loss of the British fleet, it would be far inferior to the combined German, Italian and Japanese fleets. The main fleet is still in the Pacific.

2. The Panama Canal is subject to the hazard of sabotage and air attacks either by a surprise approach from the sea or after land bases have been seized in the Western Hemisphere.

3. In case of the fall of Great Britain and elimination of its fleet, our Atlantic fleet supported by protective land and air garrisons would be confronted with the difficult task of simultaneously guarding against:

a. The establishment of air bases in South America through Fifth Column assistance.

b. Surprise air raids upon the populous cities of our eastern seaboard or upon the Panama Canal from ships operating in the Atlantic.

c. The establishment of an airplane base in Newfoundland or Labrador.

4. In any event the defense against a and c above would have to be supported by expeditionary forces of land troops.

5. In the case of the establishment of an air base in either Newfoundland or Labrador, air attacks would be possible upon American cities on the eastern seaboard as far south as Wilmington, N.C., and as far west as Detroit, and Columbus, Ohio.

6. In case of the establishment of hostile bases north of Dutch Guiana, similar attacks by Heinkel bombers could be made upon the Panama Canal.

7. Our attache reports that Germany will probably have 1200 such bombers equal to or better than our B-17 by next September. We shall have nothing comparable to such a force by that time.

8. Our Protective Mobilization Forces will not be trained or fully armed until March 1942. Prior to November 1941 we would have much difficulty in providing the essential expeditionary forces for the defense of Newfoundland, the Caribbean area, north-eastern Brazil and the support of South American Republics without dangerously stripping our continental defense of materiel.

9. Our recently acquired British naval and air bases will not be fully equipped or armed until the summer of 1942.

10. Without reinforcements the permanent garrison in Newfoundland would be entirely insufficient to defend northern Newfoundland from a foreign attack, and the establishment of an air base there. Similarly the permanent garrisons in the Caribbean area will require heavy reinforcements in order to render them secure against a major attack.

11. If Japan simultaneously became an enemy, the hazards involved in reenforcing the Atlantic fleet from the main Pacific fleet would be much increased.

12. So long as the Panama Canal remained open, transfers to the Atlantic could be made which in all probability would meet the various dangers in the Atlantic which are enumerated above, while still leaving American interests in the Pacific sufficiently secure.

We must be prepared, however, against the possibility that the Canal may be blocked by a surprise operation for a period of a month or more, completely changing our defensive situation in the Atlantic until the arrival of the main fleet in those waters.

III.

The ultimate situation

In case of the loss of the British fleet accompanied by hostile action against us by all three Axis powers, while our immediate defensive position might be thus rendered temporarily secure by transfer of the main fleet to the Atlantic, this would probably not be true of our ultimate position. Not only would the aggregate present naval strength of the three Axis powers far exceed the present naval strength of this country, but those powers would be left in control of such superior facilities for shipbuilding as to make it probable that they could become and remain indefinitely a menace to this hemisphere -- able to effect permanent hostile

lodgments upon its continents. Certainly we would have no ground for expecting either of those powers to develop a naval policy as compatible with our interests as has been shown by the British Empire during the past 125 years.

IV.

1. The above described immediate dangers to the United States arising from a defeat of Great Britain and a loss of the British fleet during the coming spring or summer cannot be entirely eliminated by anything which it is possible for us to do in respect to selling munitions to Britain between now and next September.

2. Whatever benefit Britain would derive during that period from the passage of Bill 1776 would be mainly in the increased morale which such passage would undoubtedly give to the British people. The enactment of the Bill would undoubtedly somewhat expedite the furnishing to her of American munitions owing to the centralization of purchasing and the flexibility of operations which it permits. But the immediate material advantages would, in my opinion, be far from sufficient to greatly increase her defensive power. For example, our production of the items of planes, guns (including aircraft guns, tank and anti-tank guns), and ammunition, will not be greatly increased until 1942.

3. By far the chief material benefit to be derived by Britain from the passage of that Bill will not come until 1942. By that time she will derive immense benefit from the law, and that benefit will continue through the period necessary for her recuperation after the war is over in case she wins a victory.

The present shortage of Britain's supply of American exchange which has resulted at present in all further orders for the purchase of munitions in this country being forbidden by the President will be remedied by the Bill's passage. No really important munitions, however, which may then be ordered could possibly be finished and delivered until after the coming 1941 emergency.

V.

Conclusions.

The prompt passage of Bill 1776 offers probably the last possible opportunity of, to any extent, contributing ^{materially} to the defense of this country by aid to Britain which is short of military action. That extent is mainly limited to the increase of British morale which would be effected. In materiel the assistance rendered ^{by this Bill} during the coming six months would be insignificant. And when a people are suffering from such strain and shortage of supplies, including food, as will soon be the case with the British people, preservation of morale is difficult. I therefore think that the President should consider whether the American government has not reached the time when it must realize that the policy it has thus far followed of limiting its aid to measures which are short of military action will not probably secure a British victory. It is my belief that consideration should be given to measures which will at the same time secure the life line of British supplies across the Atlantic and relieve their convoy duty units of her fleet which are sorely needed elsewhere.

18-9

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: *x18*

I hear in a private letter that the Marine detachment at Guam, which went through the November third hurricane, has been from top to bottom magnificent in digging themselves out and repairing the damages. It is suggested, however, that after all they have been through it might be good for the morale to move them somewhere else and replace them with new personnel.

F.D.S.

Letter from Grace Carlson, Honolulu, T.H., 1/27/41 to Miss Leland, retained for our files. No copies accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy.

H. J. ... XP
Honolulu,
23 January 1941.

Dear Miss LeHand:

I arrived here yesterday afternoon by the China Clipper. It hardly seems possible that I dined in Manila on Sunday night and arrived in Honolulu on Wednesday.

It was a tremendously interesting trip for me. I have crossed the Pacific nine times by ship, but this air voyage brought home in vivid manner how modern communications have shrunk distances.

I found Guam struggling to recover from the devastating typhoon of November 3d. It certainly wrecked the island. The Marine area was particularly hard hit. The Marines ~~are~~ are working hard to put their place in order again, but a catastrophe of the magnitude which they experienced takes something out of human beings. At Wake Island I learned that the PanAir people had changed their personnel who went through a recent typhoon, putting in an entirely new crew. It struck me that it wouldn't be a bad idea to do the same with the Marines at Guam. A new outfit would go in with fresh enthusiasm and without the terrifying memory of the ordeal through which they ~~presently~~ ~~are~~ ~~under~~ ~~going~~ have passed.

Apparently I was wrong with my guess that the New Fourth Army problem would be solved without a resort to arms. When I was in Hongkong I was informed by the local Communist representative that the order had been issued by General Ho Ying-chin for the Central Government troops to move against the New Fourth. However, having only recently talked to Chow En-lai and heard his considered opinion that the matter would be settled peacefully I was inclined to think that the Hongkong man was trying to propagandize me, or was unduly alarmed. But apparently he was telling the truth, for when the news broke in the press at Manila the date of the movement against the New Fourth was placed at January 12th.

I am inclined to believe, though, that the affair will be localized. Chow En-lai, in his public statement following the clash, said as much. If the Communists, who are being attacked, are willing to localize it, the Central Government certainly should make every effort to do so. It is most unfortunate, though, that it should have occurred, for it cannot help but intensify the bitterness. Clark-Farr, the British Ambassador, will, I am sure, make a strong protest, and I hope that Mr. Johnson will also do so. It is imperative, it seems to me, that civil war be avoided at all cost. China must continue to resist so as to contain as large a proportion of Japan's military forces as possible.

x150-B x

I have a suggestion to offer in connection with the China situation. The President may have considered it already, but I have been mulling the idea over in my mind since leaving Chungking and it seems to me to have some merit. It occurs to me that Admiral Yarnell would make an ideal Ambassador to China at this time. I wish in no way to cast any reflection on the work of Mr. Johnson, but for many reasons it seems to me that Admiral Yarnell might be better equipped to deal with problems which will arise in the near future. In the first place, he is admired and respected by all political groups. Then, he has a military-naval background which would be a distinct asset. His judgement is clear and sound. He can be depended on to carry out instructions to the letter, but he also has the courage and judgement to act on his own initiative when occasion demands. In this respect he would ably complement the British Ambassador.

x1274

Nelson T.
Mr. Johnson has had a long and distinguished record as chief of our diplomatic mission there, and I do not suggest that he lacks ability. It is simply that in the present situation it appears to me that Admiral Yarnell possesses certain qualifications which would enable him to get the desired results with greater ease.

This is rather a delicate matter for me to suggest and I do so only because I have given it considerable thought and feel that the idea should be submitted for consideration. I have heard the suggestion from no one else, and I do not know whether Admiral Yarnell would wish the appointment. He is a thorough patriot, though, and would serve in any capacity the President might wish.

I was glad to see that the work at Wake and Midway is well underway. My friends in the Fleet here tell me that the Fleet is in apple-pie order and ready for any call. In this connection I think I should say that I have noted with pleasure the inclination of officers, especially of senior officers, to consider new ideas. Apparently there has been some recent indoctrination from the top, for this has not always been so and the fact has worried me. Perhaps it is that Britain's experience is bearing fruit. Anyway it is a healthy sign for now is no time for complacency.

I leave for the mainland by the Matsonia tomorrow, and it will be good to be back.

With kind regards to all I am,

Sincerely,

Ernest C. Chandler

x150-b

x 997-1951
J. C. M.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 5, 1941.

Secret

Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Please let me have your recommendation on this secret recommendation of the Secretaries of War and Navy.

F. D. R.

Letter dated Jan. 30, 1941 to the President from Secretaries Stimson and Knox in re request of President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth that funds not yet appropriated but already authorized to be paid the Commonwealth from sums derived from sugar excise taxes and currency devaluation be provided at this time in order to permit improvement of the defenses of the Islands. The sum in question amounts to \$52,000,000.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 11, 1941.

Memorandum for General Watson.

Will you show this correspondence to the Postmaster General but don't give it to him?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 3, 1941.

Private & Confidential

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.

What should I do next?

F. D. R.

Letter to Frank Walker from Father Walsh, Superior General at Maryknoll, dated January 27th, re cable sent stating that the ----- Governments are now ready to send a trusted representative to discuss the terms of a projected agreement.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

Referring to your memorandum of February 3, covering a letter from Bishop Walsh to the Postmaster General, and to the memorandum which I am sending to you, separately, in comment upon possible procedure suggested by the Bishop in regard to relations with Japan,—

In as much as the Japanese Government is sending a new Ambassador, who is due to arrive here shortly, would it not seem desirable to await arrival of and contact with that Ambassador before taking any action regarding any suggestions offered through indirect channels?

The letter from Bishop Walsh to the Postmaster General is returned herewith. Enclosure: From Bishop Walsh, January 27, 1941.



MARYKNOLL : : NEW YORK

January 27th,
1941

Mr. Frank C. Walker
Madison Park Hotel
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Walker:

Today we received word by cable that the _____ Government are now ready to send a trusted representative to discuss the terms of a projected agreement.

The man selected is the one who acted for that Government previous to the Disarmament Conference of 1922. We, however, still think it would be better if a representative went from here.

Of even more significance is the fact that the most recent statements from _____ are exactly in accordance with the plan which we worked out with those people before leaving their country. Their very statements are intended to indicate their consent. The harsh talk is for home consumption, lest that Government be supplanted by a group of Extremists. A bid for friendly settlement is being clearly made.

Mr. Frank C. Walker - 1/27/41 - Page 2

I have thought it might be helpful if Father Brown were to spend a week or so in Washington to receive on call. That Government has now given clear indications that a quiet move along the lines proposed would be successful. Father Brown knows their plan and could interpret the day-to-day developments accordingly; whereas, their moves are otherwise murky, or completely deceptive, any one not provisionally informed of their true condition.

These recent developments incline us to feel that we should at least stand ready to be of immediate assistance, if our cooperation is required. For this, we will rely completely on your own judgment. I would be very grateful if, without taking the trouble to write, you would indicate your wishes by phone or telegram.

Very sincerely yours,
 Frank C. Walker
 Director General - 1/27/41

THE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of January 26, forwarding the memorandum that was handed to you several days ago by Bishop Walsh on the subject of a possible procedure in relations with Japan, I have studied the matter carefully and I give detailed comments in the memorandum immediately hereunder.

I doubt the practicability of proceeding on any such line at this time. It seems to me that there is little or no likelihood that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people would in good faith accept any such arrangement -- at this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good offices of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in China, the likelihood would be that Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that Japan would
change

-2-

change her present course of aggression to one of peaceful procedures. ~~At~~ At the same time, I feel that we should not discourage those Japanese who may be working toward bringing about a change in the course which their country is following. Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-designate to the United States, is expected here soon. Upon his arrival he may have some proposals and suggestions to offer. We shall of course wish to listen carefully to what he has to say and we can try to convince him that Japan's own best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We should not, I think, resort to other agents and channels before we have even talked with the Ambassador and while we can work through Mr. Grew at Tokyo.

The memorandum left with you by the Bishop is returned herewith. I am also returning to you, separately, the letter sent by the Bishop to Mr. Walker.

Enclosure:

Memorandum giving
detailed comment
and memorandum by
Bishop Walsh.

CH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 5, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the President.

Referring to the strictly confidential memorandum relating to the Far Eastern situation which was left with you several days ago by Bishop Walsh, it seems to me that we can best approach the question presented in the memorandum by mentioning briefly certain facts fundamental in the Far Eastern situation and then examining the proposed plan of procedure in the light of those fundamentals.

The first fundamental is that since 1931 Japan has been dominated more and more by the military group—a group which finds adherents in all classes of Japanese society, the soldier, the sailor, the merchant, the industrialist, the farmer, et cetera, et cetera. This group sets a peculiarly high value on the use of force as an instrument both in national and in international [2] affairs. As Japan's military adventuring on the Asiatic mainland and southward has proceeded, the unmistakable trend in Japan has been toward an authoritarian control with the military group coming more and more to the front. During this process, there have been some elements in Japanese society which have felt that the course being followed by their country was a mistaken one. On the whole, these elements have had, up to the announcement on September 27, 1940, of the alignment by Japan with Germany and Italy in the tripartite alliance, less and less voice in Japan's affairs. The reaction of the United States to the three power alliance, the statements made by you in your fireside chat of December 29 and in your message of January 6 to Congress, the statements made by me on January 15 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and on January 27 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the increasing manifestations that this country is rearming at a steadily accelerating rate of speed and that this Government and this country are determined to assist Great Britain and other countries which are protecting themselves against aggression, and the British and Greek successes against the Italians,—all these have probably caused many Japanese to feel that their course of [3] action may bring them into conflict with the United States and that their course is more fraught with serious risk to Japan than had previously been estimated.

If events are permitted to take their course, it seems probable that Japan will for the time being become more and more authoritarian and more and more military-controlled. In view of the big strides already made by Japan in those directions, it would be extremely difficult to check or to change the direction at this time. It seems clear that Japan's military leaders are bent on conquest—just as are Germany's. They demand that this country make concessions: that we give up principles, rights, interests: that we stand aside while Japan proceeds by force to subjugate neighboring areas and, working in partnership with Germany, contributes to the establishing of a new "world order": even that we facilitate their efforts by promising to give them financial assistance for the exploitation of areas which they expect to conquer. Is there anything that can stop this aggressively moving force—other than the resistance of a stronger obstacle or the resistance of a greater force?

Another fundamental fact is that the Chinese are fighting for their existence, against forces of [4] aggression which, if successful, will probably increasingly menace the interests of the United States.

Ever since Japan's military leaders embarked on their present course in 1931, various efforts have been made by Japanese leaders to persuade the Government of the United States to conclude some sort of new political arrangement with the Japanese Government. This effort has been motivated largely by a desire on Japan's part to make it appear to the world, and especially to their own people and to the Chinese, that the United States was prepared to acquiesce in—and even to assent to—the results of Japan's program of conquest. Japanese leaders have undoubtedly hoped by the conclusion of such an arrangement to discourage the Chinese and cause the Chinese leaders to make peace with Japan on Japan's terms.

Many of Japan's leaders earnestly desire now to extricate Japan from its present involvement in China in order that Japan may be in better position than it is at this time to embark on conquest to the southward in areas which are richer in natural resources than is China and from which Japan might, if successful in conquering these areas, enrich herself more rapidly than she can in and from China. Any arrangement which would [5] help Japan to extricate herself

temporarily from her involvement in China would be of doubtful soundness from point of view of the best interests of the United—and of the world—unless it also made effective provision that Japan desist from her program of conquest.

Turning now to the plan suggested in the memorandum under reference: An effort has been made to consider the proposed plan in its broad aspects, to evaluate the ideas which underlie the plan, and to appraise the plan in perspective. There are a number of statements in the proposed plan which, as they stand, are definitely not practicable. Comments in regard to some of these are contained in an annex to this memorandum. As indicated, the discussion in this memorandum is restricted to comment upon the plan as a whole.

With regard to section "I. LEGAL", it might be feasible for the Japanese Government to make, as a unilateral action, a declaration somewhat along the lines of Article III of the three power alliance to the effect that in view of the agreement between the United States and Japan relating to various aspects of the Far Eastern situation the Japanese Government would agree, should the United States be attacked by a power at present involved in the European war, to assist the United States [6] with all political, economic, and military means. I doubt, however, that Japan would give such a unilateral commitment. I am sure that it would not be feasible for this Government to undertake to give Japan a reciprocal commitment.

With regard to section "II. POLITIC", subsection A, this Government would, it is assumed, be prepared to cooperate toward bringing about a settlement of the Chinese-Japanese conflict—were Japan *and* China both to indicate willingness to negotiate on a basis reasonably fair and just to all concerned.

Referring to the statement in this subsection that "China and Japan could . . . unite to fight Communism in China and in the Far East", it needs to be remembered that the Chinese have repeatedly rejected offers of the Japanese to assist in fighting communism in China and have declared such offers to be merely a mask for Japanese military operations of occupation. Experience shows that the working out of any arrangement on this matter which would be acceptable both to Japan *and* to China would be extremely difficult if not impossible under present circumstances.

With regard to subsection B—in which it is suggested that there be recognition of a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" and that provision be made with regard to the [7] political status of the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Malaya, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies—it might be feasible to work out something along the lines indicated. However, a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" would be difficult to define either as to terms or as to area. As to terms, there would need be recognition of the legal equality of each of the areas (countries) included in the doctrine. As to area, the Far East is not readily delineated as a geographical area. For example, questions would arise whether countries such as India and Australia should or should not be included. There is also the question of Eastern Siberia. In one sense, such geographical questions are not important. In another sense, however, they raise further questions: whether the ties, historical, cultural, commercial, and racial, among the various regions of the Far Eastern area (Pacific area) are such as to make it feasible for there to be adopted with regard to the area any doctrine which is regional in character. We of course would not wish to be doctrinaire on this point, but at the same time it seems essential that thought be given to all important aspects of the matter.

With regard to subsections C and D, no comment would seem to be needed.

[8] With regard to section "III. ECONOMIC", we have long believed that there are many constructive lines open to Japan and to the United States in the realm of economic and financial matters *provided* that Japan desists from the course of conquest on which she has been engaged since 1931.

In general, I am skeptical whether the plan offered is a practicable one at this time. It seems to me that there is little or no likelihood that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people would in good faith accept any such arrangement at this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good offices of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in China, the *likelihood* would be that Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that Japan would change her present course of aggression to one of peaceful procedures. At the same time, I feel that we should not discourage those Japanese who may be working toward bringing about a change in the course which their country is following. As I said in my statement before the Foreign

Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, this Government has, notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, made [9] repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that Japan's best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. You have worked hard at that. I have worked hard at it. Mr. Grew has worked hard at it.

Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-designate to the United States, is expected here soon. Upon his arrival he may have some proposals and suggestions to offer. We shall of course wish to listen carefully to what he has to say and we can try to convince him that Japan's own best interest lie along lines other than that she is now pursuing. Should we succeed in convincing him, the next question will be can he convince his own Government and people?

Annex: Comments on Subordinate Aspects of the Proposed Plan.

Enclosure: Memorandum by Bishop Walsh returned.

ANNEX

COMMENTS ON SUBORDINATE ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PLAN

One. The plan itself is not new. Various of its aspects have been presented at one time or another, sometimes by American, sometimes by Japanese.

Two. In section "II. POLITICAL", subsection B, there is a statement in regard to a "Japanese-American guarantee". It would be contrary to long-standing policy of the United States to undertake to give such "guarantee". However, in view of the fact that many Americans believe that this Government in the Washington Conference Nine Power Treaty gave a "guarantee" in regard to China's independence, whereas this Government in that treaty simply promised to *respect* China's independence, et cetera, it may be that the drafters of the phrase in question had in mind nothing more than some agreement whereby this Government and other governments would pledge themselves anew to respect the independence and the status of the areas mentioned.

In this same subsection there is reference to the establishment of autonomous governments in Indochina and, in the Dutch East Indies, with the further statement that in the Dutch East Indies Queen Wilhelmina could be accepted as sovereign. The problem of working out arrangements in accordance with the statements made in the [2] proposed plan would present obvious difficulties. However, both French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies are at the present time operating in many respects as at least semi-autonomous regions.

Three. The Chinese, having in mind past Japanese failures to honor contractual obligations, have consistently insisted that they cannot and will not begin negotiations with Japan until, as evidence of Japan's good faith, Japanese troops have first been withdrawn from China. It may be assumed that this specification on the part of the Chinese need not be regarded as absolute: a complete withdrawal by Japan of her forces need not be regarded as the condition precedent; but some clear indication of a change of heart and of intention on Japan's part would seem to be a *sine qua non*.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MEMO FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

The Japanese Government cannot admit, through official channels, that American economic pressure and defense preparations under President Roosevelt have been so politically successful that the Japanese now would welcome an opportunity to change their international, and modify their China, positions.

The domestic position of the present Japanese Government is like that of the Bruening Government in Germany in 1931. The Japanese would rather lose the war in China than lose the domestic war to their own Extremists. But, the loss of the China War and the imminence of an American War, would put the radical nationalists, civil and military, in complete control. If the Conservative authorities, including Prince Konoye, Mr. Matsuoka, Count Arima, General Muto, etc. and the Emperor, can win, by diplomacy, a safe economic and international position, public opinion in Japan would restore the Conservatives to complete control.

For such a reversal, the Japanese majority needs, no less than China, the help of the United States. Failing this, they foresee the possibility of a union of their own Extremist elements with the Radical forces in China; a union comparable to, and an appendage of, the compact of Russia and Germany in Europe. They feel that if some constructive cooperation is not realized with the United States before March or April, the Fascist element will take control in both China and Japan, no matter whether England or Germany wins in the Spring offensive.

Such an eventuality would surely close the door for the Allied cause in the Far East-----, in his own words, "is riding the horses until he can stop them." -----, in his own words, said that "to call the present war in China a Holy War is a blasphemy," and "to call the Treaty with Wang-Ching-Wei an equal Treaty is a lie." -----said he would probably be killed if we revealed his statements to certain Japanese.

2. We found the Japanese officials virtually despairing of any possibility of reestablishing cordial relations with the United States. President Roosevelt's policy, and the Italian losses in the Mediterranean have created a remarkable opportunity for solidifying the Far Eastern situation in our own favor, and the Japanese are apparently now following a plan of procedure for cooperation with the United States. Mr. Matsuoka designed his speech of December 19th as an indication of this intention.

The Japanese feel that their alliance with the Axis will have to be nullified realistically before it can be broken legally and officially. The Japanese authorities are ready (though they dare not admit their readiness at the peril of their lives) to substitute the United States for Germany, by an agreement which would embrace the following aspects:

I. LEGAL (for Japanese public opinion)

A. The Japanese Government could maintain that as they accepted the Axis Alliance to maintain world peace by restricting the European War vis-a-vis the United States (but much more Russia) they could apply the same principle to Germany and threaten Germany with Japanese involvement if she extends the War beyond its present confines. (Germany then would be doubly hesitant to declare war on the United States.)

II. POLITIC

A. Acceptance of the cooperation of the United States in a settlement of the China War on the basis of the secret Truce Terms offered last October by Chiang Kai Chek. With some guarantee of politic-economic order in China, and the removal of China as an immediate military menace, or a political menace through a European 'sell-out', China and Japan could then unite to fight Communism in China and in the Far East. This would take Germany, now acting through Russia, out of China.

[3] B. A recognition of a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine based on the aforementioned China settlement, the Japanese-American guarantee to check any third power attempting to alter the political status of the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore or Malaya, and the establishment of autonomous Governments in Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, in order to remove these areas as potential war spoils, and in order to forestall the demand of Japanese Extremists for forcible action. (These autonomous Governments would agree to respect all existing investments, etc.) Actually, in the Dutch East Indies, Queen Wilhemina could be accepted as a Sovereign.

C. Just prior to our abrogation of the Commercial Treaty, the Japanese and British had virtually agreed upon a Treaty reopening trade in the Yangtze Valley. The British, therefore, would have no objection.

D. No territorial aggrandizement in China proper.

III. ECONOMIC

A. Japan (and with her, the Far East) is drifting into a commodity economy which will produce a low standard of living which she does not like, but cannot avoid without American assistance. American assistance (cfr. additional memoranda) could be so given as to guarantee the political agreement and set up an economy in the Far East so totally variant from the German that the Germans could not do business with it. By ear-marking, but leaving in the United States,

a heavy gold credit, with interest payments, for substantiating the currencies of Japan and China, the United States would put the Far East on a money economy like our own, and hold over both China and Japan the threat of withdrawal for any failure to comply with the political provisions of the joint agreements.

[4] B. Japan would grant a complete Open Door provided she received similarly accepted and could actually be sought by both China and Japan under cal Trade Treaty with the United States allowing free entry of certain basic commodities, heavy machinery, etc. Cotton and agricultural surpluses would be similarly accepted and could actually be bought by both China and Japan under the monetary arrangement above mentioned.

Because of the domestic situations, any such arrangement would have to be presented to the Japanese and Chinese people as a fait accompli. Meantime, merely to indicate that such a settlement is possible is to put power in the hands of the Conservative element in Japan and give them confidence to proceed.

A representative of President Roosevelt could be introduced, with the full knowledge of Mr. Drew, to work out, with the utmost speed and secrecy, in co-operation with the controlling elements in Japan, including the Emperor, such an agreement as would bring some order in the Far East, and put within the power of President Roosevelt the opportunity to immunize the Pacific for at least three years.

The Japanese people who now despair of American friendship would welcome this as the greatest boon to their national life and security, for which the Japanese would sacrifice anything except their Far Eastern position. The representative of the President should be someone whom he knows and trusts intimately; someone who will be apprised fully of American aims in the Far East; someone who is keenly aware that the Germans will attempt ruthlessly to prevent any American-Japanese agreement; and someone who will not attract attention as an official member of our State Department.

If President Roosevelt acts to investigate this possibility, we would be willing to cooperate with his representatives for the safeguarding of the Japanese officials, and the verification of their statements.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 10, 1941.

Memorandum for,

The Secretary of the Interior,
The Director of the Budget.

Please talk this matter over and let me have final recommendation.

The whole matter should be treated as highly confidential.

F. D. R.

Letter of Feb. 7, 1941 from Acting Secretary Bell of the Treasury in re recommendation for the appropriation of certain moneys amounting to approximately \$52,000,000 to the Philippine Islands to be used for defense purposes.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE SECRETARY,
February 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a memorandum containing suggestions of statements which might be made orally to the Japanese Ambassador when he calls on you.

Attachment: Memorandum.

SUGGESTION FOR INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

There is offered for consideration the suggestion that in the initial conversation with Admiral Nomura following presentation of his credentials the issues between the United States and Japan be not discussed in such a way as to cause Admiral Nomura to feel that this Government is closing the door to any diplomatic

efforts which he may make as Ambassador. Reference might, however, be made to the assumption that he, as a seafaring man, would welcome frank speaking, and the following points might then be touched upon:

1. There is no disguising the fact that relations between the United States and Japan are not good. These relations have deteriorated for the reason, as we see it, that Japan has embarked upon a course of expansion by force. There is no need at this time to dwell upon the fact that Japan's course has been attended by more than 250 instances of the bombing by Japanese planes of American mission and other properties in China, by the sinking of the *Panay* and the burning or sinking of three other American vessels with loss of American life, and by the disruption of the normal and legitimate activities of thousands of Americans.

2. With reference to the alliance entered into by Japan with Germany and Italy, some Japanese statesmen [2] say that Japan has retained freedom of action. Japan is aware of our policy of assisting those countries which are resisting aggression. In these circumstances, the question naturally arises whether Japan's actions will demonstrate that Japan in fact retains liberty of action or that Japan has pledged itself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things which this country is committed to support, things which it always has supported and which it forever will support.

3. The Government of the United States has noted repeated statements by Japanese leaders to the effect that the United States is moving toward involvement in the European war and that such involvement would constitute a world calamity. Do not these statements, in view of happenings in the Far East, give rise to the warrantable and corollary question whether Japan itself, through its military activities toward the south and through its commitments to Germany and Italy, is not drifting toward involvement in the European war and whether such involvement would not be, in the words of Japan's leaders, a "world calamity"? There comes to mind in connection with this question Japan's military occupation of or military activities in north China, central China, south China, the Hainan Island, the Spratly Islands, and, thus far, parts of French Indochina. It appears to those on [3] this side of the Pacific that there is in the public utterances of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press undue emphasis upon the asserted responsibility of other nations and not sufficient consideration of the possible consequences of Japan's own presentation of constantly expanding aims at the expense of other countries.

4. Our two countries have drifted apart from that friendly and reciprocally advantageous attitude which in general had previously characterized their relations with one another. Some very acute questions are now presented to each country. Without going into these at the moment, it is suggested that, if Japan has a desire to examine the points of divergence with a view to talking over the situation fully and frankly, the time has arisen when that should be done. If the Japanese Ambassador feels that he would like to discuss such questions, the appropriate officers of this Government are of course available for such discussion. This does not mean a negotiation; it means a discussion attitudes, policies, objectives.

5. These are some of the thoughts which honesty and candor require to be frankly expressed. In expressing them, we are not unmindful of the circumstances attending the appointment of Admiral Nomura as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. The press has reported that he repeatedly declined this assignment. The fact that Admiral Nomura, [4] with his high character his statesmanship, and his well-known friendship for the United States, finally accepted the responsibilities of the position of Japanese Ambassador to the United States, indicates to us that there is still desire on the part of Japan that progress toward improving relations between the United States and Japan may be made.

Note: With reference to the question of "tone" in the opening stages of our contracts with the new Japanese Ambassador, it is believed that it may be advisable—in the light of indications from the Far East—to "speak softly" (carefully avoiding any word that might to a wishful thinker imply that we would consider offers of "compromise"), while simultaneously giving by our acts in the Pacific new glimpses of diplomatic, economic, and naval "big sticks."

FEBRUARY 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a memorandum containing suggestions of statements which might be made orally to the Japanese Ambassador when he calls on you.

Attachment: Memorandum.

FE: MMH: HES

[Hand written:]

(Original in State Folder)

(Copy in Japan Folder)

SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

There is offered for consideration the suggestion that in the initial conversation with Admiral Nomura following presentation of his credentials the issues between the United States and Japan be not discussed in such a way as to cause Admiral Nomura to feel that this Government is closing the door to any diplomatic efforts which he may make as Ambassador. Reference might, however be made to the assumption that he, as a seafaring man, would welcome frank speaking, and the following points might then be touched upon:

1. There is no disguising the fact that relations between the United States and Japan are not good. These relations have deteriorated for the reason, as we see it, that Japan has embarked upon a course of expansion by force. There is no need at this time to dwell upon the fact that Japan's course has been attended by more than 250 instances of the bombing by Japanese planes of American mission and other properties in China, by the sinking of the *Panay* and the burning or sinking of three other American vessels with loss of American life, and by the disruption of the normal and legitimate activities of thousands of Americans.

2. With reference to the alliance entered into by Japan with Germany and Italy, some Japanese statesmen [2] say that Japan has retained freedom of action. Japan is aware of our policy of assisting those countries which are resisting aggression. In these circumstances, the question naturally arises whether Japan's actions will demonstrate that Japan in fact retains liberty of action or that Japan has pledged itself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things which this country is committed to support, things which it always has supported and which it forever will support.

3. The Government of the United States has noted repeated statements by Japanese leaders to the effect that the United States is moving toward involvement in the European war and that such involvement would constitute a world calamity. Do not these statements, in view of happenings in the Far East, give rise to the warrantable and corollary question whether Japan itself, through its military activities toward the south and through its commitments to Germany and Italy, is not drifting toward involvement in the European war and whether such involvement would not be, in the words of Japan's leaders, a "world calamity"? There comes to mind in connection with this question Japan's military occupation of or military activities in north China, central China, south China, the Hainan Island, the Spratly Islands, and, thus far, parts of French Indochina. It appears to those on [3] this side of the Pacific that there is in the public utterances of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press undue emphasis upon the asserted responsibility of other nations and not sufficient consideration of the possible consequences of Japan's own presentation of constantly expanding aims at the expense of other countries.

4. Our two countries have drifted apart from that friendly and reciprocally advantageous attitude which in general had previously characterized their relations with one another. Some very acute questions are now presented to each country. Without going into these at the moment, it is suggested that, if Japan has a desire to examine the points of divergence with a view to talking over the situation fully and frankly, the time has arisen when that should be done. If the Japanese Ambassador feels that he would like to discuss such questions, the appropriate officers of this Government are of course available for such discussion. This does not mean a negotiation; it means a discussion of attitudes, policies, objectives.

5. These are some of the thoughts which honesty and candor require to be frankly expressed. In expressing them, we are not unmindful of the circumstances attending the appointment of Admiral Nomura as Japanese Ambassador

to the United States. The press has reported that he repeatedly declined this assignment. The fact that Admiral Nomura, [4] with his high character, his statesmanship, and his well-known friendship for the United States, finally accepted the responsibilities of the position of Japanese Ambassador to the United States, indicates to us that there is still desire on the part of Japan that progress toward improving relations between the United States and Japan may be made.

Note: With reference to the question of "tone" in the opening stages of our contacts with the new Japanese Ambassador, it is believed that it may be advisable—in the light of indications from the Far East—to "speak softly" (carefully avoiding any word that might to a wishful thinker imply that we would consider offers of "compromise"), while simultaneously giving by our acts in the Pacific new glimpses of diplomatic economic, and naval "big sticks".

FE:WAA:HES FE PA/H
2-12

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.

In regard to the Spratley Islands, I thought it was perhaps better not to mention them in our talk with Nomura yesterday.

I suggest, in view of your message, that we use the routine method of asking Grew to question the Japanese claim to them by asking them how they justify their occupation.

They may come back and say that like Canton Island and Enderberry Island, the Spratley group was uninhabited, but we have a perfectly good answer in the fact that both Great Britain and the United States each claimed those Islands by virtue of discovery and occasional guano use later, but also that the United States and Great Britain entered into a friendly agreement in regard to the future.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 14, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

The Secretary of State called to say that he and his associates do not think it is a good idea for us to lay claim to the Spratly Islands but rather to question the Japanese claim instead. If we are going to make a formal representation to the Japanese Government on this Spratly Island situation, my associates think it would be better to do it in a routine way through our Ambassador in Tokyo in a note.

The Secretary thinks it is all right to mention the Japanese occupation of these Islands and question it without claiming it ourselves.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 20, 1941.

Private & Confidential.

Memorandum for Hon. Sumner Welles.

I have just read the purported instructions from Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Ambassador Nomura dated February 14.

Please read them.

These instructions seem to me to be the product of a mind which is deeply disturbed and unable to think quietly or logically.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

The attached is a brief of Admiral Pratt's interview with Ambassador Nomura.

I thought the President would be interested.

Respectfully,

D. J. CALLAGHAN

Memo—March-7-41

INTERVIEW WITH NOMURA ON MARCH 4

At his own request, I met The Ambassador on March-4—He gave me a lunch at the Plaza, and we had a three hours conversation alone in his private quarters—I am returning the compliment by giving him a small dinner at the St. Regis tonight March 7.

My remarks followed, without my knowing it at the time, almost exactly the line indicated in the confidential report of the American Advisor for the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Moore.

I told the Ambassador that Japan's best promise for the future lay along economic lines, and not through military conquest.

That Japan being an island State, like Britain, her real interests, lay along the path of sea power, and not military power, and that her best promise for the future lay in connection with Britain and the United States, and not with the Axis. That sea power was not destructive as military power was—Sea power kept the trade lanes open—was liberal—and to succeed must be conciliatory and not aggressive. Military power was destructive—antagonized those it overran—was nonproductive—did not open trade lanes, but closed them—and ultimately defeated its own purpose.

I told him that joining the Axis was what turned American sentiment so definitely against Japan. I cited our Constitution, which puts no bars on naval strength, but definitely limits moneys to the Army for two years. This in itself showed the feeling at the time, that too great military strength was a menace, and that fear of too great military power in unscrupulous hands had become an enduring part of American life and thought.

I told him that we did not wish to see Japan destroyed—that her influence properly used could always be a strength in the Orient—that Russia is and always would be the main threat to Japan, as long as the present Communist influence lasted.

[2] I told him we were definitely out to see Britain win, and would go the limit if necessary, because it was essential in an economic sense, and for the purposes of an enduring peace, that sea power prevail over aggressive military power. That 6 or 7 years ago, when visited by members of the Japanese General Naval Staff, in Los Angeles, and asked for an opinion, I had told them then that the military domination of China would be a failure.

I told him that even if Japan won the first naval victory—we had the power to build and she had not—that she would be so weakened, that ultimately she would lose her influence in the Orient and be supplanted by Russia, and that her ideologies and not those of Japan would influence the Orient.

That the best way to combat communism in China, their great fear, was along the economic road, and not along the aggressive military path—that given the chance to live, and become stabilized along economic and peaceful lines, there was no fear of China becoming communist in the sense Russia is today—that China's natural socialism centered around the family and the guild—as far apart from the Russian brand as the two poles, and if given the chance to work out her own salvation, Japan need never fear the Russian brand fully penetrating China. That military domination in China would never put down the brand of communism Japan feared, but on the contrary would drive China closer to Russia.

I told him frankly that if a new war started in the Orient, it would be Japan's making—not ours—that the decision depended largely on the future course they adopted.

I advised him to exercise the Oriental talent for patience, and see if in the end the military conquests of Hitler in Europe, would not run the same course there that Japan's military venture in China did. That in effect it would be a failure.

Nomura was more than frank, and agreed thoroughly with all I said. He told me of his interviews with Lord Halifax and The President—I gathered that my views were in entire accord with those of the President.

[3.] I gathered that Japan does not wish war with us, and Britain, and that a southern drive against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, will not be undertaken, certainly not for the present, if wiser counsels can prevail—that the leading military and naval men were against it—that the economic path was the one they wished to pursue—that the Elder Statesmen had strongly advised against the China invasion, but had been overthrown by the military

clique, but that the failure of the China venture, *haf* converted many of the leading military men.

That since the China invasion had been such a failure, leading naval and military thought had swung around, and was much more liberal now than it was then. He said Japan was full of German military men, and Gestapo agents, trying to induce Japan to act in conjunction with the Axis, but that after all Japan had a mind of her own, and the decision was hers and not Germany's—that there were few or no Nazi naval men in Japan.

His own personal secretary has just come from England, and has had considerable experience there—His naval and military attaches have much influence in the war office, and I gathered they were mostly in accord with his views. He admits he has a hard task, and only accepted the post from a sense of duty. He is extremely liberal—his views on the liberal influence of sea power vs. aggressive military influence, coincide with mine—and I judge he is infinitely more sympathetic to the liberal policies of Britain and the United States, than he is to those of the Nazis.

I gathered that if Japan were given a little chance to save face, so important to the Oriental, in Indo-China, along the economic path, it would do much to offset the smart of the China failure, and strengthen liberal influence in Japan itself, which though under a cloud was still fairly strong, and if I inferred correctly, was more apt to grow than to weaken.

I gathered that the main fear of military men were *tye* spread of Communism in China—that they frankly admitted that military domination would not solve the problem—and that they didn't know how to solve it—Hence I made the remarks I [4.] did, as what appeared to me to be the only way out for a solution. This covers the main points, and I trust I said nothing counter to the general trend of our own policies—all I said was in the spirit of friendliness to Japan, and in the hope that she would do nothing rash which could only lead to her own ultimate defeat, which I did not wish. I wanted Japan to be strong, but a liberal generous Japan, not a militaristic Japan. In passing, I might add, that in the course of the years I have had many contacts with the Japanese, and contrary to the general opinion, I have never had one of the samuri class, deliberately lie to me.

W. V. PRATT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 13, 1941.

Secret

Memorandum for the President

I thought the President would be interested in the attached copy of a report made by Rear Admiral Turner, re his conversation with Ambassador Nomura.

As the President will recall, Admiral (then Captain) Turner was the skipper of the U. S. S. ASTORIA which, in April '39, carried to Japan the remains of the Japanese Ambassador who died in Washington. Admiral Turner is very well known to, and very well liked by the Japanese.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

MARCH 13, 1941.

From: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. N.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.

1. On March 12th I met the Japanese Ambassador at a cocktail party given in his honor by the Japanese Naval Attache. In the course of a five minute chat he said he would like to converse with me at greater length. On March 12th he telephoned me to ask me to see him at 5 p. m., that day, either at the Embassy or at my home. I arranged to call at the Embasssy at that hour. I shall hereafter refer to him as "Nomura." The words of the conversation are my own; I merely try to give the gist and impressions of the talk.

2. After an exchange of pleasantries, Nomura stated that his mission here was to prevent war between Japan and the United States, that he had undertaken the mission with a realization of the possibility of failure, and that he was even less hopeful of success after arrival here, but that he had undertaken the mission as a matter of duty to his government, and because of his conviction that the best interests of the two countries were to maintain peace. He referred

to his friendship with Admiral Pratt and other United States naval officers, and stated that he was exploring the ground, as best he could, in order to find a basis on which the two nations could agree. He said that he would value receiving my views as to the future.

3. I replied that naturally, as the War Plans Officer of the Navy, I could express no opinions as to military matters, and since military officers were not authorized to express the political views of the government, I could say nothing on that score. Therefore, I would confine my statements to the expression of my concept of the general attitude of the American people toward Japan, so far as I could determine it. [2] I had been to Japan four times, and had known Japanese there, in China, in Hawaii, and in California. I felt that I understood the Japanese better than the average American, and I admired their many excellent qualities. I would speak frankly, and he must assume that what I said was in no way to be construed as a criticism of the Japanese. Different peoples had different viewpoints; all have good qualities, and also have qualities that are not so good; and it is these inferior qualities, and the differences in culture, that often give rise to misunderstandings.

4. I stated I believed that, underneath, the Japanese and the American people liked and respected each other. Minor differences and disagreements had naturally appeared, but I believed the events of the past ten years were more ominous, and that they were deeply disturbing to Americans.

5. Nomura agreed that the feeling was worse than it had been in past years, but stated that the "New Order" in the Far East originally had not been intended as a military adventure, but was designed to be purely economic and cultural. Unfortunately, radicals had obtained a strong influence, and the execution of the New Order had been initiated by the force of arms. He was impressed by the views that he had received in this country, and he agreed with them, that the victor and the defeated in a war received almost equal losses, and that both suffered severely. He gave France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as examples.

6. He stated that he had talked, at various times, with high ranking Japanese army and naval officers as to whether Japan would be benefited by the war in China. Practically all of them were convinced that this adventure was a mistake. Certainly it had proved a terrible drain, and the task of controlling such a great territory by force seemed almost impossible to accomplish. When the project first came up, the high ranking army officers had opposed it, but the younger, radical element had been so strong that the older men had acquiesced. He believed now, on the contrary, that though the younger element was still in favor of strong measures, the older army officers in command would not give in to them. The Navy, on the contrary, had been and still are in favor of peace with the United States.

[3] 7. I replied that it was this use of force that had disturbed the United States. All thinking men recognized the necessity for outlets by an industrial country such as Japan had become, and recognized her need for sources of raw materials. Nevertheless, forceful expansion, such as Japan had undertaken, cuts across established national and personal interests, and naturally arouses antagonisms. The United States has difficulty in accommodating itself to the variations in Japanese policy which result in the shifts of power among the three quite different and antagonistic elements of Japanese political life. The question now was as to how much further Japanese Far Eastern conquests would extend. Japan never has had reason to fear a military expansion of the United States into the Far East; when Commodore Perry in 1856 recommended that the United States should seize the Bonin and the Loo Choo Islands, the American people had rejected the idea. They accepted the temporary care of the Philippines reluctantly. In my opinion, they have no wish to extend permanent military power into the Far East. They wish to remain at home and at peace. They believe that gradual changes of status, and not sudden changes accompanied by force, will in the long run prove the best. The deterioration of American and Japanese relations, I believed, was chiefly due to the use of forceful measures by Japan, and in particular to the Japanese adherence to the Axis. This had come as a disappointment and a shock to Americans, who believed it a weapon aimed at themselves and the British. Nomura's appointment as Ambassador had slightly relieved this feeling, as it was construed as a desire on the part of Japan for improved relations. Nomura is respected by Americans, and is known for his desire to maintain peace with the United States. However, since the beginning of the affair in Indo-China, I felt that opinion here had become worse than before.

8. Nomura recognized the value of a peaceful conquest. Relations of the United States with Mexico and Central America now under the Good Neighbor Policy were far better than when he was here in 1921, and the peaceful policy appeared very effective. Japan has not now, and never has had, any desire to extend control over the Philippines. With regard to adherence to the axis, it was his opinion that Matsuoka, whom he knew well, had been sincere in his opinion that this action actually would be conducive to peace in the Pacific.

[4] Nomura had not agreed to this, but Matsuoka had been much surprised by the severe reaction of the United States. As to the Indo-China affair: Japan is in need of rice and other supplies; Indo-China had been even more uncooperative than had the Netherlands East Indies; furthermore, Thailand is a friend. These influences had determined Japan's course.

9. I stated that, of course, different peoples had difficulty in understanding the point of view of others. Their culture, habits of thought, and customs are different, and they fail to allow for inevitable mistakes. That is doubtless one of the reasons that the United States and Japan began to fall apart. It is necessary to understand a people's background before its point of view can be appreciated. From my reading of translations from Japanese newspapers, and talking to Japanese, I feared that they might fail to appreciate the extremely close cultural and political relationship that exists between Great Britain and the United States. We both have the same origins, our economy is closely tied together, and though we have fought two wars and have had many quarrels, it should be understood that the United States would not stand aside and see Great Britain fall. The United States had intervened in her favor in the last war, and it must be clearly apparent that the American people are now determined to do all that lies within their power to save Great Britain now. This principle of common interest applies to British holdings in the Far East as well as in the Atlantic. I wished there were a way to make the Japanese understand this important relationship.

10. Nomura said all Japanese naval officers understood this thoroughly, but, unfortunately, Japanese army officers did not. He tried to explain this to them, but they would not believe him. He emphasized this point by several repetitions.

11. Nomura was convinced that the American people were slow to make up their minds, but thereafter were very determined to carry out their decision to the full. He believed that they would help the British to the best of their ability, with material alone, if possible; but that when the very severe German submarine and air attacks would nullify this help, the United States would enter the war against Germany. He did not believe German invasion plans were certain to succeed, but he believed it possible that in a few months the British people might be starving because of air and submarine action against the convoys.

Secret

[5] 12. Nomura is no longer active in the Navy, but, in his opinion, the presence of the United States Fleet in Hawaii, particularly in combination with the British, forms a stabilizing influence for affairs in the Pacific. This fleet would be less potent if many of the American destroyers and other light forces should move to the Atlantic to help the British. Battleships might be left in the Pacific, but their influence alone would not be great without other forces of adequate strength. (This was the only time he seemed to want to "pump" me).

13. I agreed that the submarine and air menace placed Great Britain in a very bad position. Their danger is grave. We can not be sure how the matter will end. I intimated, however, that ways are available for defeating the German submarines and aircraft which have not been fully exploited. I had no idea whether the American people would make war in the Atlantic, the Pacific, or remain neutral. I pointed out that American warships are now being turned out rapidly, and that many of these would be available for the Atlantic without reducing our strength in the Pacific. In any case, it was my opinion that if war occurred in the Pacific, it would be because of events in the Far East, and not because of any decision by the United States to attack Japan, even though many persons were now advocating this step, and Gallup polls indicated strong support for such a move.

14. Nomura was very cordial. I believe he is fully sincere, and that he will use his influence against further aggressive moves by the military forces of Japan. He seemed desirous for support of the more liberal Japanese elements.

R. K. TURNER.

CABLE ADDRESS: [illegible]

WALTER C. GUYER
JOHN L. GEE
DAVID RICHBERG
WALTER H. BEEBE
WALTER H. BUSICK
WALTER H. RICHARDSON
WALTER H. LAMDA
WALTER H. CLEAVELAND
WALTER H. JANDRY

*file
as indicated*

LAW OFFICES
DAVID RICHBERG, BEEBE, BUSICK & RICHARDSON
BOWEN BUILDING
615 FIFTEENTH STREET

WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 13, 1941

Dear Steve:

Here is the memorandum which I left with Sumner.
I am quite sure that it gives in short compass a background
that would be valuable to "The Boss".

Hastily,

Joe

Mr. Stephen T. Early,
The White House.

Enc.

*The President: - I ask
for this copy of
Joe's report to the
State Dept.*

SE

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY JOSEPH E. DAVIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEBRUARY 18, 1941

For the information of the Department, and for such value as it may have, I submit the following:

Last week, at my law office, I was offered a retainer by a group representing Japanese interests who desired advice and counsel, in connection with the betterment of relations between the United States and Japan. They submitted responsible references as to their reliability.

I told them that if they wished to tell me about their problem, with the understanding that I incurred no fiduciary or other obligations by listening to them, that I would consider the facts and advise them as to my attitude thereafter. To this they agreed.

They stated that they represented certain big business groups in Japan, who were in close relationship with practically all of the Japanese Cabinet, except Matsuoka, the leaders of the Navy and many of the leaders of the Army. They also stated that the internal, political and economic situation in Japan had deteriorated so rapidly in the past four or five months, that the group which they represented had become convinced that there was no escape from complete internal disaster, communism, and confiscation of all property rights, except thru ending the Sino-Japanese war, and by coming to a complete agreement with the United States.

They confidently asserted that, if the President and Secretary of State would "take hold of" this situation vigorously, a rapprochement between the two countries could be effected in which the United States could "write its own ticket".

This they recognized involved a complete "volte face" on the part of the Japanese Government. In the face of that fact, they nevertheless confidently maintained that if negotiations were had, the following could be effected:

(a) That Japan would get out of the Rome-Berlin axis.

(b) That Japan would withdraw from China upon terms which the United States would determine.

(c) That Japan would modify its policy with reference to the Orient; and would return to the "status quo ante" in accord with the concepts of the United States Government as to what constituted fairness in the Pacific and the Orient.

(d) That even as to Manchukuo a settlement could be had satisfactory to the United States.

The foregoing contained only one qualification and that was that it was expected that the United States, while insisting upon the foregoing results, would exercise amelioration in the manner of doing the job; so that the Japanese government responsible for the new policy could measurably "save face" before its own people.

[2] The specific proposal suggested was; that the President and Secretary of State should send to Japan, by air and immediately, someone who could verify their representations by direct contact with their principals, and report the facts to the President. They suggested that if the Under Secretary of State or Mr. Hopkins were to go to Japan; they could and would place themselves at their disposal to have them meet, unofficially, the leaders of these various groups, and see for themselves that their representations as to what could be done were well founded.

They stated that they made this suggestion because they could secure greater frankness thru unofficial contacts which they could arrange, rather than thru official contacts made thru the American Embassy; and that in this suggestion there was no reflection upon the ability or effectiveness of Ambassador Grew.

My reply to these gentlemen was that neither I nor my firm would accept any retainer or employment in this situation. I stated, however, that if they could make these representations with sufficient weight behind them to the Department of State; and could make good on their representations, that they would be rendering a great service not only to the Japanese interests they serve but to the cause of peace in the world.

In connection with their suggestion that in my private capacity I go to Japan to verify their representations, I replied positively and unequivocally that under no circumstances would I do so.

The foregoing is reported to the Department in the belief that it might be of some value in connection with the situation.

My own judgment, from what I gathered in these discussions, is that there is a "possibility" that it might be well worth the Department's while to explore and consider the matter. There might be just a chance that this might be "the moment" for the "break" in the war situation, which the defection of Japan from the axis would undoubtedly afford. If there is nothing to it, still a valuable side light might be afforded in the situation and nothing would be lost.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., March 13, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the President.

In accordance with the President's instructions, I have written a letter to Dr. Nelson, copy attached.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan.
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

Confidential

Dr. WILBUR A. NELSON,

*Corcoran Professor of Geology,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia.*

MARCH 13, 1941.

DEAR DR. NELSON: The President has considered your memorandum written over date of February 17th, and has asked me to reply for him.

The President is intensely interested in the area mentioned in your memorandum, is fully aware of your study of the region—and remembers, of course, with regret, that your projected expedition had to be postponed because of the international situation.

I have been asked to convey to you that the President appreciates your reminder of our interest in that area, and the necessity of obtaining all possible information, hydrographic and geographic. To this end we have sought and are obtaining from certain friendly sources, information which is vital to our store of knowledge of particular regions in the area.

In the present state of international relations, the President feels that, for many reasons, it would be unwise to disclose our particular interest in certain regions in the South Seas, by sending an expedition or a Presidential envoy for study in the area. It is certain that the presence of such an expedition or envoy would become known shortly, and, possibly, would have a deleterious effect on projected plans.

The President has asked me to express his regret that, for the reasons given above, he feels that he cannot give favorable consideration to your suggestion at the present time.

With my own personal good wishes, I remain,
Sincerely yours,

D. J. CALLAGHAN,
*Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.*

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 7, 1941.

Memorandum for Captain Callaghan.

Will you break this news to Professor Nelson in your best manner?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 3, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum for the President

In re the proposal made by Dr. Nelson, the Navy Department feels as follows:

(a) There is on hand a considerable amount of confidential information on the islands in question, contained in Pacific Airpilot, in confidential monographs, and in sailing directions.

(b) War Plans is in the process of obtaining additional needed information from Australia and New Zealand.

(c) That sending an expedition to these islands *now*, would inevitably become known to ORANGE, would disclose our hand, and destroy the element of future surprise, in any contemplated use.

While it is true that one can *never* have *enough* hydrographic and other pertinent information on hand, re particular areas, it is felt that the thought contained in paragraph (c) above it of paramount importance, as indicating the undesirability of undertaking such an expedition at the present time.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan,
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

It is suggested that a study be made of the little known island region of the South Pacific between Hawaii and New Zealand, much of which region is under mandate to New Zealand and Great Britain, to acquire comprehensive data on this region which will be of immediate benefit to the United States and to New Zealand in the present emergency.

A number of these islands, which were first discovered and claimed for the United States by the captains of American clipper ships, are now uninhabited or have only a small remnant of their former population.

As the leader of the temporarily postponed National Geographic Society-University of Virginia Pacific Islands Scientific Expedition, with the cooperation of the United States Coast Guard, and as one who has been studying this area rather intensively in preparation for this important Expedition, the necessity for such an immediate study by a special Presidential envoy is considered to be of utmost importance in this time of emergency.

Wilbur A. Nelson,
WILBUR A. NELSON,
Corcoran Professor of Geology,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia.

FEBRUARY 17, 1941.

See original
1-41

March 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the call which the Japanese Ambassador is to make on you this afternoon, suggestions are offered as follows:

One. Should the Ambassador bring up the question of Mr. Hirota's visiting the United States, you might comment to this effect: We of course welcome visits to our country by persons occupying responsible positions in other countries. Visits at the present time by any such persons may be especially informative both to them and to us, in view of the current complexity of problems of international relations and of the tremendous changes which have occurred in the United States during recent months. If Mr. Hirota chooses to visit this country while en route from Europe to Japan, he will of course be welcomed.

Two. Should the Ambassador mention his knowledge of the fact that the Japanese Government has been in communication with the Japanese Government in London since 1940, you might say that you are sure that the Japanese Government in London is in communication with the Japanese Government in Tokyo.

-2-

of improving relations between Japan and the United States, you may care to say -- as I did to the Ambassador on March 5 -- that you very much appreciate the purpose of the Ambassador's compliments and that of course officials of this Government charged with the conduct of foreign relations could not confer with them individually in regard to matters pending between our two Governments unless the Japanese Ambassador should assume the responsibility and the initiative to that end.

There, however, or opportunity may develop, in the course of the conversation, of which you might care to take advantage for the offering of observations on lines as follows:

In view of Japan's membership in the imperialist alliance with Germany and Italy, there arises naturally whether Japan has retained freedom of action and whether she remains still an independent, or whether Japan has sacrificed herself in alliance with Germany to secure the things -- principles, policies and objectives -- in the support of which this country is interested and is concerned. Can the alliance stand in support of the Japanese Government's policy to withdraw from the world stage in general, and to make herself a world power in general, and to make herself a world power in general, and to make herself a world power in general.

-3-

of military and naval expansion and move toward conquest of the rest of the earth? As long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and as long as the Japanese army and navy extend their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, the apprehensions and the concern of this country will be very real and our reactions be increasingly realistic. This country is proceeding with a program of rearmament with ever increasing speed and effectiveness, and our national effort, directed in no way toward any program of aggression, is more and more being concentrated upon the problem of perfecting our defense and supporting the resistance of other nations to movements of conquest. We wish to be friends, we are ready to be friends, with every nation in the world -- but in our concept real friendship and real cooperation can prevail only between and among nations each and all of which want peace and security for all.

*Justice**CH*

FK:MMH:HES

YE

PA/H

PA/H:SKH

Gen. Douglas,
Philippine Islands
March 21, 1941

Writes to Mr. Early stating that he understands there may be a vacancy in the office of High Commissioner of the Philippines. Makes application for appointment to this post.--Under date of 4/25/41, Gen. Watson replied to Gen. MacArthur re the above stating that the President has asked him to say that he has been currently informed about the Far Eastern situation and, frankly, that he wants Gen. MacArthur there in his military capacity rather than any other. Gen. Watson adds that the President believes that Gen. MacArthur's service is most important in the role he now has.

See 400-Philippines - High Commissioner

400-Philippines

SECRET

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1941.

The President

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Our Military Adviser to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, has recently recommended the strengthening of the seacoast defenses of the Philippines against possible invasion.

He has requested that seven 8-inch railway guns (old model) and twenty-four 155 mm guns, together with the necessary auxiliary equipment and ammunition, be placed at the disposal of the Philippine Government for this purpose.

Title to equipment made available under this proposed transfer would remain with the United States pending final adjudication of all accounts between the two governments prior to 1946 as specified in the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

The amount of equipment involved is relatively small. It does not affect our present commitments to the British Government and cannot materially affect future arrangements.

The War Department is of the opinion that the proposed transfer would both strengthen the defense of the Philippine Islands and improve the position of the United States in that area without impairment to more important defense objectives.

Your approve of this transfer is recommended.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

H. L. S.

O. K.

F. D. R.

SECRET

G. P. L. No. 187

Japan 3-10-41
1-41

*file
confidential*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 3, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR the Director

16-12200 GPO

Subject: Japanese Government and its obligation to the Axis.

The DIO 3ND reported today that the Mitsui Bank of New York has been instructed by its London office to conduct business on the premise that the Japanese Government is not going to fulfill its obligations to the Axis Powers. Source of this information is of doubtful reliability, he stated.

*This from
McFall*

B-7-J

WSD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE ^{x20}
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ^{x6}

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR BY SIGNATURE.

F. B. S.
x3460

Letter from Hon. J. W. Elizalde, Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the U.S., Washington, D. C., to the Secretary of the Interior, 3/2/41, quoting telegram received from President Queson, directing him to submit it to the Secretary of the Interior, which quotes letter which President Queson sent to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands, 1/3/41, in re issuance of Executive Order by President Queson creating the Civilian Emergency Administration, sent to the Secretary of State; copy of memo, with explanation of contents sent to the Secy. Interior.

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

7 4 21

April 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the attached letter from Mr. J. M. Elizalde, the Philippine Resident Commissioner, to Secretary Ickes, which you transmitted to me under cover of a memorandum dated April 7, 1941, it would appear that this letter was probably given to you by the Secretary of the Interior only for your information and that since a reply to the Philippine Resident Commissioner will presumably be made by the Secretary of the Interior, it does not call for any reply from you. This view is submitted for your consideration. Should you wish a reply drafted for your signature, the Department will be glad to collaborate in its preparation.

C. H.

Attachment:

Letter from Mr. Elizalde
 to Secretary Ickes, dated
 April 6, 1941.

with Philippine High Commission

THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D. C.
April 4th, 1941

The Honorable
Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have today received a telegram from President Quezon with instructions to submit it to you personally. The radiogram reads as follows:

"Commissioner Elizalde
Washington DC

"I am quoting below text of letter which I have today sent to High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre with the request that you personally submit copy thereof to Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, as indicated in the last paragraph:

'Baguio, April 3, 1941.

'My dear High Commissioner Sayre:

'Secretary Vargas has conveyed to me your message with reference to the promise made by me to President Roosevelt not to exercise any of the powers vested in me by the Emergency Power Act without first advising him of contemplated action. According to Secretary Vargas, this matter came up in connection with the Executive Order I have issued creating the Civilian Emergency Administration. The creation of this body through that Executive Order has been done pursuant to the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board which you and I created after discussing the matter with Admiral Smeallie and Major General Grunert. The recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board have not only received your complete approval but you have personally urged me to act promptly on them. The first of these recommendations is the creation of the Civilian Emergency Administration.

'Considering the broad and extraordinary powers to be exercised by the proposed organization if and when the emergency should arise, I assumed that you knew that I

THE HONORABLE, MANUEL L. QUEZON --

4/4/1941.

could not act favorably on the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board without making use of the powers vested in me by the Emergency Power Act. I also assumed that since you are the representative of the President of the United States in the Philippines you would not ask me to take measures in accordance with the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board unless you knew that the President of the United States was or would be agreeable to the action suggested by you for you were regarding my commitments to President Roosevelt. It is to be observed that until the emergency arises the civilian emergency administration will not exercise any of the powers granted the President by the Emergency Power Act so that as a matter of fact the reference to the said act in my Executive Order is for the present purely technical.

'I desire to make it clear that in my opinion the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines is as much the primary responsibility of the government of the United States as is the military defence of the Islands. Indeed the protection of the civilian population is by the very nature of modern warfare an essential part of the military defenses of the country.

'In gladly assuming (that) the responsibility as far as the resources of the Commonwealth permit it of carrying out the measures recommended by the Civilian Emergency Planning Board for the protection of the civilian population, the Commonwealth Government merely desires to show by deeds our loyalty and our determination to do all we can in support of the United States. But if my action in this respect, instead of being presented in the proper light to the President of the United States is to be interpreted by you as a violation of my commitments to President Roosevelt, then I shall revoke my Executive Order and do nothing in connection with the recommendations of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board.

'I am instructing Secretary Sison not to call a meeting of this Civilian Emergency Administration, or do anything until I hear from you.

'I am sending copy of this letter to Secretary Iakes for his information and that of the President as well as to the successor of Admiral Smeallie and to General Grunert.

'Sincerely yours,


'MANUEL L. QUEZON'".

The Honorable, Harold L. Ickes -- #3

4/4/1941.

There are one or two errors in the text and I am endeavoring to get a repetition from the cable company. I will send you the corrected one at the earliest possible moment. I shall also be at your disposal at any time for whatever personal inquiry you may wish to make in this matter.

Sincerely yours

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. M. Elizalde', written over the typed name below.

J. M. ELIZALDE

Resident Commissioner of the Philippines
to the United States

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

APR 10 1941

MEMORANDUM for the President:

I have received your memorandum of February 10 forwarding the secret recommendations of the Secretaries of War and the Navy submitted to you on January 30 and the comment of the Secretary of the Treasury on these recommendations.

In accordance with your instructions, I have taken this up with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and I submit the following draft of a radiogram to be sent to the United States High Commissioner in lieu of the message proposed by the Secretaries of War and the Navy. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget concurs in this message which does not depart in any essential way from the general tenor of the message proposed by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, but is more informative as to the: (a) measures under consideration by the War and Navy Departments; (b) the use of future appropriations, if any, of sugar excise taxes; (c) method of appropriation, i.e. not a procedure analogous to the present appropriations of the coconut oil excise taxes. It seems desirable to give President Quezon this additional information now. This proposed message would read as follows:

"U.S. High Commissioner
Manila, Philippine Islands.

"Will you please inform President Quezon that his desire to cooperate with the United States in preparing the Philippine Islands for defense, and his suggestions that the necessary expenditures be made from funds collected from sugar excise taxes and moneys that may be due the Philippines as a result of currency devaluation, are gratifying to the Government of the United States.

"The security of the Philippine Islands has been under serious consideration by the War and Navy Departments, and steps are being taken to strengthen their defenses. Certain of the measures contemplated may appropriately be charged to the funds in question and it might be desirable to make any future appropriations available for the same purposes.

"United States military authorities have suggested measures to strengthen and enlarge existing defense installations which facilitate operations and defensive capabilities of the present garrison, and which would include calling the Philippine Army into active service for training under Section 3(a)(2) of the Independence

400 Philippines - High Commissioner

Act. Any installations would eventually become available to the Philippine Government in 1946. Funds would remain in the United States Treasury to be expended under the supervision and control of the appropriate officials of the United States Government.

"Estimates will be prepared in accordance with the foregoing and an appropriation will be sought from the Congress to be expended for the improvement of the defense of the Philippine Islands.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."

I am in complete accord with the general terms of the recommendations outlined in the joint letter of January 30 to make available these authorized appropriations for the improvement of the defenses of the Philippine Islands. I wish to point out, however, that the Philippine Independence Act establishes the United States High Commissioner as your representative in the Islands and provides that he shall be recognized as such by the commanding officers of the military forces of the United States in the Islands. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the High Commissioner is the logical official of this Government to supervise the expenditure of these funds and that the legislation making the funds available should specifically so provide. The High Commissioner is on the ground and would have the benefit of the technical advice of the Commanding General, Philippine Department, United States Army, and the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. As your representative he should be in the best position to coordinate the activities of the Commonwealth Government with the military and naval requirements of this Government. However, the above proposed radiogram does not necessarily commit you to this procedure if it is found later to be impractical.

The United States High Commissioner was advised as to the general position taken by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and this Department, and there has now been received in the Department a message from him (radiogram No. 275), dated April 3, setting forth his further views. A copy of this message is attached.

The above proposed message was drafted after consultation with the Bureau of the Budget ~~but~~ prior to the receipt of this message from the United States High Commissioner; however, I see nothing in his communication which would make this message inappropriate. He seems to be concerned primarily that power to initiate action should be retained by American officials, and recommends that no communication should be sent to the Commonwealth authorities that could be interpreted as an actual or implied commitment by you as to the method of expenditure, use or control of these funds. The proposed message says: "Funds would remain

in the United States Treasury to be expended under the supervision and control of the appropriate officials of the United States Government". The High Commissioner suggests the use of some such phrase: "To be expended by the military and naval authorities of the United States in accordance with the approved recommendations of the Joint Board." The first phrase seems sufficiently clear that control of these funds will be maintained by this Government. I do not think that this question has been studied sufficiently yet to attempt to make this language more specific by reference to a Joint Board such as contemplated by the High Commissioner. Such a Board might be desirable, but at first glance it looks involved and would give only nominal participation to representatives of the Commonwealth Government. You may wish to amend the proposed message by eliminating the reference to future appropriations, but as written it commits you in no way on that point.

I am firmly convinced that it is desirable to retain control in our hands, but to the fullest possible extent permit participation by representatives of the Commonwealth Government; but to do this and secure the cooperation of the Commonwealth officials will require delicate handling.

The recommendations of the High Commissioner will be helpful in working out final details of this matter, but in view of the long period of time which has elapsed since this question was first raised I believe that President Quesen is entitled now to a statement as to what he may reasonably expect. I think the proposed message clearly sets forth a sound general policy and goes into as much detail as is advisable at this time.

If you approve transmission of this radiogram, it is suggested that you return it to this Department to be sent in cipher.

HAROLD I. JONES
Secretary of the Interior.

x6

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 11, 1941.

Approved:

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received April 4, 1941.
(Manila, P. I.)

deb

EMERSON.

Interior Department.

Washington.

April 3—No. 275.

Your ordinary mail letter February 19 concerning sugar excise and dollar devaluation funds received March 29. Appreciate your informing me as to proposed action and your solicitude as to position of High Commissioner.

With regard to substance of proposed action see my radio to you No. 548, August 6, 1940. If President decides to recommend to Congress that it appropriate funds covering sugar excise taxes under Sugar Act of 1937 and dollar devaluation under Act of June 19, 1934, to be devoted to the military defense of the Philippines, I should like to urge following considerations:

1. The Commonwealth Government is responsible for the "passive defense" of civilians in the Philippines, namely the organization of adequate measures for civilian welfare and protection such as insuring adequate supplies of food stuffs and fuel, preparing shelters and protection against air raids, strengthening and training the Constabulary, organizing a home guard and the like. The United States Government is responsible for the "active defense" of the Philippines up to 1946. Therefore, since power should go with responsibility, United States Army and Navy should have full power to determine the ways and means of such active defense and to control expenditures therefore.

2. It is clear that Philippine defense is not something separate and apart from general defense of the United States. Philippine defense is an intimate part of and should be closely coordinated with United States general defense.

3. Therefore, the absolute control of expenditures for "active defense" of Philippines should be in the hands of those responsible for general defense of the United States, namely United States Army and Navy authorities. It is not sufficient that they have power merely to approve expenditures proposed or initiated by others.

4. It would be particularly unfortunate to limit American control to approval of measures and of appropriations initiated by the Commonwealth Government, as this might easily prevent the United States military authorities from effectively planning in advance for defense of Commonwealth or from a necessary coordination of policy. While the phrase "under the supervision and control * * *" as used in proposed message from President Roosevelt to President Quezon seems less objectionable than the phrase "with the approval of * * *" the former phraseology seems not sufficiently exact and might give rise to argumentation and possible friction between United States Military and Naval authorities and Commonwealth Government to the possible detriment of a coherent plan for defense. It would [2] seem preferable to use some such phrase as "to be expected by the Military and Naval authorities of the United States in accordance with the approved recommendations of the Joint Board" mentioned below.

5. However, I believe that the Commonwealth Government should have a part and be asked to collaborate in the formulation of plans for the expenditure of these funds as considered most beneficial to Philippine defense. Such collaboration might take the form of a Joint Board to recommend the purposes and projects in order of priority for the expenditure of funds, such Board to be composed of representatives of the United States Army, of the United States Navy, of the High Commissioner, and of the Commonwealth Government. It would seem a logical function of High Commissioner to attempt to reconcile opposing views and to coordinate action. It should be provided, however, that in case of possible disagreement in Board's conclusions, the representatives of the United States Army and Navy should have the power to cast the deciding vote. All procurement of materials and personal services and all disbursements should be effected by the United States Army or Navy. The recommendations of Joint Board in Manila when approved or acted upon by the Commanding General of Philippine Department and Commandant of Sixteenth Naval District to be referred to War and Navy Departments in Washington for final action.

6. In order to avoid unnecessary friction or delay appropriations should be made directly to the United States Army and Navy with some such provision as above for collaboration by Commonwealth Government.

7. Until legislation is actually passed I recommend that no communication to Commonwealth authorities and no release in Washington should be made that could be interpreted as an actual or implied commitment by the President of the United States as to the method of expenditure, use or control of these funds.

8. If any communication is sent from the President of United States for President Quezon, it should be addressed to the United States High Commissioner as recommended specifically by the Secretary of the Interior. In communications between officials of the United States and Commonwealth Governments it will avoid embarrassment and facilitate our efforts if the following opening form is used:

"Please inform President Quezon (or even better, The Commonwealth Government)".

9. The legislation making appropriations of sugar excise funds should presumably not apply to future collections and should provide that the appropriations made do not imply any obligation to appropriate future collections or future dollar devaluation funds. (End tabulation.)

Nothing in foregoing should be considered as disapproval on my part of desirable expenditures for training, equipment or extension of Philippine army or for improvement and extension of fixed fortifications which might eventually become the property of an independent Philippines, provided [3] that such expenditures are deemed desirable by military authorities of the United States.

I have discussed whole problem with Commanding General of Philippine Department and with Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. The conclusions and recommendations here set forth are theirs as well as mine.

I have as yet seen no text of proposed legislation. If and when this is formulated I should appreciate text being transmitted by radio and my being given opportunity to comment on it before its submission to Congress.

Please furnish copies of this radio to the President and the Secretaries of War, Navy and State.

SAYRE.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 15, 1941

Memorandum for the President

Honorable Cordell Hull
Admiral Emory S. Land
Honorable Harry Hopkins

May I advise, as a matter of information, that Frank Kluckhohn of the New York Times Washington Staff, gives me the following statement:

"The Domei official Japanese correspondent tells me that the Japanese intend to halt and delay for a month American merchant ships on their way to the Red Sea."

S. T. E.

4/15/41

Memo for the files.

Return to Admiral Stark his Secret memo to FDR 3/28/41 enclosing copy of let to him from Admiral Thomas Hart 4/4/41 re situation at Manila, P. I.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, May 1, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am returning to you herewith the memorandum, with enclosures, transmitted to you under date of April 28 by the Secretary of the Navy which you were good enough to send me for my information with your memorandum of April 30. I have given it to Murphy to read. The latter should be in Casablanca Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

Admiral Pratt's memorandum in particular has been most helpful to me.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLS.

Enc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1941.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNITED SECRETARY OF STATE

Please read and return.

You may want to see Bob Murphy.

E. J. B.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 30, 1941.

Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State.

Please read and return. You can show it to Bob Murphy.

F. D. R.

Memorandum from Admiral Pratt to the Secretary of the Navy and another memorandum from Joseph B. Phillips, the Foreign Editor of Newsweek.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, April 28, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

I am enclosing herewith a couple of papers which you might find interesting reading. One is by Admiral Pratt and the other by Joseph B. Phillips, the Foreign Editor of Newsweek. I know in what high esteem you hold Admiral Pratt and I found them both very interesting.

F. K.

Enclosures—2

MEMO FOR ADMIRAL PRATT

(1)—The need to protect our flank in the South Atlantic is pressing. Sierra Leone is the best base. In addition however there are numerous smaller islands in this region, which are worth consideration. Two weeks ago Newsweek had a story, based on a report by a French geographer, saying that Germany had established bases and stored fuel on some small islands off Bathurst. Nothing has been heard of this so far in the war. In addition I would like to point out that in my opinion, the French situation is deteriorating rapidly. The immediate German purpose may be to secure the French fleet and North Africa, but the influence will certainly extend to Dakar, and possibly to the Cameroons, and the present Free French Equatorial Africa. Contrary to the opinion often expressed, I am doubtful that the policy of the Petain Government, will be guided by French public opinion. The hold of Germany is too strong. There are too many men ambitious of power around Petain, or such as Laval. Consequently I submit that your memorandum might include a suggestion that within the immediate future, every possible pressure should be brought on France, through such things as the food question, and publicizing our own armaments effort and our determination to prevent a British defeat, to forestall a German success in France. To this end propaganda for the French public will do some good, but not enough. The important thing is to impress a few individuals, such as Admiral Darlan and General Huntzinger. I have recently heard you express an opinion on General Weygand with which I concur, nevertheless he is important in Africa, and I think it would be well to be certain that someone in our consular or diplomatic service has access to him with the ability to exert the desired pressure. To express a purely personal opinion, I believe that the next big break will come in France. Even such a thing as an American effort to secure the release of cer- [2] tain French war prisoners—say those needed for the Spring planting and harvest—while it would probably be fruitless, nevertheless would create a favorable impression.

While Sierra Leone would serve us well and could be acquired from Britain, nevertheless I feel that the acquisition of Dakar would make a much greater impression upon Europe. I do not have enough military information on the situation there to know whether this is possible. If it is say, by a landing of marines, I would consider it an important step to convince both Europe and South America of our determination.

(2)—You and I have recently heard some interesting but uninformed discussions of our possible influence in the acquisition of Irish Bases. I have no special information on this subject, but would like to make the following suggestions—First that the influence we can exert on this problem must be secondary to the English-Irish problem. Second that one definite contribution we can make is to analyze Irish-American opinion in this country and to influence it as much as possible. Although my contact with these political groups is too slight to be of much use, it had been enough to give me the opinion that a serious study of such groups would be worth the while of the State Department or of the Navy Department. The divisions in Ireland are reflected here, and I have myself been present at meetings of persons who were con-

tributing to the Irish Republican Army. My impression is that most Irishmen in the United States, are anti-English, and I feel that many of them have been influenced by such organizations as the Silver Shirts and Father Coughlins followers. This however is only a suggestion that a more serious study should be made of these groups, with the idea that they cannot be influenced unless they feel that the final peace settlement is to be determined more by the United States [3] than by Britain.

(3)—As regards our position in the Far East, it definitely is not my opinion that we are doing enough if we merely leave Japan a way out from the Axis alliance by such devices as convoying ships defensively to the limit of the Neutrality zone. Japan is a nation on the prowl without resources and anxious for whatever she can get. The keys here are primarily Russia, and secondarily a bold front on our part and that of the British. This is true because for several years Japan has feared Russia more than it has us or Britain. I am of the opinion that unless we act immediately—Russia will sell out China and force Chiang-Kai-shek to make a peace with Japan. Everything in Chiangs past record points to the probability that he will consent to this. You know there is a very serious division in the Japanese government over the Axis alliance, and that it has been accented by the new neutrality treaty with Russia, because there are a number of Japanese of influence who still think their main enemy is Russia. Consequently I have two suggestions to make, First that the State Department, and also Navy men, who often have more effective contacts with the Japanese should impress upon them that we are as determined to keep up our aid to China as we are to Britain, and second that we should make a very special effort to impress Russia. As you know I am of the opinion that this physically weak power is pursuing a policy designed to secure a compromise peace in Europe and in Asia, or a German or Japanese victory after an exhausting war. Nevertheless from first hand experience I am convinced that the primary objective of the Stalin regime is to survive among a growing host of enemies. I have what I consider to be reliable information that Germany has promised survival to this regime, which naturally has great influence in the Kremlin. It is within the bounds of possibility that [4] that Russia can force China to make peace with Japan, thereby freeing Japan for an attack on ourselves and British interests in the Far East—To offset this we can take three lines of action—1—as said above impress Russia that our aid to China will continue regardless of events in Europe—2—Make it clear to Russia that we are interested in the war in the Balkans and North Africa, and that we are anxious to prevent a German domination of the Straits of the Dardanelles which is a matter of old and vital interest to Russia, in spite of all the present talk about a possible substitute outlet through the Persian Gulf, and—3—to make every effort to impress Russia by our industrial war effort. This country for a variety of reasons, is more apt then any other to be impressed by the figures on the American war industrial effort. From two conferences which you and I have attended recently, I have the impression that the extent of this effort has not been fully publicized. Moreover it is to the advantage of Russian policy at the moment to encourage this effort and to lessen sabotage. This war is a struggle for power, in which ideologies are only the instrument of power groups, and I see no reason why given our true position in the world we should not be capable of playing upon the obvious weaknesses of both Russia and Japan to emasculate the danger to ourselves in the Pacific.

(4)—As regards the specific recommendations in your memorandum, I have only two suggestions to make—(a)—that the headquarters of a joint American-British strategy board might better be in Canada than in Washington—(b)—that such a Board should have its own press relations bureau, quite separate from the notoriously inadequate Ministry of Information in London, and that in the selection of such an organization the British Dominions and ourselves should have more weight than the British.

[5] Note—As an eddenda, I submit that all my information as a Foreign News Editor, is to the effect that in the case of defeat, the remnants of the British Fleet would be quite as apt to retreat to Singapore as to Canada.

JOSEPH B. PHILLIPS

MEMO ON SIERRA LEONE

We should have a base at Freetown on the south side of the Sierra Leone river. It is a British possession, having an excellent harbor, with an anchorage

space over 9 miles long and 1 mile wide, for ships of the deepest draught. It is protected from the seas on the north, by shoals extending well to seaward, over which heavy seas break, and by low flat land. There are Government docks at which ships drawing 30 feet of water could berth, discharge, and take on cargo. There is a nice little town with churches, hospitals, barracks, and a sanatorium in the hills. It should be reasonably cool and healthy, for it is open to the breezes from the north and west, and some of the quarters and barracks are in the hills.

It could not be attacked from the north, for the land on the north side is low and open to gunfire, and the flats extend well to seaward. The sea guards it on the west, and the river extends into the interior on the east. On the south it is protected by a series of hills and knolls, ranging from over 2,500 feet down, beginning about four and a half miles from the town and almost surrounding it. Any attack from the south would have to storm these hills and take them, before entry to the harbor could be made. It lies 450 miles south of Dakar, 2,760 miles from our base at Trinidad, and is 1590 miles from the nearest point in South America, approximately the same distance that Dakar is. It is a better spot for a base than Bathurst on the Cambia river, also a British holding, though Bathurst is nearer Dakar being 120 miles away.

IRISH BASES

The best bases to secure and use in Ireland would probably be, if such a move is practicable—Cobh-Lough Swilly-Berehaven in Bantry Bar. Berehaven was used as a destroyer base in the last war. It covers the air and sea approaches from the west and south—Cobh is the natural port [2] for the discharge of cargo—Lough Swilly is an extensive bay on the north coast of Ireland. It is the sea approach to Londonderry. A base in this vicinity would cover the northern and western approaches to Scotland and the Irish sea.

POINTS SUGGESTED FOR CONSIDERATION

Since the Lend Lease Bill has given the authority, and the \$7,000,000.00 the power to start the wheels of production rolling, the most important factors to consider in the Aid to Britain program, are (a)—systematic and efficient planning between ourselves and Great Britain, and (b)—efficient and quick action in the matter of getting our production in the safest way to the localities where Britain can best use it. The need of speedy action in the case of—(b)—is evident since the successful solution of the Campaign of the Atlantic, is the most serious problem facing Britain now, and during the summer months, and transport across the sea is the weakest link in our aid to Britain scheme. In attacking this problem of shipping, there are two points to consider—(c)—the replacement of tonnage sunk, by the most rapid methods of construction, regardless of the size of the carriers—(d)—the safe transit of ships and their cargoes, with a minimum of loss, irrespective of any particular method by which ships cross the seas. In other words speed in transit and a reasonable degree of security are the key notes. If we attempt to safeguard shipping by escort, our own political position at home has to be considered, and the risk of involvement of a war in two oceans. Yet if we are not willing to assume some of the risks of defending the shipments regardless of what ships carry them, we might as well throw our money down the sink, and Britain may fall. If she does the logical spot for the British Government to move to is Canada, though the fleet might move to Singapore. Then we are in the war, for it has very definitely reached the Western Hemisphere, for we have defense commitments with Canada which we cannot [3] dodge. It would seem to be wiser policy to attempt to confine the fighting to Europe than have it come over here. A risk of our involvement in war, which is confined to sea and long range air activity, is a minimum risk, compared to what we would probably face if Britain fell. If the steps we take are in defense of our own rights as we view them, and we escort cargoes for the present no further than 30 degrees west longitude, which is within the limits of the western hemisphere, this might give Japan an out, in that the real aggressor might be termed the one who fired the first gun or torpedo, and Japan might be glad of an excuse not to go to war with us.

In general, in the matter of our sea and air aid to Britain, there are three courses we may pursue—(e)—we may turn over to Britain all the sea and air craft she needs, and which are at our disposal, with the promise of having them returned later. In the matter of aircraft, this presents no operational diffi-

culties, and the speed up in our own production should give us a good safety margin, in case we had to look more closely to our own defense needs. The case of our war craft is different, though the difficulties attendant to turning over regular men of war, does not apply to smaller craft, such as Coast Guard ships—yachts—patrol boats—tugs—mine sweepers. If we turn over too many men of war at one time, there is the problem for Britain to find trained crews to man them—there is a training period for British crews to learn how to run them without breakdowns—and there is the matter of additions and changes in material to make our ships fit to war specifications. Away from gunfire and air attack we should be able to make a better and quicker job of it—(f)—there is the course of conduct where we hold fast to all our sea and air craft, expecting to use them later. This is a negative effort, productive of no aid to Britain, and extremely wasteful of time—(g)—there is the com- [4] promise plan and this seems to me to be the one offering the most promise. This plan would be to turn over to Britain, all the sea and air craft she could use immediately, and which we could spare, having in mind our Pacific committment, and that we should start convoy immediately.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

(1)—That a Board be appointed, composed of competent British and American naval and military men, to study the war, plan a joint strategy and determine upon the proper tactics for its execution, if and when the time comes, that joint action is required. The seat of this Board would best be in Washington—(possibly Canada)—removed from the center of strife, where quiet thinking is possible, with all information given it.

(2)—That steps be taken toward locating suitable bases in Labrador and Greenland, for the purpose of establishing across the narrow waters separating them, direct air flights for all types of planes, from the U. S. to Newfoundland—Newfoundland to Labrador—Labrador to Greenland—Greenland to Iceland—Iceland to the British Isles.

(3)—That steps toward the acquirement of temporary bases in Ireland and Sierra Leone be started.

(4)—That direct sailings between our own ports and the Res sea be started. Turkey the key spot in the Eastern Mediterranean has not given in yet, and if she fights, air power—(the lack of which was one of the main reasons Greece fell)—in quantity will be needed. Our ships not to be convoyed on this route, by ourselves or the British. Nor should we endeavor to protect them yet on this route against raiders. The effort to do this would cause a dispersal of our naval force more urgently needed elsewhere now. If raiders sink or capture one this is an act of aggression.

[5] (5)—Turn over to the British, exclusive of the needs of the Pacific fleet, all sea and air craft they can use immediately, and which we will not need in the convoys we escort. This is a practical measure since every war craft and aircraft we so turn over, goes into full war use immediately, while those we retain will not get into full war use until we get into the war.

(6)—Since British shipping is much tied up, if quick plane deliveries, are needed to West Coast African ports, in order to be flown to North Africa for immediate use, make the deliveries in our own fast ships, by direct sailings to West Coast African ports.

(7)—Fit out immediately more ships of the C-type, similar to the one now being fitted out—that is the convoy, cargo aircraft carrier type.

(8)—Since the rapid transit of cargo is more efficient by direct sailings than by convoy, the principle should be established, that each individual cargo carrier, as far as practicable should be made as immune to the submarine and aircraft as possible. In new construction this would put a limit on size, and the account on speed, both in construction and in transit. Older ships of slow speed must be escorted in convoy, and all means of defense used, even with the autogyro and blimp if it is found possible to use them.

(9)—That ships of 15 knots and over should not go in convoy.

(10)—That slow ships of 10 knots and under, should go in convoy.

(11)—That between 10 and 15 knots discretion should be used whether to send ships in convoy or not.

(12)—That convoys should be small.

(13)—That the Neutrality Zone be extended to 30 degrees longitude west, which is within the limits of the western hemisphere.

(14)—That we start to escort convoys to longitude 30 degrees west, and then turn them over to the British.

[6] (15)—That as soon as practicable, we start an air patrol, by sea planes, conducted from those bases we have acquired or may acquire, which from their location in the Atlantic can give shipping important information.

(16)—That the convoys we escort may be composed of ships of all nationalities, and form in our ports.

(17)—That when British war craft enter our ports for repair, the matter is taken under consideration, can we swap for the time being, an undamaged ship of the same type for the one damaged. If not then train the crews of the damaged ships, so that in time they can handle one of our own without much further training.

(18)—That as our heavier battleships come along, they go to the Pacific, to relieve one or two of the older battleships, which may then be put in the Atlantic service as deemed advisable.

(19)—Should it develop later that we become an active belligerent and found that in turning over too many of our warships and aircraft, while as a non belligerent, we have stripped ourselves of the means to conduct a joint war efficiently, we have an agreement with the British that such of our air craft as we had loaned, be returned, or that a new realignment of forces, their distribution and operational tasks be assigned, in order to conduct efficiently the joint war, in whatever world areas war operations are conducted.

(20)—That as soon as we decide to convoy, even to long. 30, a state of National Emergency be declared.

(21)—That when a State of National Emergency is declared, or before steps be taken to insure the safety of our merchant ships against acts of sabotage, or those inimical to our interests.

(22)—If the present political crisis in Australia, leads to a diminution of their active aid to Britain, for their own defense purposes [7] we may have to exert more pressure on Australia, to reassure them of our active support, in case their island is threatened by a southern Japanese move.

W. V. PRATT

Memo—April 30—41

Report of a very interesting conversation, I had with the Japanese Ambassador on April 28—The interview was private—held in the Hotel Plaza—He and I were the only ones present during the entire interview—it was held at his request, and lasted two and a half hours. In the main the conversation was general, but always stuck to the main theme—the war—However, there were certain definite statements, Nomura made, to wit—that Japan definitely wanted a peace with China—would ask no indemnities—did not desire the military occupation of China—that now, though at first military occupation had been a purpose, this idea had been given up, by most of the influential leaders—including most of the higher military men—nearly all of the naval men—and as I gathered by practically all of the leading business and financial heads—What opposition existed rested entirely in the younger group—that Japan's aim vis-a-vis China was the rehabilitation along economic lines of China and Japan in order to create a stable economic situation through which both Countries would profit, along the lines of cooperation.

With regard to the southward expansion—Japan's aims there were in line with the policy adopted in China—that a military move directed at Singapore and the Dutch East Indies was not intended, but economic stability, and a free flow of trade in which Japan could participate—and I gathered on equal and not on preferential terms—He distinctly did not want war to creep into the Pacific—and I gathered this was the general sentiment in Japan—as it would tend to disturb Japan's policy of economic rehabilitation and stability in the Orient. In spite of the Russo-Japanese agreement, the great fear is and will continue to be Russia—not that they fear Russia in a military sense [2]—but that in a long war, with Britain and Germany exhausted—Stalin would be the only winner—then Communist influence would dominate the Orient, much to Japan's undoing—that he, and I judged most of Japan's informed military authority regarded Russia as a weak country, with Stalin under the thumb of Berlin—that Russia was not sincere and could not be trusted.

Nomura stated that of all foreigners in his country the Americans were the best liked.

He stated that the capitalist group in Japan were distinctly opposed to the Axis economic system—that Japan's system was the growth of one patterned after ours and that of Britain, and that the supremacy of the Nazi system would distinctly disrupt their own, and as I gathered would interfere much with Japan's economic policy in the Orient, as it was fundamentally different from the one Japan visualized.

The immediate purpose of the discussion with me, was in connection with a visit he hoped Matsuoka would be able to make to this country in the near future—When Matsuoka went to Berlin—he, Nomura had cabled him, asking that he return via the United States—Matsuoka could not do it then, as he had to complete arrangements with Russia—I gathered that the feeling was, if an atmosphere was created in this country, which was not hostile to him, since Japan was an Axis partner, that he, Matsuoka, might be glad to come to this country to talk things over.

I told Nomura then, if the suspicion was aroused in this country that Matsuoka came as an Axis agent prepared to spread the Nazi doctrine of a conqueror's peace, it would in my opinion be futile, and would only result in a greater antagonism in this country, for we would feel then that Japan had been sold lock, stock [3] and barrel to the Nazis—But that if Matsuoka came with the purpose of establishing friendly relations with this country on the basis of limiting the war to Europe—establishing a condition of peace in the Orient, not to be broken by further military conquests there, and keeping the peace so that war could not spread to the Orient, there might be a possibility—I was not a statesman, nor in a position to make statement which carry any weight, but it was my opinion that the one successful approach to this country, and the only one giving any promise might be along the lines I suggested.

I asked him about Matsuoka, stating that I heard he was in sentiment hostile to this country—The Ambassadors reply was to this effect—That Matsuoka must not be judged entirely by what he says—that he is a disciple of the American political method of saying a great many things to see their effect—but what he has in his heart may be quite another matter.

I gathered, however, from the whole conversation, that there was a growing fear in Japan, that ultimately, if the Axis were the victors Japan might have to fear Hitler, about as much as they do Stalin—that he, Nomura, looks forward to a long war, and in the end he did not see how Hitler could prevail over Britain and the United States with their great reserve power.

This represents the gist of the conversation.

W. V. PRATT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 6, 1941.

Confidential
Memorandum for the Secretary of State

Will you speak to me about this?

F. D. R.

Letter from The United States High Commissioner giving a report on the Philippines, dated April 23, 1941.

file

400
Philippines



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

MAY - 7 1941

The President,

The White House. MAY 8 9 3. AM '41

My dear Mr. President:

RECEIVED

In connection with a message which you authorized to be sent on April 12, through the United States High Commissioner to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, with regard to the appropriation of certain funds for defense purposes in the Philippines, I enclose a copy of a radiogram which has been received from the United States High Commissioner containing a further message for you from Mr. Quezon on this subject.

1355
x119

This correspondence and other information indicate a difference of opinion between Mr. Sayre and Mr. Quezon on this question. Mr. Sayre believes that all of this \$52,000,000 should be used for direct military and naval purposes and that expenditures for civilian welfare and protection should be borne by the Commonwealth Government from other funds, having in mind the coconut oil excise tax funds now being collected in the United States and credited to the Commonwealth Government at the rate of approximately \$17,000,000 annually.

x137

Mr. Quezon is on record as stating that he believes that the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines is as much the primary responsibility of this Government as the military defense of the Islands. He desires to use the coconut oil taxes for other purposes and therefore requests that \$15,000,000 of these additional funds be set aside for civilian defense.

From 1934 to March 1, 1941, approximately \$110,000,000 have accrued to the credit of the Philippine Government as a result of the coconut oil taxes. When it is considered that these extraordinary receipts annually approximate one-third of the revenues from ordinary sources, it is perhaps not unreasonable to feel that a part at least of such revenues might be used in the present emergency as suggested by the High Commissioner. He intimates that you might make such a suggestion. However, the Commonwealth authorities have under consideration the expenditure of a part of the coconut oil money for the purpose of increasing the Philippine Constabulary and the construction of an airport. I doubt the advisability, until we know how far they are prepared to go voluntarily, of attempting to put more pressure on them at this time.

400 Philippines High Commissioner
249 Official

Inasmuch as I understand that estimates for the appropriation of this money are to be prepared by the War and Navy Departments, I am sending copies of all this correspondence to the Secretaries of War and the Navy for their information. Until their recommendations are received, therefore, I do not believe that any further action is necessary. 12
18

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior.

Enclosures.

X6

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received April 5, 1941.
(Manila, P. I.)

deb

EMERSON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
April 5 - No. 285.

Commonwealth proposes to include in fiscal year 1942 Budget of coconut oil excise tax fund items for Constabulary and Manila Air Port. United States Army would like to see both approved as aid to defense. Our Civilian Emergency Planning Board has strongly recommended that Philippine Constabulary should be strengthened as a measure of civilian defense. See copy of report of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board forwarded you on March 26, 1941 by air express. Would appreciate views of Interior as to whether these items conform to requirements Section 6 Public No. 300, 76th Congress. In view of suggestion by Commonwealth to use coconut oil funds for strengthening Constabulary it is evident Commonwealth considers Section 6 broad enough to include National Defense items. This view was expressed by Secretary Finance Roxas last year. My Legal Adviser is of opinion these funds can be used for National Defense items including civilian defense measures, basing his opinion upon assumption word "and" used in a disjunctive sense in Section 6 of Act August 7, 1939 requiring funds to be used for "meeting new or additional expenditures which will be necessary in adjusting Philippine economy to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States and in preparing the Philippines for the assumption of responsibilities of an independent state." In this connection see also page 13 mimeographed undated strictly confidential memorandum entitled "Drafts of Proposed Legislation to Effectuate the Report of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs" transmitted by letter December 23, 1938 from me as Assistant Secretary of State to High Commissioner Mott. In view of possible emergency it is highly desirable that coconut oil funds be available for both active military defense and passive civilian defense. See my No. 275, April 3, 1941. Commonwealth is desirous of presenting as soon as possible Budget to Assembly which adjourns its regular session on May 22, 1941. Please expedite reply.

SAYRE.

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received April 23, 1941. deb
(Manila, P. I.)

EMERSON.

Interior Department.
Washington.
April 22 - No. 314.

Confidential for the President. In letter dated April 21, 1941, President Quezon requests me to forward following radio to you:

"In reference to your contemplated action of asking Congress to appropriate the funds collected from excise tax on sugar as well as the funds authorized from the gold devaluation for the defense of the Philippines as requested by me, I recommend that you include the setting aside of \$15,000,000.00 for the carrying out of the civilian defense plans and \$5,000,000.00 for the construction of a proposed dry dock in Manila harbor, plans for which the Navy Department is familiar with." <

x655

In considering this recommendation you will doubtless wish to secure the opinion of War and Navy Departments as to question of whether entire sum derived from both sugar excise tax and dollar devaluation funds of approximately \$52,000,000.00 is more than sufficient for expenditures necessary for "active" military defense of Philippines. If entire sum of \$52,000,000.00 is necessary for "active defense" you may wish to consider possibility of allowing Commonwealth Government to use coconut oil excise tax funds to supplement other Commonwealth funds available for financing cost of "passive" civilian defense, as recommended in my radio No. 285 of April 5 to Interior. Also see my confidential radio to Emerson No. 275 of April 3, 1941 regarding responsibilities of United States and Commonwealth Governments with respect to defense and pointing out distinction between "active" and "passive" defense.

SAYRE.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Confidential*

May 14, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE:

For your information and
return.

F. D. R.

*Given attention
CH*

State

2-1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Clarence Dillon, of Dillon and Reid, 'phoned the following:

"The Japanese have in this country two insurance companies, one of which is the Standard Insurance Company of New York, an excellent little company doing a good business. Mr. McCain of my office happens to be on the board of these companies, and has been for a good many years.

"The Japanese were over here last December exploring the possibility of selling the companies, or something, and to see what the situation was. The other day we got a cable from them asking if we could arrange for the sale of these companies in sixty days. Then, a few days later, their manager over here asked us if we could make them an immediate bid: so we spoke to the Aetna in Hartford, and we cabled them on Friday, making them a bid, and a very low bid for immediate reply. We got a cable from them this morning, accepting the offer.

"I thought that this might be of real interest to the President, as it looks like the Japanese are selling out their assets over here in a hurry. We had purposely cabled them a low offer for immediate acceptance, to see what would happen, and they accepted immediately.

"If the President wants any details on this, McCain can be in Washington today to give details to anybody designated."

E?M.W.

B. I. State
European War

CH,
OK *Send it*
F.D.R.

Original to
State
5/14/41

May 10, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I return herewith a radiogram of April 2, 1941 from the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines in which he communicates, with his approval, a recommendation by Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, that a proclamation be issued declaring that "all interior waters of the Philippines and passages thereto, including the Sulu Sea, constitute territorial waters under United States jurisdiction and in which full enforcement of United States neutrality is undertaken". The Admiral's recommendation is based particularly on his desire "to be in a position to prevent any belligerent fleet from entering the Sulu Sea with the ostensible or real purpose of attacking the Netherlands Indies in the event of belligerency involving them".

W.C.

The

The President,

the White House.

43-60
Philippines
Philippines - High Commissioner

-8-

The Admiral's recommendation has been the subject of discussions with officers of the Navy Department and this Department is informally advised that the Navy Department does not consider it advisable to approve the recommendation. Aside from the question of policy, this Department is convinced that any claim by this Government to territorial jurisdiction over the Sulu Sea would not be tenable. It would be strongly opposed by other governments, particularly by those interested in the navigation of the Sulu Sea, and would constitute a precedent which might prove to be very embarrassing.

Moreover, it is not necessary for this Government to claim territorial jurisdiction over the Sulu Sea in order to prevent its use in any manner which might be deemed inimical to the safety of the United States.

I suggest for your consideration the following draft of a reply to Commissioner Sayre:

JK (

For the High Commissioner from the President. Your 120, April first, 9 a.m. For various reasons I do not feel that we should assert jurisdiction. This decision would not, of course, preclude us from taking such measures as may be necessary and appropriate to safeguard our interests.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL *CD*

x 18
x 1561
- L. F. State

Enclosure:
Radiogram of
April 1, 1941
from the U.S. High
Commissioner to
the Philippines.

x 246
x 99

Telegrams must be
 immediately prepared to
 be sent being communicated
 to my office. (S)

Mobile

Dated April 1, 1941

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

120, April 1, 9 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander in Chief

United States Asiatic Fleet, referring to the
 Neutrality Act of 1939, Section 16, Executive Order
 7233 and Proclamation 2342, both September 5, 1939,
 recommends that it be proclaimed that all interior
 water of Philippines and passages thereto, including
 the Sulu Sea, constitute territorial waters under
 United States jurisdiction and in which full enforce-
 ment of United States neutrality is undertaken. The
 presence of vessels of foreign belligerents in such
 waters obviously would constitute a danger to the
 safety of the Philippines and no vessels should be
 permitted to enter such waters which would not be
 permitted to enter other United States territorial
 waters. The Admiral desires particularly to be in
 position to prevent any belligerent fleet from
 operating the Sulu Sea with the assistance or moral
 support

- 2 - 120, April 1, 9 a.m. from Manila.

purpose of attacking the Netherlands Indies in the event of belligerency involving them. In view of practical exigencies of the situation here I concur in Admiral Hart's recommendation and consider it feasible under general principle of international law as applied under present world conditions to such waters. Please immediately bring matter to the attention of the President.

SAYRE

GW

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE SECRETARY,
May 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter from the High Commissioner, dated April 23, 1941, which you sent me with your memorandum of May 6, has been read with much interest and I appreciate the opportunity of reading it. For your consideration I suggest a reply somewhat along the following lines:

"Your letter of April 23, 1941 has just reached me and the several items of information given in it, as well as your comments, are found illuminating and useful.

"It is gratifying to learn that you are working in such close harmony with General Grunert, Admiral Hart and Admiral Bemis; also, that the strengthening of our armed forces in the Philippines has resulted in a more satisfactory trend in Filipino public opinion.

"Your comments upon the health of President Quezon and the consequent increase in his irascibility are very interesting. I am sure that in view of this tendency on his part you have kept [2] in mind the importance of exercising even more than usual tact in all of your relations with him. I am fully aware that in the tense atmosphere of the present situation it is not easy to collaborate without misunderstandings with a man of his proud and sensitive nature who is in a weakened condition consequent upon his illness, and that you will find it necessary to be more than ordinarily patient as well as wise. I am counting upon you to exercise just such wisdom, patience and tact, since the maintenance of harmonious relations is essential to obtaining the maximum degree of cooperation.

"Your remarks as to your desire to continue in the High Commissionership for not more than another year, and in regard to the various rumors which have reached Manila as to your replacement, have been given my careful attention. Since I have no ideas as to making any change at the present time, you should not permit yourself to be disturbed by rumors and press comments. I am carefully considering your suggestion that some statement be made in a press conference. Your desire to be relieved after another year will also be kept in mind."

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, Baguio, April 23, 1941.

Via Airmail
Personal and confidential
BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN M. WATSON,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Will you be good enough to see that the President is given personally the enclosed very confidential letter which is for his eyes alone? I shall greatly appreciate your kindness.

What a tragic world this is becoming! I often wonder how the President and all of you in the White House can keep up the pace. I do hope that his health continues good.

With warmest personal wishes, believe me,
Ever sincerely yours,

FRANCIS B. SAYRE.

Enclosure.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, Baguio, April 23, 1941.

Via airmail
Personal and confidential
The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have not written you for some time because I realize the tremendous burdens which you are carrying and do not want to bother you with too frequent letters. However, the trend of affairs in the Far East at this time would seem to call for a brief report from the Philippines.

President Quezon has recently recovered from what seemed at one time a very serious illness—a recurrence of lung trouble. There was a period when he saw almost no one. He is now in the summer capital at Baguio and still moves about in a wheel chair; but when I talked with him a few days ago he seemed in good spirits and looked quite well. He told me that the spot on his lung had completely healed.

His illness has not improved his irascibility. Fortunately this irascibility has not led to any further public utterances criticizing the High Commissioner, but I am more or less prepared for such an eventuality as President Quezon bitterly resents any opposition or difference of opinion and, in the natural course of events, such differences are bound to arise unless the High Commissioner makes himself entirely subservient to President Quezon's desires.

We were delighted to see Mr. Currie who stopped over here on his way to Chungking and again on his way back. I found him keen and intelligent and I was glad of the chance to talk with him and give him a picture of our situation here. I hope that he has had an opportunity to discuss with you some of the difficulties which confront us.

Last month we had another interesting visitor, Mr. van Kleffens, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, whom I had known some fifteen years before at The Hague, Mr. van [2] Kleffens spoke with delight of his talk with you in Washington. It chanced that the British Air Marshal from Singapore, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, was passing through Manila at the same time. Naturally we all talked together although, as you know, there was nothing whatever official in our joint talks. The newspapers as usual made much of our conferences. Perhaps the news of our joint meeting, exaggerated as it was, had a not unhealthy effect upon opinion in the Far East.

For the past several months I have been wrestling with defense problems. I have been working in the closest cooperation with General Grunert, Admiral Hart and Admiral Bemis. Frequent conferences have established close coordination in our various fields of work. Our country is fortunate to have at this time men of such outstanding good judgment and ability in their field as they. All of us here feel glad that you have decided to recommend to Congress the appropriation of the sugar excise taxes and dollar devaluation funds for Philippine defense.

I have been doing my best to urge and stimulate the Commonwealth Government to build up civilian defense. Last October, with President Quezon's cooperation, I organized a joint committee composed of both Americans and Filipinos to study the problem of civilian defense and make concrete recommendations. The committee rendered an excellent report covering such matters as strengthening the Constabulary, building up home guard units, securing adequate supplies of food and fuel, building air-raid shelters, and the like. I urged President Quezon and the Commonwealth authorities vigorously to push forward this work; and they are now pushing it as best they can. The question of financing it is still an unsettled question. They are naturally eager to finance it with American money if they can.

There is considerable uneasiness here over a possible Japanese invasion. Public opinion, at times jittery, was gratified as a result of the increased strength of the United States Army and Navy forces here. I believe that the steps taken were timely and necessary. Although the general trend of Filipino utterances is loyally to uphold America in her struggle for democracy, occasionally one runs into undercurrents of opinion among the Filipinos that their country is being dragged into an imperialistic war and will be sacrificed like many other small countries. The strengthening of our armed forces here is the most effective reply.

May I in closing speak of a matter which may appear [3] merely personal but which because of the delicate situation in the Far East importantly affects the work of our Government at a most critical time. I refer to the rumors emanating from Washington which have appeared in the newspapers here as to the appointment of someone to succeed me as High Commissioner. I have tried to ignore such reports and when questioned as to them have of course disclaimed knowledge of any foundation for them. This morning headlines in the Manila papers blazoned the rumor afresh. It now has the appearance not of mere idle rumor but of forces actively at work to secure my return to Washington. The persistence of the rumor cannot but be detrimental to the morale of my staff and to the effectiveness of our work among the American and Filipino communities. I should warmly appreciate a confidential word from you whether these reports have any foundation. My single desire is to uphold your hands in the great work which you are doing and to further the interests of our country.

In any event, I think I should not remain here more than one year longer. After that, if events run their natural course, I hope I might be assigned to some other post, for I believe that from health considerations three years in the tropics are sufficient.

If you do not desire to retain me here for another year, I am sure it would materially strengthen our Government's work and prestige in the Philippines if you or Secretary Early, perhaps in reply to a question planted in a press conference, could publicly express confidence in me and thus put a definite end to the persistent rumor of my recall to Washington.

This letter has already become longer than I intended. But I believe you want to be kept informed in a personal way of the highlights of the situation in the Philippines.

With admiration and affection, believe me,
Ever sincerely yours,

FRANK

197-A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ^{x6}

Edwin Pauley's telegram about going to war with Japan over the Dutch East Indies, if necessary, is wholly proper for him to send.

Confidentially, however, I know that you realize that that kind of snap judgment foreign policy determination is something we get a lot of every day.

For instance, if I could spend a week with Pauley -- eight hours a day -- giving him the history and the present facts relating to the pros and cons of the Far East and their relationship to the pros and cons of the Atlantic -- and now Russia -- he then might be beginning to graduate from the ranks of the amateurs.

F. D. R.

Telegram from Edwin W. Pauley, Los Angeles, Calif., 6/17/41 to the Hon. Harold L. Ickes, suggesting action to prevent Japan from going into the Netherlands East Indies.

x220-A
x246-A



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a telegram which has just reached
me from Edwin W. Pauley.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

400
Philippines

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14
File
Bureau

June 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL EATSON

I want to take this up
with Frank Murphy when he comes in
to see me. Will you give it to me
at that time?

x41-A

F. D. R.

400 Philippines High Commissioner



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information I am sending you a copy of a radiogram from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde, in which he expresses the hope that Mr. Sayre will be retained as High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. I also send you letters addressed to me under date of June 6 and June 9 respectively, by Commissioner Elizalde. Will you be good enough to return these to me?

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Harold G. Ickes".

Secretary of the Interior.

x6

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM REC'D IN CODE JUNE 6

Commissioner Elizalde
Washington, D. C.

This is to confirm what I told you over the long-distance telephone.

During the last two or three months there have appeared in the local papers reports from the United States, to the effect that the recall of High Commissioner, Francis B. Sayre, is being contemplated in Washington, D. C. because High Commissioner Sayre and the Commonwealth Government cannot work in harmony and cooperation. While, in a few occasions, High Commissioner Sayre and I have held different views on certain public matters, as naturally happens between persons of independent minds, I am glad to say that High Commissioner Sayre and I are able to overcome such differences of opinion and cooperate with each other in the common task of promoting and protecting the best interests of the United States and the Philippines. There exists complete harmony and cooperation between his office and mine, and our personal relations are most friendly. Unless, therefore, the President needs the services of High Commissioner Sayre in the United States in some other capacity, I hope he will be kept here as long as possible. I am writing a letter to the President of the United States along these lines.

In any event, I hope it will be possible for Governor Murphy to come on some mission, for we want to see him again and give him a good time. Please give him my best regards.

W. U. I. 2. 0. 5

THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

INTERIOR DEPT.
RECEIVED
JUN 10 1941
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY.

June 9, 1941

The Honorable
Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:


I desire to inform you that, in my recent conferences with certain Members of the Maritime Commission, I was advised that, in view of the withdrawal of approximately 45 per cent of American tonnage from commercial shipping and the increased demands in the United States for strategic commodities, the American ships remaining in private operation, probably including ships of Philippine registry, will be required to curtail and in some instances completely eliminate Philippine sugar.

Some of the lines which have been carrying sugar, such as Waterman, Lykes and Pioneer, have thus been prompted to discontinue calling their vessels at Philippine ports.

As you well know, unless some relief can be secured, this will have a serious effect upon our finances and economy and it may precipitate a chaotic situation in the Philippines.

I know you will do everything possible to protect our interests and I assure you of our sincere appreciation for all the efforts you have exerted in our behalf.

Sincerely yours,


J. M. ELIZALDE
Resident Commissioner of the Philippines
to the United States

THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 6, 1941

INTERIOR DEPT.
RECEIVED
JUN 10 1941
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY.

The Honorable
Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In connection with the movement of Philippine sugar to the United States, I desire to call your attention to the following information which was cabled to me today from the Philippines:

On June 6, 1941, the Philippines had already shipped 567,328 long tons of sugar out of its duty-free quota of 800,000 long tons. Another 35,400 long tons was loaded and ready for clearance from Philippine ports -- a total of 602,728 long tons definitely shipped or about to leave the Philippines.


Of the remainder, 133,528 long tons was booked for shipment. American vessels have contracted for 109,728 tons; Japanese, 19,800; and Norwegian, 4,000.

This leaves only 63,744 long tons still unbooked. However, ten vessels are due to arrive in the Philippines with 64,000 tons uncontracted for, sufficient space to take care of the balance of our 1941 quota.

Of our quota of 50,000 long tons of refined sugar, 22,000 tons had been shipped on June 6, and another 16,000 tons was booked or loading. Thus, 38,000 long tons have left Philippine ports or are about to be cleared, leaving only 12,000 tons to be booked for shipment.

It is believed in Manila that unless shipping in the Pacific is disrupted or more drastic requisitioning of vessels is made, there will be no deficiency in our quota this year.

Sincerely yours,


J. M. ELIZALDE
Resident Commissioner of the Philippines
to the United States

June 17

2. Justice Murphy is standing by awaiting an audience at the President's convenience.

CONFIDENTIAL

Navy Department, 17 June 1941

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Total Enlisted Strength, 14 June	239,387
Fleet Reservists (enlisted) on active duty	8,596
Other Reservists (enlisted) on active duty	26,451
Retired Men (enlisted) on active duty	766
Total	35,813
Aggregate Enlistments (last 24 hours)	234
Aggregate Discharges (last 24 hours)	131
Gain	103

Admiral Towers stated today that Air Marshall Harris, R. A. F., has arrived in Washington for duty as direct representative of the Chief of Air Staff. The present Air Attaché, Air Commodore G. C. Pirie, R. A. F., will serve under Air Marshall Harris as his Chief of Staff. Air Chief Marshall Bowhill until recently in command of aircraft of the Coastal Defense of the United Kingdom, is due to arrive in the United States this week to take direct charge of the problem of overseas ferrying of aircraft built in the United States for Great Britain. It is believed that these two details will be of great assistance to our part of aircraft aid to Great Britain.

Admiral Kimmel today warned Naval families to be wary of anonymous telephone calls since they are used to obtain information about ship movements and to create suspicion and discord in families.

[2.] *Paymaster General of the Navy*, to leave the 23rd of June for visit to the First and Third Naval Districts, making an address on June 26th at the new Navy Supply School at Harvard University where there are about 440 student Naval Reserve Officers of the Supply Corps.

Bureau of Ships. The Carrier Ship Maintenance Desk has been consolidated with the Battleship Maintenance Desk. All minesweepers and all Bird Class minesweepers converted to other purposes, which had been under the Carrier Desk, were transferred to the Auxiliaries Ship Maintenance Desk.

Captain Sheldon advises contractors are expected to complete work on the Bethesda Medical Center in October. It is expected the Center will be ready for occupancy around January 1, 1942. Partial occupancy will begin as soon as possible.

Hawthorne, Nevada ammunition depot expected to be expanded to provide additional storage space. A contract involving \$1,999,500.00 is under consideration as authorized in the 41-41 Building Program.

UAW, (CIO), and A. F. of L., production workers of Electric Auto Lite Company, Port Huron, Michigan, threaten to strike over a wage increase. This company has a Navy contract [c] for electric cable and magnetic wire.

Hipper and Scheer drydocked at Kiel on June 12 according to reliable reports.

Admiral Leahy advised on June 13 that the CAPTAINE DAMIANI and ALBERT (French tankers) were sent to CONSTANZA in order to test the possibility of supplying France (*by sea*) with some of the oil that the Rumanians agreed to deliver to France. This scheme may be given up since the CAPTAINE DAMIANI was torpedoed and badly damaged on June 14.

Twenty-one Japanese warships and transports heading South from Wenchow at midnight June 12 and 13. Effective midnight June 16 and 17 Japan closed waters in Swatow area to shipping according to reports.

Dakar's inner harbor is protected by a submarine net according to reliable reports. One of the ships recently arrived at DAKAR from CASABLANCA brought ten light and ten medium tanks. The rains are now getting underway and most of the roads will be useless until October or November.

Sun Shipbuilding Company employees, Chester, Pa., received twelve cents an hour pay increase and have accepted a pact banning strikes and lockouts for two years.

[4] *Perkins* advises German naval units, including some heavy types, have been concentrating in and around Copenhagen the last few days, perhaps because of desire to obtain better facilities and greater security or for possible naval demonstration in the Baltic.

Germany pressing Russia to turn over warships to Japan according to *unconfirmed* reports—50 Soviet destroyers, 20 submarines, 14 minelayers, and 300 military planes reported involved.

Inland Steel Company, East Chicago, Ill., experiencing continuing series of minor slow-downs and department strikes. Possibility of major trouble indicated.

Italian submarine believed to be shadowing convoy NE of Azores on June 14.

London is full of conjectures on the Russian-German situation. There was a tendency to believe Russia would give in to Hitler's demands, both economic and military, if they have not yielded already.

French trucks and automotive equipment in Algeria being taken over by the Germans will prove worthless when it arrives in Libya.

Port of Lagos, Nigeria, was swept with magnetic gear on June 15 and it was expected to be open on June 16th.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 18 June 1941

<i>Total Enlisted Strength</i> , 16 June -----	239, 722	
<i>Fleet Reservists</i> (enlisted) on active duty-----		8, 596
<i>Other Reservists</i> (enlisted) on active duty-----		26, 635
<i>Retired men</i> (enlisted) on active duty-----		766
		<hr/>
Total -----		35, 997
<i>Agregate Enlistments</i> (last 24 hours) -----		204
<i>Aggregate Discharges</i> (last 24 hours) -----		65
		<hr/>
Gain -----		139

Admiral Moreell reports out of a total of 14,293 housing units completed by all Government housing agencies, 44 percent has been built by the Navy according to June 7 Weekly summary sheet of Defense Housing Coordinator. The first funds for the construction of low-cost defense housing became available to the Navy on August 12, 1940. The first contract was awarded October 2, 1940, the intervening 50 days being required to prepare plans and specifications as none were available. By February 7, 1941, all but 120 out of a total of 17,110 housing units for which funds were available were under contract. The remaining 120 were placed under contract by May 4, 1941. The first houses were occupied March 1, 1941, and as of June 16th the total occupied is 6,325 in various localities. In addition to the 17,110 units previously mentioned, 548 more units are being built with savings made in the construction cost under the [2] \$3500.00 limit determined by Congress.

Richard R. Adams, Ex. V-P, Grace Lines, advises confidentially continually worried of sabotage by members of crews. Has asked Navy cooperation to prevent sabotage. This confirms concern by certain officers about possible trouble from seamen in merchant marine.

Merchant Marine reserve officers may now be ordered to active duty without their consent. The Secretary of the Navy instructed in exercising this authority it is intended to conflict with the functions of the Merchant Marine to the minimum extent consistent with the urgent needs of the Navy.

Naval censorship has been established for the Island of Guam through a notice sent to the Governor.

A Naval Air Station has been established at Kodiak, Alaska.

Proposed bridge across the Columbia River from Port of Astoria Docks to Point Ellice, Washington is in most undesirable location since it would seriously jeopardize Navy patrol plane operations and approaches in bad weather when visibility is poor during routine operations from Naval Air Station at Tongue Point four miles away. Army Engineer holding hearings at Portland during next 2 weeks.

[3] *General Vandergrift* reports 2nd Defense Battalion USMC ready to move to Parris Island. Move will start on June 23rd, and will continue one train a day for approximately four days.

Royal Norwegian Navy is requesting cooperation of British Admiralty and U. S. Navy in sending relief expedition of 2 small ships to the East Coast of Greenland the middle of July for party of 7 Norwegians and 22 Danes collecting meteorological data. Party needs supplies; has radio station capable of reaching Copenhagen and probably would be in position to operate another in McKenzie Bay capable of supplying meteorological data to Iceland.

Suva (Fiji Island).—Hawaii radio link was discontinued on June 15th in order to prevent shipping agents in Suva announcing arrivals and departures of allied shipping to West Coast—U. S.—Western Union has discontinued their arrival and departures services.

Leaves have not been cancelled by general order in the Marine Corps as rumored. Some leaves may be curtailed from time to time due to special training operations it is reported.

Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal announced on June 17 establishment of the U. S. Naval Reserve [4] Aviation Base at New Orleans, La., effective as of July 15, 1941 thereby completing the Navy's program for establishing 16 Naval Reserve bases throughout the country.

Temporary appointment of Naval Warrant Officers or enlisted men as commissioned officers required by the Naval expansion program is provided in the bill passed by the House and sent to the Senate yesterday.

Japanese government has allotted seven million dollars for spreading propaganda in the U. S. during 1941, it is reliably reported.

Axis submarine refueling in West African waters possible from mother ship designed as freighter, from Canary Islands, bases on uninhabited coasts, or from BISSAGOS ISLANDS. DAKAR not being used. WASSON wants permission from State Department to investigate.

Japanese Naval Concentration reported still steaming South.

Japanese bombing of U. S. S. TUTUILA either criminal carelessness or a deliberate attempt to bomb the American Embassy and TUTUILA is indicated from military study.

Axis seamen (460) reportedly leaving Tampico on June 19 for GUADALAJARA.

Schoenfeld (Helsinki) advises German military circles reported to believe that Soviet army must be eliminated in 1941. *Phillips* reports Vatican believes Soviet will not compromise with Nazis.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 2 July 1941

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, chief of Bureau of Aeronautics stated: There are indications that the Germans have constructed, recently, a large number of airplanes designed specifically for sweeping for magnetic mines. Inasmuch as it is known that the British have sown a large number of such mines for protection against invasion, this program may have special significance.

Admiral McIntire reports hospital dispensary plans for Bermuda. Argentina and Trinidad have been approved and sent to Yards and Docks and that Quantico Hospital went into Commission 1 July.

Fort Schuyler taken over by Navy last week. 150 reserve college men arriving there 7 July for Navy Ordnance indoctrination. Fort Schuyler will now become receiving ship for all Ordnance Ensigns. From there they will be taken for instruction at gun factories. While there they will be shown all major industrial plants in New York Area.

System of Battle Signal Lights being changed from horizontal to vertical. Involves Emergency purchases of certain materials through the Bureau of Supplies and [2] Accounts for forwarding to Portsmouth.

Traffic between Sweden and Germany now temporarily established through Denmark it is reported.

Two Portuguese trawlers SANTA PRINCESA and SANTA JOANNA, a number of two and three masted schooners all equipped with radio or radio telephone and 12 French Schooners of three or four masts but without radio are reported fishing on the BANK OF BANKS. Convoy data could be communicated by enemy vessels to ST. PIERRE for transmission to Germany but it is not known whether this is done, it is reported. *Turks* appear utterly amazed at Vichy request for right of transit to Syria and for war material it is reported from a reliable source.

German Armistice Commission criticizes Weygand as impeding and sabotaging work of Commission in North Africa it is reliably reported.

British and Chinese military staffs will meet in Burma during first week in July to conclude agreements on Mutual Co-operation in case Japanese attack

British. Plans are laid for use by British planes of Chinese airbases and British assistance to Chinese guerillas it is reported from a reliable source.

Russians continue to suspect and mistrust the British and [3] are tolerating the British Military Mission instead of keeping it fully informed and making use of it according to impressions reported by Steinhardt.

Admiral Nyes reports that consideration has been given to a request from the Radio Club of America asking if various Government Departments approved the use of this Organization's facilities and mailing lists to assist in securing technicians for the British Civilian Technical Corp. State, War and Navy saw no objection.

French and Germans appear to be attaching great importance to LATAKIA, Syria it is reported.

BORDEAUX and NOZIMA MARU each with a cargo of chrome ore (total 9,600 tons)—from Philippines to United States, reported requisitioned by the Japanese Government. It is pointed out this is a method of blocking movement of the United States strategics without actual overt act.

Japanese Extremists including the Army and Navy groups urging immediate action in support of Berlin it is reported. *Grew* reports Prince Konoye said Japan could reconcile U. S. S. R. neutrality treaty and Tripartite Pact, Germans expected to be successful and will control Western portion of U. S. S. R., but did not believe German influence would reach the East and that the So- [4] viet may not collapse.

2 *British Destroyers* sunk 1 July, a third bardly damaged in Axis Air and Submarine Attack in East Mediterranean it is reported.

13 *German Ships* in Orient ports reported loading wartime supplies preparatory to sailing halfway around the world in an effort to run the British blockade.

Finland now has 13 divisions fully mobilized and three more are being mobilized it is reported.

Portuguese Trawler believed to have been taken over by the Germans, found to have fuel oil concealed below salt when seized by Canadians at St. Johns.

FORT de FRANCE departed from Martinique for Cayenne under escort by Naval auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR, carrying cargo of 1233 tons consisting mainly of flour of American origin.

KOKUYU MARU a special service vessel under charter to the Japanese Navy, is reported to have sailed from the Naval Station at Kure to load oil and gasoline at Los Angeles.

Italian Vessels departed South American ports as follows: from Para towards open sea the MON BALDA 27 June. From Recife 28 June "Twentyfour Maggio" for Hamburg it is reported.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 3 July, 1941

Japanese general opinion is that Nazis will gain quick victory; if so Japan may occupy maritime provinces it is reported from a reliable source. *American Officials* at Mukden and Harbin have noted no indications that Japan is preparing to attack Russia. Reports from Third Naval District from a reliable informant close to Japanese industrial interests states they expect Japan to move against Russia about 20 July. *Japanese* vessels of one Japanese steamship company have received orders to be west of Panama by 25 July regardless of passengers or cargo. The vessels of another Japanese company are ordered to discharge all cargoes on the Pacific coast for the present, it is reported from a reliable source. 5 Japanese vessels due New York first half of July. *Axis shipping* losses up to 17 June as follows: 102 freighters 469,000 tons taken or seized; 198 freighters 1,060,000 tons sunk by British or scuttled by own crews; 345 ships 1,725,000 tons unidentified total 645 ships 3,254,000 tons—additional 47 freighters 84,000 tons under Axis control or in their service were sunk; 53 vessels 320,000 tons seized in South American or [2] United States Harbors it is reported from a reliable source in London.

Ships reported sunk include: MALAYA II (British.) MAASDAM (Dutch) 8812 tons. GRAYBURN (British) 6342 tons. AURIS (British Tanker) 8030 tons. BARRHILL (British) 4972 tons. MONTFERLAND (British) 6790 tons. RABOUL (British) 5618 tons. TRAFALGAR (British) 5542 tons.

Possible torpedo attack on Panama Canal between 1st and 15th of July is reported from a reliable source "in spite of the fact it sounds fantastic."

Rumors are current in the Iberian peninsula which alleges that the United States is considering early action against the CANARIES the AZORES, CAPE VERDE and ICELAND. On the other hand the Italians, Germans and French in Spain are very much afraid that the United States will move against West Africa and Dakar while the Germans are busy with Russia: all West Africa is considered to be vulnerable by German High Command which considers that an American attack would prove disastrous to the future plans of the Reich according to reliable reports from Madrid.

Russian Air Forces is reported from a reliable source as follows: 5552 first line planes in 346 squadrons divided as follows:

[3.]

Type	Number of squadrons		Number of aircraft	
	Army	Navy	Army	Navy
Pursuit	100	16	2,000	292
Light bombers*	160	20	2,270	292
Heavy bombers	20	None	320	None
Patrol	None	30	None	378
	280	66	4,590	962

*Includes reconnaissance and dive bombers. The above are first line planes—estimated reserves are 30 percent. Personnel includes 10,000 officer pilots, 10,000 nonflying officers, 9,000 officer observers, 6,000 cadets, 75,000 enlisted men from all ranks, 100,000 parachutists and airborne troops (reported.) Air force is poorly organized, trained, equipped and has poor morale. Planes copied from 1st class power's models 3 or 4 years old. Relative Russian strength to German in ratio 2 : 3, Japan 5 : 3 (in Far East). Twelve hundred aircraft in Far East cannot be withdrawn without yielding air superiority. Aircraft industry will not function in war time. Anticipate large numbers of Soviet planes to be shot down in combat or destroyed on ground.

Germans will reach Moscow in 5 days according to British informant it is reported from a reliable source.

British Admiralty is printing ten thousand copies of a booklet on the identification of German, Japanese, Italian and French merchant ships. It is designed for use by [4] ships and planes and contains among other things scaled aerial silhouettes. Wide unrestricted distribution is intended and copies will be made available to U. S. N.

General Weygand is reported to have earnestly requested that American radio broadcasts accord less prominence to his name because his relations with the Germans have been made far more difficult by this practice.

Gunther reports from a reliable source, a dummy city of Ploesti has been constructed a few miles from the real city. It is said to have been based on aerial photographs. It is possible that the fires which were reported to have been ignited, according to Russian communiques, were fires set in the dummy city to deceive the enemy.

Barrage balloons are proving effective in England and Germany for defense purposes. Army has about three thousand on order now. U. S. M. C. planning for their use in connection with outlying possessions it is reported. Balloon barrage defense against aircraft in Moscow indicated abandoned it is reported from a reliable source in Moscow. No coordinated planning of air raid protection in Moscow.

Nazi troops withdraw during the past week 15th, 52nd and 86th German divisions from France and official estimates place not over 35 divisions now in Holland, Belgium and France it is reported from a reliable source.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 7 July, 1941

Expansion of Axis commercial air activities in Natal region has seemingly opened a relatively safe steamship traffic between Europe and South America and possible domination of an invasion route from Africa to Brazil, inimical to United States interests. Italian and German commercial planes apparently

carry out air reconnaissance against British ships and afford protection for sailings of own vessels it is reported from a reliable source.

Shortages are reported by the Director of the Navy Budget and Reports as follows: *STEEL*—The shortage of mild and alloy steel in the defense effort is acute and is becoming more so every day. All bureaus using steel report delays. These delays are occurring regardless of preference ratings and notwithstanding the fact that steel has been placed on the critical list; *ALUMINUM and MAGNESIUM*—Both Aluminum and Magnesium are now under mandatory priority. Even so and with numerous substitutions delays caused by lack of these materials are becoming worse each day. As an example, the Adapti Company [2] a subcontractor for Dravo cannot get a promise of delivery from the Aluminum Company even though this item carried a priority of A-1-A it is reported; *MACHINE TOOLS*—All Bureaus report delays due to lack of machine tools. Estimated delays in vital machine tools vary from a few months to one year. Of the 5,723 machine tools of various descriptions due during the period January 1, 1941 to May 31, 1941, 3,414 or about 60% are overdue; *TIN*—is causing delay in the delivery of tinned provisions ordered by the bureau of Supplies and Accounts; *OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS*—Shortage of Optical instruments in cameras, binoculars, fire control instruments, etc. continue due to lack of optical glass and personnel qualified to produce lenses; *INSTRUMENTS*—At present the shortage in this category is being felt chiefly by the aircraft industry and for certain anti-aircraft instruments. The shortage in this field will not be felt until the ships now being laid down approach completion; *FACILITIES*—Many projects under the cognizance of Yards and Docks have no priority ratings, *CLOSE-RANGE ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT*—the obtaining of these guns, mounts, ammunition and fire control equipment remains critical. Progress is being made but the obtaining of machine tools, cartridge case brass, steel and powder remains very critical; *OTHER* [3] *MATERIALS*—Forged armor for Battleships is now running 8 to 15 months behind schedule.

Japanese developments reported include: abrogation of Russian Neutrality Pact in the near future is predicted to be followed simultaneously or soon afterwards by an attack on Siberia; consideration of an extension of the limits of Japan's territorial waters which would cut off Vladivostok from normal trade and hamper any shipments of United States materials to Russia is reported; *Japanese ships* continue to expedite loading, unloading and departure direct to Japan from the East Coast ports of North and South America; *concern* is reported over attempts made by the Japanese to extend their influence among various Moslem peoples in regions as distant as Iraq; *Russians* evacuating women and children from Japanese territory; 2 air craft carriers at YOKOSUKA; and the next Japanese move is to be complete occupation of French Indo-China to begin within one week according to German sources in Tokyo.

Bismarck Survivors verify the *British suspicion* that the vessel displaced over 45,000 tons it is reported from a reliable source. Secret report on Bismarck sinking by Navy expert to be available by end of week.

[4] *Mail* for United States ships now routed and sorted in New York and San Francisco. A plan is being considered to sort official mail in Navy Post Office for trans-shipment by pouch thereby reducing the number of people knowing where ships are located in the interest of security.

Soviet Commissariats are busy moving their offices, presumably toward the East, Steinhardt reports.

Nazis have 200 rigs ready to operate in Soviet oil fields a reliable source reports.

Religious fervor among the masses of Russia is re-awakening on a large scale and the Army has been permeated by this sentiment is the *interesting* report of the Father General of the Society of Jesus who suggests rejecting atheistic Communism in Russia and emphasizing the religious and nationalistic character of the defenses of Russia to have emerge something resembling the old "Holy Russia", Phillips reports.

Leahy reports Mechin's Mission to Turkey to obtain transit of troops and war material "a complete failure."

Reinforcements for Dakar are reported from 3 French ships arriving from Morocco carrying several hundred native troops (to be demobilized), military trucks and 690 tons of rubber.

CONFIDENTIAL.

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 8 July, 1941

Leahy reports *Henry* (French Ambassador to Japan) indicates the Japanese Imperial Council probably reached a decision in favor of action against U.S.S.R. in the basis of the following motives (1) Obvious military reasons (2) The hopes of producing a collusion between Japan and United States and (3) Nazis have plans of their own for Dutch East Indies.

Partial mobilization of all forces has been ordered in Japan it is reported reliably.

Chiang Kai-shek predicted (5 July) that Japan would abrogate the Neutrality Pact with Russia and would attack Siberia it is reported from a reliable source.

Assistant Secretary Bard is to inspect shore Naval activities at Boston and Newport and will open Naval Air station at Quonset Point on Saturday. Admirals *Towers*, *Hepburn* and *Moreell* will join him at Quonset Point.

Appearance of United States Blue Jackets in United Kingdom causes many questions of number of Naval observers in London. *Winant* asks if there is any objection to releasing these figures.

Bureau of Ordnance expects delivery of the first [2] American made 20 mm Anti Aircraft (AERLIKON) gun this week from the British Production Line at Providence, Rhode Island; future production from this plant will be furnished the British and USN on percentage basis. This gun will be successor to the 50 calibre gun for anti air craft and probably in time will be used on Merchant ships as well as on battle ships. Ordnance has its own exclusive production of this gun from other sources including the Hudson Motor Car Company.

Wholesale price index for all commodities for week ending 28 June 1941: 87.7.

For the purpose of cooperating in every way possible with the spirit of the President's executive order 8802. *Assistant Secretary Bard* reports the formation of a committee to investigate the extent to which their enlisted personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps is representative of all American citizens. In case there should be evidence of discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin, the committee is to suggest corrective measures.

German instructions apparently have been given to advise Berlin of all information concerning shipping and cargo from the United States to the Red Sea.

If United States enters the war all northern South American countries will follow suit according to opinion of important German Secret Agent "Greif" in South America.

Marked departure in the past 36 hours from usual routine by Japanese Merchant Marine units in communications practice has been reported.

French Government is negotiating with the Government of Brazil for purchase of 60,000 bales of Sao Paulo cotton it is reported.

Cape Verde Islands now have 1,600 of troops on the Island it is reliably reported.

Communist strike activities in the United States being held in almost absolute abatement it is reliably reported.

"It is hoped" a new spirit will be injected into the personnel and that lack of direction, initiative, and coordination will be replaced by accelerated action in the war effort in the Middle East with the appointments of Generals *Haining* and *Auchinleck*, it is reported.

In YOKOHAMA BAY ships of the following classes are reported: *Battleships*: 2 HYUGA, 1 FUSO; *Cruisers*: 3 KAKO, 1 CATORI, 1 JINTSU; *Destroyers*: 8; *Submarines*: KAIJUN TYPE; *Gunboats*: 1 SAGA; *Tenders*: 3; *Tankers*: 2 SHIRIYA and SARUTO.

Miniature Mass X-Ray is being used by Navy Medical Corps [4] to detect early tuberculosis among recruits. This is a Navy development which already has demonstrated its value. It is an inexpensive method.

Heavy armour piercing bombs again dropped on berths of German warships *SCHARNHORST*, *GNEISENAU* and *PRINZ EUGEN* at Brest, where bomb dropped from altitude of 50 feet also hit stern of 10,000 ton liner. 43 Wellingtons in air attack on Brest dropped 128,000 pounds of bombs. One stick possibly straddled the *SCHARNHORST* it is reported.

S. S. ANTINOUS is the first American ship that has arrived at Suez, it is reported.

LARAMIE expects to arrive BAHIA, Brazil 22 July for duty, under Comtask force 3.

Underwater obstacles, probably antisubmarine nets have been placed in areas in Hiroshima Bay off Kure the Japanese have notified mariners.

Commanding General of Fort Richardson, Alaska, has sent a fine letter of commendation to Com Thirteen regarding the splendid cooperative spirit of the Army, Navy and Marine forces and their civilian assistants in Alaska.

Italian Gun Cruiser (8 inch) thought to be the GORIZIA was sunk on 29 June by a submarine of the Mediterranean fleet.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

16 July, 1941

Facilities of More than 20 large corporations are not now being used in Defense Production Mr. Batt has reported. Investigation in Navy shows there is considerable plant capacity not now being used and more is becoming available as priorities begin to take hold. The difficulty today is to find work for these Companies to do. There is a marked increase in the desire to take part in Defense Production, probably resulting from necessity because of scarcity of material, etc. Navy is concentrating on this problem and is cooperating fully with OPM, particularly with the Defense Contract Service and the Federal Reserve Board activities in both the country-wide and local efforts to utilize all productive capacity as fully and as quickly as possible. A Navy order of 14 July has been distributed to further the expedition and prosecution of work-subcontracting. Naval Liaison Officers will appraise the Defense Contract Service of (1) "so called bottlenecks" (2) necessities for "speed ups" of production (3) necessity for more sub-contracting (4) inefficient management or operation. (5) unsuccessful attempts to contact sub-contractors and (6) expansion needs. Every effort will be made to remedy these situations locally and reports will be sent to the Navy Department on each case. Mr. Mehornays Defense Contract Service may be being by-passed in OPM it is reported.

Status of Section Bases is that all but two of the thirty are under construction; 17 are in use although the construction work has not been completed. The two bases not started are being held up pending the acquisition of the necessary land, and it is anticipated that they will be started in the near future. It is tentatively proposed to construct 16 additional Bases and add to the facilities of at least 5 of the existing Bases, it is reported.

Entrance to Manila Bay and the nearby Subic Bay area are being mined for "General defense purposes." The Navy Hydrographic Office reports that the areas "will be dangerous after daylight 17 July." The Hydrographic Office also reports a restricted Pilot Chart of the Northern North Atlantic Ocean embracing the waters surrounding Greenland and Iceland has been evolved and has appeared regularly since June 1941.

The Suez Canal is closed to through traffic as a consequence of recent air bombings it is reported from a reliable source. Increased air activity over Malta is reported.

Invasion of England temporarily abandoned by Germans because of slowness of Russian campaign, effectiveness of RAF raids on Nazi war industry and severe losses in Russian War it is reported from a reliable source in Berlin.

"Plans have been made and are being carried out for the evacuation of many Commissariats and institutions from Moscow" Steinhardt reports as of 13 July 5 P. M. This, in spite of official statement to the contrary reported 13 July. Kazan (Soviet Russia) might be seat of Government or at least for the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Chinese G-2 is uncertain whether Japan will move North or South but believes the appointment of Okamura to command in North China and Itagaki in Korea is significant since they are Manchurian and Russian experts. A Chinese member of North China puppet regime states Japan will attack Siberia when Moscow falls it is reported.

Complete disruption of Portugal banking and commercial system has resulted from sudden blocking of port accounts causing hardship, financial loss and creation of ill will toward the U. S. at a most critical time it is reported.

Morris reports continued attention of German press to the [4] occupation of Iceland may be to prepare the German Public for a possible "call" for help from Portugal in order to protect some of her outlying possessions from President Roosevelt's "aggression."

Portuguese vessel CARVALHO ARAUJO (1,210 tons full load) arrived 13 July noon from Terceira where it is reported to have discharged a special cargo of military supplies and about 1,000 troops it is reported from Ponta Delgada (Azores on Sao Miguel Island.)

JOAO BELO (Portuguese SS 6,365 tons) carrying large quantities "of war materials" arrived from Lisbon on 13 July. One full infantry (1,200 men) battalion (fully equipped) was landed. The JOAO BELO was expected to depart for Fayal, Azores—chief town of Horta) and Terceira (Azores) 15 July with about 1,000 troops for these islands it is reported from a reliable source.

Sprinkler systems are not relied on in London against incendiary bombs.

The Secretary of the Navy has ordered that enlisted men of Naval Reserve on active duty be not discharged or reenlisted or their enlistments extended. This order is the result of a decision of the Comptroller General of the United States dated 9 July, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

22 July, 1941

Rumors, at variance with one another, in Japan makes reporting developments difficult, *Grew reports*. Many of these rumors have German origin. He believes "efforts by Japan to secure a privileged position in Indo-China should be taken with gravity;" however, he thinks "the chief preoccupation for Japan' remains China."

Japan will take military and economic control of Indo-China in the near future is the opinion of important Thai Government officials it is reported by a reliable source.

Japanese Naval Units reported maneuvering in VAN DIEMEN Strait (Japan) south of KYUSHU (Southernmost of main islands of Japan) on 16 July included: 3 carriers, 7 battleships and between 52 and 57 destroyers and submarines it is reported from a reliable source.

No decision has as yet been reached in connection with the Department's request to send two American Naval Observers to Vladivostock and American Military Attaches are not to be granted permission to visit the Russian-German front it is reported from a reliable source.

10 *Nazis* divisions are at present concentrated on the [2] Spanish border and the Hendaye-Irun Bridge has been reinforced to carry heavy traffic it is reported from a reliable source. Informant "apprehends" these developments presage a Nazis attempt to occupy the coasts of Portugal and Spain in order to obtain submarine and air bases lying beyond the range of the British bombers and simultaneously neutralize Gibraltar as a naval base and close the straits.

Sea and air landing equipment is being assembled by the Nazis at Constanza (Rumania) and in the Danube Delta in preparation for a possible invasion of the southern U. S. S. R. it is reported.

A *Peruvian* land and sea attack on 27 July is indicated by the latest *alleged* intercept, the sea attack to be at SALINAS and southward, with bombardment of SALINAS and GUAYQUIL (Ecuador) it is reported.

Intercepted messages from German Secret Agents in Mexico and South America show the following has been reported to Berlin: (1) Plans of the Curtiss-Wright Model 22 Falcon All-Metal Bomber have been copied. (2) there is a Ferro Vanadium shortage in connection with construction of submarines at Manitowoc, Wisc. (3) German Agent OTIC has been offered a new bomb sight by an Argentine Officer. (4) 9 [3] Boeings have been flown, presumably to England with a British American crew, and that 20 more will follow in coming weeks.

Mr. Batt has called attention to the difficulty involved in securing reliable statistical estimates on the future requirements of the War and Navy Departments of aluminum and magnesium. Army, Navy and OPM officials are consulting on the methods of estimating these requirements. This is most difficult to do with any degree of accuracy because of changing requirements and the decentralization of purchasing. Apparently OPM wants this information by the 20th of

each month by the pound for the various uses so as to allocate certain amounts to various groups. It is felt here by some, this cannot be done and that it is not necessary because it would set up another priority system on top of the present one which will work if allowed to adjust needs either by increased production, reallocation, substitutes, elimination or waiting.

O. P. M. is reported to believe Army is giving better information than Navy; however a representative of Bethlehem Steel Company has advised Navy that this Company can get all the information it wants from Navy but can get [4] nothing from the Army. This applied especially to heavy forgings 8' howitzers and 155 mm guns. This probably is due to the fact that Navy is operating many things on a project basis while Army is on a fiscal year basis.

Approximately 5,000 man days are estimated to have been lost during the past week in strikes affecting Naval Defense contracts, making a total for this month of July to date of approximately 26,500 man days. Two million man days are estimated to have been lost in plants at which Naval Defense contracts have been involved, of which 90% have been lost since 1 January, 1941. Last week, in strike cases involving Naval Defense contracts 7 were settled, 21 are still open and 7 strikes are pending in which information relative to Naval Defense contracts is not available. The slowdown technique is being used in the strikes at the Federal Mogul Corporation, Detroit, Michigan, and the Mitchell Metal Products Company Cleveland, it is reported.

All new Bases have been surveyed except Great Exuma (Bahama Islands) which survey will be completed in July. Arrangements will be made to have some survey made in Greenland. New charts will be made up as the information becomes available to the Hydrographic Office.

197-A

July 11, 1941

My dear Mr. Haight:

Please let me acknowledge, on behalf of the President the receipt of your letter of June twenty-fifth. Your interest in giving the President the benefit of your views regarding the present world situation is indeed appreciated.

I am

Very sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President

Norman Haight, Esq., *
450 North Spring Street,
Los Angeles, California.

LD/EAK

HAIGHT, TRIPPET & SYVERTSON

ARTHUR H. HAIGHT
 OSCAR S. TRIPPET
 ARTHUR L. SYVERTSON
 1110 W. WYOMING ST.
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

1524 SOUTH SPRING STREET
 LOS ANGELES

June 25, 1941

HON. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

President of the United States
 The White House
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Which has occurred since I last talked with you and I would not press on your time now except for the super emergency that has imposed itself upon the nation due to the happenings over the week-end, and to the fact that West Coast sentiment on this has not escaped you. I am taking the liberty of sending this through Miss Leland as per your suggestion.

I refer to the attitude toward Imperial Japan, the probability of Japan striking at Russia from the East and quickly, and the situation which will present itself should Russia collapse at an early date and present us with a spectacle of having German land and air forces bolstering Japan in eastern Siberia, threatening Alaska and assisting Japan in her drive to the East Indies.

For almost one year now the Gallup polls have shown that there are three citizens willing that we risk a war with Japan to every one willing that we should undertake a war in Europe. The reasons are several. Even Middle West-erners see in Japan a constant menace to our rear should our involvement develop from Europe. Many feel that China did nothing to bring her present plight upon herself, whereas there is and always will be considerable debate (however un-guided) as to the extent that the intrigues of Europe have been responsible for the present plight of France and Great Britain.

Others argue that from a moral viewpoint China was the first nation desecrated after the nine-power pact was signed. We, together with Europe, let China down at that time. Few overlook the practical viewpoint - even the most timid of us cannot adequately defend ourselves or maintain our standard of living should we lose access to the tin, rubber, and other resources of the East Indies.

Finally, four hundred million grateful Chinese would be an advantage of no mean proportions during the coming hectic generation. Recently I have heard of many lines

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 AD-2

HAIGHT, TRIPPET & SYVERTSON

-2-

that the reason we are failing to take action in the Orient is not so much because it would slow down our all out help to Britain as because Great Britain is looking beyond the war and does not care to have us establish a commercial and trading foothold in the Far East.


Superimposed on all this is the much graver reality of the moment, namely, that Japan will, if Russia begins to collapse, drive into her rear. Within months, not years, Japan and Germany together may have air bases scattered along north-eastern Siberia, perhaps within a two mile puddle jump of Alaska. Moreover, such a collapse will doubly assure Japan's proposed drive on the East Indies and strengthen her ability to conquer China.

I need not tell you of your own ability to crystallize public sentiment; in fact sentiment will crystallize itself if it is correctly informed. Should we miss the opportunity now of crystallizing and determining the Oriental picture we may later on find ourselves to be unable to give support to Great Britain at all because of joint Japanese-German operations in eastern Siberia, Alaska, and the Indies; - it may be our Munich.

I do sincerely hope, Mr. President, that in your conferences of the next few days while revamping the international approach, you may give careful consideration to this rising national sentiment which, in spite of little being said of it and in spite of it being "pooch-pooched" by such hokum artists as Hugh Johnson, has caused a majority of our people to feel we have a more acute menace facing us in the Orient than we have facing us in Europe at this moment, serious though the latter is admitted to be. Japan alone is probably afraid to fight; Japan with the German Luftwaffe would be something else again.

With personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,



Raymond Haight

RH:K

To doubt you are aware that most of
 or that's what defense has been made up of having one
 line from a station along the Pacific coast,
 so that some of fire might not covering some of our
 side coast defense. Major Brown, of Los Angeles, in-
 stituted to on the other way to it possibly a similar idea
 might be suggested to our own Air Department to prevent
 the Southern California coast. It may sound like a
 lame idea - the subject was discussed in an article by
 June Higgins, page 34, in "The Pacific War Defense"
 "Defense", but the idea was not the result of the War
 wouldn't have used it. I trust our own War Department
 isn't overlooking it.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM for The President:

A long "magic" has just been decoded but has not yet been put in shape for distribution. It covers the following:

Japan, through Vichy, is issuing an ultimatum to Indo-China for the occupation of eight air bases and two naval ports (Cameron and Sigan) for the avowed reason of preventing further encirclement by Britain and the United States. No time limit is stated.

The Chief of Naval Operations in Japan to the Naval Attache in Washington states that on account of the shortage of ship tonnage in the Sea of Japan, the requirements by the Army, the inability to charter ships at the present time, and the fact that many foreign ships no longer make Japan a port of call, the following re-scheduling of shipping will be effected:

Japanese ships will be removed from the run between the Philippines and the east United States coast.

The run to the east coast of South America will be continued through August but it will be impossible after September 1st. However, nine ships will serve the east coast of South America via Cape Horn. (This may signify their anticipation of inability to use the Panama Canal.)

Their shipping will continue to the west coast of South America.

A full copy of this "magic" will be sent you as soon as it can be prepared.


Chief of Staff.

SECRET

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

Secretary, General Staff

July 1941

GENERAL DOUGLAS MAC ARTUR
Manila, P.I.

Effective this date there is hereby constituted a command designated as the United States Army forces in the Far East STOP This command will include the Philippine Department comma forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines called and ordered into the service of the Army forces of the U. S. for the period of the existing emergency COMEA and such other forces as may be assited to it STOP Headquarter United States Army forces in the Far East will be established in Lanila Philippine Islands STOP You are hereby designated as the Commanding General United States Army forces in the Far East STOP you are also designated as the General Officer United States Army referred to in a Military Order calling into the service of the armed foces of the United States the organized military forces of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines dated July 1921 STOP Orders calling you to active duty are being issued effective July 1941 STOP report assumption of command by radio END

G. C. MARSHALL

x25-7

Secret

OK

JDR

7/26

able to be
sent by Chief of Staff
if when order &
allatment are approved



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

July 25, 1941.

400
Philippines

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith transmitting a revised draft of a proposed military order forwarded for my consideration by the Assistant ^{W.C.} Director of the Bureau of the Budget this date. This order is in substitution for the proposed Executive order entitled "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines" transmitted to you with my approval by letter of July 21, 1941.

The proposed order, which has been revised in this Department as to form only, has my approval as to form and legality.

Respectfully,

Francis Biddle
Acting Attorney General.

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x335
x463-6

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

SECRET

JUL 25 '01

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:


Due to the situation in the Far East, all practical steps should be taken to increase the defensive strength of the Philippine Islands. To that end, you recently approved the submission of legislation to Congress authorizing the appropriation of approximately \$52,000,000 from sugar excise tax and currency devaluation funds for general defensive purposes recommended by the Army, the Navy, and the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

One of the more urgent measures recommended to augment the present inadequate defenses of the Philippine Islands is the calling into active service of the military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The 75,000 officers and men involved can be mobilized and trained over a period of about one year at an estimated cost of \$32,000,000. Pending the enactment of enabling legislation and the appropriation of moneys in accordance therewith, no funds in the hands of the War Department are available for initiating the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army. In view of the urgency, it is suggested that approximately \$10,000,000 be allotted from the President's Emergency Fund for this purpose, with the understanding that repayment of such amount will be made from any appropriations received from sugar excise tax and currency devaluation funds.

Draft of an ^{Military} (Executive) Order calling into the service of the armed forces of the United States the organized military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is attached. This draft, now being processed through the Bureau of the Budget, differs from one previously approved by you in that provision is made for flexibility in its administration.

I strongly recommend that this ^{Military} Executive Order be now promulgated, and that you authorize the allocation of \$10,000,000 from the Emergency Fund for the purpose of initiating the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army.

Respectfully yours,



Secretary of War.

Inclosure

Draft of ^{Military} Executive Order.**SECRET**

Approved 7/26/01

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
Washington, D. C.

July 25 1941

*Letter dated 7/26/41
/ Filed 79
Treasury
numbered letter*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

There is transmitted herewith a proposed letter, prepared for your signature, and addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, allocating the sum of \$10,000,000 from the "Emergency Fund for the President," to be expended by the Secretary of War, in his discretion, for the calling into active service of the Armed Forces of the United States, the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and for the emergent mobilization and training of such forces.

The request for this allocation by the Secretary of War is contained in his letter to you dated July 25, 1941, recommending the issuance by you of a Military Order calling into the service of the Armed Forces of the United States the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

Reimbursement of the \$10,000,000 proposed to be allotted from the "Emergency Fund for the President" is to be requested of Congress by the War Department in connection with legislation to be submitted recommending the appropriation of certain sugar excise tax and currency devaluation funds.

/S/ John B. Blandford, Jr.

Assistant Director.

Enclosure.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., July 21, 1941.

THROUGH DIVISION OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am herewith transmitting a proposed Executive order entitled "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."

The proposed order, presented by the Acting Secretary of War and forwarded for my consideration by the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget this date, has my approval as to form and legality.

Your attention is invited to the fact that this order is presented by the Acting Secretary of War as a substitute for a proposed order, bearing the same title, transmitted to you by the Attorney General under date of November 25, 1940, which you have held pending developments making issuance thereof advisable.

Respectfully,

FRANCIS BIDDLE,
Acting Attorney General.

[Stamped:] Received, Jul 25 10 26 AM '41, Bureau of the Budget.

JULY 25, 1941.

The Honorable, The ATTORNEY GENERAL.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: This has reference to my letter of July 21, 1941, transmitting draft of a proposed Executive Order entitled, "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines".

Pursuant to suggestion of the President that the form thereof be a Military Order rather than an Executive Order, the War Department has prepared and there is transmitted herewith a revised draft, similar in substance and entitled "Military Order".

The revised form of the Order has my approval.

It has been requested that action upon the proposed order be expedited.

Very truly yours,

Assistant Director.

Enclosures.


EXECUTIVE ORDER

CALLING INTO THE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES THE ORGANIZED MILITARY FORCES OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES

*This was changed to a
military order.*

Under and by virtue of the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States, by section 2(a)(12) of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934 (48 Stat. 457), and by the corresponding provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a General Officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines: Provided, that all naval components thereof shall be placed under the command of the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, United States Navy.

This order shall take effect with relation to all units and personnel of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, from and after the dates and hours, respectively, indicated in orders to be issued from time to time by the General Officer, United States Army, designated by the Secretary of War.



THE WHITE HOUSE,

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 18, 1941.

HONORABLE HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SMITH: Request that the inclosed draft of a proposed Executive Order to call into service all military forces organized by the Philippine Government, authorized by Section 2 (a) (12) Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, be processed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in paragraph 2, Executive Order No. 7298. If approved, it is requested further that this draft be substituted for a similar proposed Executive Order which, as stated in your letter dated December 11, 1940, to the Secretary of War, was approved by the President as to form and is now being retained at the White House for signature if and when issuance shall be found advisable.

The revision requested does not change basically the draft of the Executive Order previously approved. The purpose of the revision is to provide for latitude in calling units and personnel into service and to vest command authority in a general officer to be designated by the Secretary of War, rather than in the Commanding General, Philippine Department, as stipulated in the original draft.

It is requested that the processing of this revised draft be expedited so that prompt action can be initiated in the event of an emergency situation arising in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Acting Secretary of War.

Secret

DEC. 11, 1940.

The Honorable, The SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This has reference to letter of October 31, 1940 signed jointly by yourself and the Secretary of the Navy, transmitting memorandum dated September 27, 1940, (file J. B. No. 305 (Serial 655) secret) addressed to the Joint Board by the Joint Planning Committee, and drafts of a proposed Executive Order and a proposed Executive Proclamation relating to the Philippine Islands.

The proposed Executive Order and proposed Executive Proclamation, as revised by this office and by the Attorney General, have been submitted to the President and have received his approval as to the form thereof. The unsigned originals are being retained at the White House for later signature if and when their issuance shall be found advisable. Meanwhile, there are enclosed herewith five copies of this form of the order and of the Proclamation for your information and for distribution confidentially to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Interior (for transmittal to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands), and the Commanding General, Philippine Department.

By direction of the President.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director.

Enclosures.

JUL 21 1941.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Reference is made to my letter of November 16, 1940 transmitting drafts of a proposed Executive Order and of a proposed Executive Proclamation relating to the Philippine Islands, which were presented by joint letter of the Secretaries of War and Navy, for the purpose of securing informal approval of the President as to the form thereof, and for the retention of the unsigned originals at the White House where they would be available for immediate issuance if necessary.

The proposed Executive Order transmitted under that date, which was entitled "Calling Into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of

the Philippines", provided, among other things, that Philippine military forces therein ordered into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, should be placed under the command of the Commanding General, Philippine Department, United States Army.

There is transmitted herewith a revised draft of the proposed Executive Order, presented by the Acting Secretary of War under date of July 18, 1941, which the Department desires be substituted for the draft of order referred to above. The Acting Secretary points out that the revised draft of order does not change basically the draft previously acted upon, and that the purpose of the revision is to provide for latitude in calling units and personnel into service and to vest command authority in a general officer to be designated by the Secretary of War, rather than in the Commanding General, Philippine Department, as stipulated in the original draft.

[2] While the original draft of the (unsigned) Executive Order was cleared with the State and Interior Departments, (who indicated a desire to be again consulted just prior to the formal issuance thereof) the revision presently proposed has not been referred to these Departments for comment since the proposed changes concern only certain military features rather than the basic policy involved. It is contemplated, however, that upon the informal approval by the President of the form of the proposed revised order, that copies thereof will be forwarded, as in the case of the original drafts, to the Secretary of War for his confidential information and distribution to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior (to be transmitted to the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands).

This order has my approval.

Very truly yours,

[Signed] JOHN B. BLANDFORD, JR.
Assistant Director.

The Honorable, The ATTORNEY GENERAL.
Enclosures.

MILITARY ORDER

Order and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, by the Constitution of the United States, by section 2 (a) (12) of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, (48 Stat. 497), and by the corresponding provision of the Constitution appended to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a General Officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; ~~and~~ that all naval components thereof shall be placed under the command of the Commander of the Sixteenth Naval District, United States Navy.

This order shall take effect with relation to all units and personnel of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, from and after the dates and times, respectively, indicated in orders to be issued from time to time by the General Officer, United States Army, ~~designated by the Secretary of War.~~

This order shall become effective on July , 1941.

The White House,
July , 1941.

*Hopkins*THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1941.

SECRET VIA NAVY*w/H 5 430 PM PST*HOPKINS
BONDON

Welles and I highly approve Moscow trip and assume you would go in a few days. Possibly you could get back to North America by August eighth. I will send you tonight a message for Stalin.

All well here. Tell Former Naval Person our concurrent action in regard to Japan is, I think, bearing fruit. I hear their Government much upset and no conclusive future policy has been determined on. Tell him also in great confidence that I have suggested to Nomura that Indo-China be neutralized by Britain, Dutch, Chinese, Japan and ourselves, placing Indo-China somewhat in status of Switzerland. Japan to get rice and fertilizer but all on condition that Japan withdraw armed forces from Indo-China in toto. I have had no answer yet. When it comes it will probably be unfavorable but we have at least made one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to South Pacific

ROOSEVELT

470
Philippines

Wilson House
July 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR R.F.:

The President has signed Military Order re Philippines military forces, and has approved ten million dollar allotment as well as text of proposed cable from Marshall to McArthur.

Shall give out text of Military Order here, but nothing else. Regards.

W. D. H.

x25-T
x25
x335
x119

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*Mexico Files
1-41
file
personal*

July 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


In accordance with your memorandum of July 25, 1941 transmitting a letter of July 18 addressed to you by Ambassador Daniels at Mexico City, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft reply to Ambassador Daniels.

Ambassador Daniels' letter and its enclosure are returned herewith.

Enclosure:

1. To the Honorable Josephus Daniels.
2. From the Honorable Josephus Daniels, July 18, with enclosure.

R. Kelly



PERSONAL

Mexico, July 18, 1941

Dear Franklin:

Dr. Stanley Jones, one of the greatest preachers in the world, has been in Mexico attending a religious gathering of more than five hundred religious leaders, mostly from Mexico and the United States. You know his history. As a young Methodist preacher he went as a missionary to India where he has made a place as the leader of American missionaries. A few years ago he declined to accept the office of Bishop to which he had been elected, saying his call was to preach the gospel in India. He knows that country as no other preacher. His long residence in Asia has made him familiar with conditions in China and Japan and he is deeply interested in seeing the war between these two countries brought to a close, as all of us are.

Talking with Dr. Jones yesterday, he told me of recent conversations he had had with Dr. Miaø, Secretary of the National Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, a well-known author of Japan, regarding a possible basis for peace between China and Japan; he became convinced that the situation may be ripe for the United States to mediate between the two countries. He said that "it appears to be the one possible door to peace in the world situation," and added: "If it begins there it may spread."

I know that your heart's desire is to see an end of the tragic wars and would welcome an opportunity to bring about an honorable peace. Because of this I am enclosing for your confidential reading the memorandum which Dr. Jones prepared at my request.

I am not familiar enough with the international situation, or the possible influence of the persons quoted by Dr. Jones, to give advice. I wish I knew
more

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House, Washington, D.C.

-2-

more of the inside situation in those countries. I am passing on this memorandum from a great soul, a friend of long standing, for such consideration as conditions in the Far East may justify. I pray daily that you may find a way to lead the world to peace and permanent ending of war.

In your last letter you expressed the hope that my health was good and I was "not working too hard." As to the first, I was never so well as now. As to the second, though I give myself freely to my duties here, when I think of the heavy burden you bear and strain upon time and mind and heart, I feel that in comparison I am almost only a part-time worker.

My wife joins in love to you and Eleanor.

Affectionately yours,

Joseph Daniels

Enclosure.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE PEACE BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA

In informal conversations between Dr. Miao, Secretary of the National Christian Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, well-known author of Japan, regarding a possible basis for peace between China and Japan, I found the following:

1. They both agree that the time is ripe for a consideration of a possible peace if a basis could be found. They were both speaking individually, of course, and were not representing in any way anyone officially. But each thought that he was expressing the opinions of a large number in each country and possibly on some points the official attitude.

2. Dr. Kagawa said that he thought Japan was prepared to make peace on the basis of four points:

- a. The recognition of Manchukuo.
- b. The suppression of Communism in China.
- c. The elimination of anti-Japanese agitation in China.
- d. The recognition of the territorial and political integrity of China by Japan.

He suggested that there might be other points raised by some, such as (a) a creation of a joint defense system in Mongolia against Russian Communism, (b) the port of Shanghai under Japanese control, (c) a concession between Hongkong and Indo-China for immigration. But these were subsidiary—the four points above were the main bases of peace from the Japanese viewpoint.

Dr. Miao said that if the intention of the peace between China and Japan is that Japan's hands may be freed to carry out aggressive intentions elsewhere, then the peace would not be a real peace. China wants real peace. He said that if China could get two things nailed down she would be prepared to negotiate the rest:

- a. The territorial and political integrity and sovereignty of China.
- b. The recognition of Chang Kai Shek as the head of China.

If these two things were agreed upon, China would feel that there is a basis on which peace could be considered, not that she recognizes that the other points raised are necessarily legitimate, but they might be made subjects for negotiation. Dr. Miao suggested, for instance, that some agreement might be worked out for joint control of Manchuria.

[2] It will be noted that there is one area of agreement between the two suggestions, namely the territorial and political integrity of China. This is important for this area of agreement is not a marginal matter, it is central.

As to the recognition of Chang Kai Shek, Dr. Kagawa thought it might be brought about in time, but Japan's face would have to be saved in the matter, for Wang Ching Wei had been recognized. He thought it might be possible to solve the matter if Wang Ching Wei should agree to give away to Chang Kai Shek for the sake of peace and the unifying of China. Dr. Miao thought that Wang Ching Wei would have to give way entirely and that there could be no place for him in the government after what he had done. Dr. Kagawa said that the recognition of Chang Kai Shek is not impossible as many Japanese considered him as a great man. Both agreed that peace could be scarcely hoped for if Chang Kai Shek were left out, for he represents China in a way that no one else does.

It was suggested by Dr. Kagawa that if I want to get the official viewpoint it might be well for me to see the Japanese Ambassador. Accordingly, I endeavored to see both the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Ambassador during a short visit to Washington. The Chinese Ambassador was absent speaking at the University of Michigan and the Japanese Ambassador was tied up with engagements and could not give me the time during the period at my disposal. But the Japanese Minister invited me to see him instead. Apparently the Japanese Minister is the diplomatic advisor to the Ambassador.

I made it plain to the Minister that I did not represent anything official, that I was only there in the capacity of one who desires to see these two nations come together on a just basis, and that it was also clear that the opinions I was interpreting from Dr. Miao and Dr. Kagawa were entirely unofficial and were elicited by my own initiative. In other words, they did not raise the matter with me—I raised it with them. I also suggested that I knew the Minister's situation as a diplomatic official and that he need not give anything on the matters raised, but that I would put the matter before him and he could comment on it or not, and I would understand. After I had placed the conversations I had before him, he replied that he would comment on the matter, but in an unofficial capacity.

He said that Dr. Kagawa left out one important point, namely, the economic cooperation of Japan and China. When I asked if the economic cooperation meant [3] the political dominance of the country by economic control, as many Chinese and others thought it would, he replied that it need not necessarily mean this. He further stated that although the territorial and political integrity of China was not specifically stated in the government statements regarding a basis of peace, it was implied in the other three points, because these points inferred a sovereign and independent China. He also added that the government of Japan had stated that there would be no indemnities and no territory demanded of China. This, too, he said implied the political and territorial integrity of China.

He suggested that Japan would desire a joint defense in Mongolia and North China against possible Russian aggression in these sections. When I pointed out that in the minds of the Chinese this planting of Japanese soldiers in North China and Mongolia would cancel the point about the territorial and political integrity of China, he replied that on the face of it it would, and that the demand might seem to be harsh, but in international law a nation might still be sovereign if she requested another nation to help her in the joint defense of territory.

In regard to the recognition of Chang Kai Shek as the head of China, he stated that the Japanese government recognized Wang Ching Wei because he was willing to accept Japan's basis of cooperation and that if Chang Kai Shek would be willing to do so then Japan would not mind who it was at the head of the government.

It seems to me that this left open the possibility of Japan's recognition of Chang Kai Shek if a new basis could be worked out which the latter could accept.

At the close of my talk one thing seemed to be intact in both viewpoints, namely, the territorial and political integrity of China. Of course, there was the possibility of this being threatened by the proposal of joint action in North China and Mongolia. But on the whole it remained. There was also the possibility of the recognition of Chang Kai Shek under certain conditions—conditions held by both sides. It was not ruled out.

When I came to the point of the possible mediation of the United States to bring peace in the Far East, I again urged on the Minister that he need not answer if he did not see fit. He replied that he would comment, not as giving an official but a personal view, that if my suggestions meant that America was to interfere in the Far East and try to impose her own terms, then the reply is, No. But if she should offer her good offices to help China and Japan to settle their own differences, then, Yes.

[4] When I asked if I might express the substance of our conversations to anyone of my friends who might be in a position to pass it on to those who would be in a position to do something, he replied that I might, provided it was understood that all of these opinions were simply explorative and were personal and private and not official. He added that the world must have peace and that America is in a position to help toward peace. When I suggested if America offered her good offices to help bring peace between China and Japan it might mean that she would thereby be led to straighten out her own differences with Japan, he agreed.

It seems therefor that the situation may be ripe for America to mediate between China and Japan. It appears to be the one possible door to peace in the world situation. If it begins there it may spread.

E. STANLEY JONES.

Dear Sir:

I much appreciate your thoughtfulness in forwarding with your letter of July 13, 1941, a memorandum prepared by Dr. Stanley Jones suggesting a possibility of peace between Japan and China and of American mediation between these two countries. Dr. Jones is well known to me by reputation and I admire his fine character and high purpose.

Just a week previous to the date of your letter, Representative John E. Voys of Ohio wrote to me and enclosed a copy of a similar memorandum written by Dr. Jones. Dr. Voys at the same time sent a copy of Dr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. Leon Johnson. In both Dr. Voys' letter and Dr. Jones' memorandum were given special study by officers of the Department of State, I am enclosing a copy of the reply which Mr. Johnson sent to Dr. Voys.

As you may imagine, the Japanese action in reference to French Indochina has created new problems with far-reaching implications in the Far Eastern situation. You have doubtless read Mr. Wallace's statement, as contained in House Bulletin No. 178 of July 24, in regard to our attitude toward that development, and the White House press release, contained in House Bulletin No. 179, July 26, in regard to the freezing of Japanese assets in this country.

It is good to know that you are enjoying excellent health. Eleanor joins me in sending affectionate regards to you and Mrs. Daniels.

~~Respectfully,~~

Affectionately,
JDR

Enclosure:

From Mr. Johnson to
Mr. Vorys, July 21.

The Honorable
Josephus Daniels,
American Ambassador,
Windsor, D. C.

JULY 23, 1946.

The Honorable JOHN M. VORYS,
House of Representatives.

DEAR JOHN: I referred your letters of July 11, 1941 to me and to the President and their enclosures in regard to the question of possible mediation by this Government in the conflict between China and Japan to the appropriate officers of the Department for study and comment.

We have studied with care the contents of your letters and of Dr. Jones' memorandum, and we are very glad to have the benefit of your views and those of Dr. Jones who is well-known to the Department. The various points and considerations mentioned in Dr. Jones' memorandum have been brought to our attention from time to time from various quarters and we have been and are keeping them constantly in mind. In addition to the broad general factors mentioned in Dr. Jones' memorandum, the Department must take into account the fundamental national policies of the various nations concerned, especially as manifested in the acts of those nations and in the statements of responsible officials thereof.

In past public statements and utterances by Japanese officials there has been considerable emphasis placed on terms similar to those referred to in Dr. Jones' memorandum. In this connection it may be observed that the contents of the agreements which the Japanese Government has made with the régime of Wang Ching-wei at Nanking afford some concrete indication of the nature of the settlement with China which the Japanese Government has thus far had in mind.

This Government has during recent years been making earnest efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that the real interests of Japan lie in adopting policies in regard to international relations and conduct which are in line with the thought and procedures in which this country believes.

[2] Should you feel, in the light of the foregoing comment, that you would still like to discuss this subject with an appropriate officer of the Department, such an officer will be glad at any time at your convenience to place himself at your disposal.

If Dr. Jones should have occasion to visit Washington, officers of the Department would welcome an opportunity to see him and to obtain the benefits through personal conversation of his observations and views.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN G. ACHESON,
Assistant Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

25 July 1941

Japanese military preparation in Manchuria continues at accelerated rate is indicated by a report from a reliable source. This "seems to portend he (Japs) is preparing in North for Major efforts". On the other hand, *Grew* reports "there has been a gradual weakening of the ties binding Japan to the Axis over a substantial period of time" and "the Government of Japan is expecting overtures from the Government of the U. S. S. R. designed to produce "a-general agreement."

British Members of Parliament have invited some American Senators and Representatives to visit Britain shortly. *Germans* are returning to their French owners, all small boats (less than 300 tons) seized at time of the occupation it is reported.

German losses during first two weeks of Russo-German campaign were 640,000 to 700,000 men; 1100 to 1200 tanks; a Navy source reports.

The strike on oil tankers, Great Lakes Area, "is Communist influenced for the purpose of preventing production in the steel industry".

[2] *Admiral Towers reports* Navy's aviation training program for pilots, flight crews and maintenance personnel, is "ship-shape" and under way ahead of schedule. Today the Navy has four main pilot training stations with a combined student entry of 800 a month—Pensacola 300, Jacksonville 200, Corpus Christi 300—The Naval Station at Miami is providing the advanced carrier type train-

ing. The Navy including the Marine Corps had 40,521 aviators and 3,657 under training, 1 July, being 276 more aviators and 981 more students than the 1 January 1941 estimates. The *shortage of airplanes* of the type required for advanced training is becoming *critical*. Training capacity now is available for 9,095 aviation enlisted men every four months; by 1 January 1942 this will be increased to 12,000.

Information from an Official source on the Statement by the Carnegie Institution expert (in the 18 July Bulletin) shows that for some months weather reports to the fleet have been transmitted in confidential cipher; that all reports of weather observations made by Naval vessels are confidential. *Sabotage* of a torpedo has been reported to Bureau of Ordnance. *Considerable has been learned* about Italian espionage activities in the United States during the past week.

[3] *Secretary Knox* has appointed Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker, of M. I. T. as Coordinator of Research and Development for the Navy Department, Chairman of the Naval Research and Development Board and Member of the National Defense Research Committee. Dr. Hunsaker reports he is surveying Navy's research projects in order to determine the extent of the present program.

Approximately 36 Public Relations Officers from the Naval Districts and the two Fleets will be in Washington Monday for a four-day conference and school on Public Relations.

Secretary Knox reports expansion of facilities of the Naval Communications to meet the increased load placed on the system by demands of Navy Department operations under the National Emergency.

The Senate has passed a bill authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to establish a secret detective force to investigate any existing or threatened espionage or sabotage in United States Naval establishments. USN makes a careful check of requests for the dismissal of aliens working in plants having defense production. Before any dismissal is requested, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence's central and field files are checked. 40% of the requests received are "washed out" because no cause for action is found.

The Navy's program for supplying Diesel engines for small boats, together with the special power-plant requirements for the newly developed landing boats, has resulted in the development of a more modern type of Diesel for these small craft. This engine is manufactured by the National Supply Company at the Superior Diesel Engine Plant and has been installed in both the 30-foot Bureau Type Steel and the 36-foot Higgins Type landing boats.

Voluntary Spanish and Portuguese language instruction is progressing both in Washington and the Naval Air Stations at Pensacola, Florida, Jacksonville, Florida and Corpus Christi, Texas. Arrangements are being made to expand the language instruction during the coming year, by using the facilities of a WPA project. It is anticipated that over 5,000 officers and enlisted men of Navy and USMC will undergo special instructions during the current fiscal year. *Puget Sound* Naval Hospital is expanding. It has almost reached its limit for the area it serves. For the present, however, it is adequate, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery reports.

SECRET

15 July, 1941

For the President only:

When I was in Canada the Government official stated that you could go to Ottawa on the seventh of August. I wanted to show you from Canada but there were no communications there. I was going to remain here a day or two longer for conference with the War Office. The visit here very secret. I am wondering whether you would think it important and useful for me to go to Ottawa. Air route situation good and a reasonable time in getting back. I have a feeling that everything possible should be done to be certain the British maintain a permanent front even though they be defeated in this line to retreat. If British could be my eye be influenced by a critical time I think it would be very good to have direct communication from you through a personal envoy. The stakes are so high that it would be worth the effort to do this. It is in a sense a way that we can be sure to have a low level supply too. You of course have made no move in regard to this and will wait your advice. If you think a personal envoy would still leave have no fear of being detected. I will wait your advice. Price situation but average 1941-1942...

Page 7 d. 2. 1

and it seems to me they have every convincing reason to all of us
for that determination. I do hope you are well and so sorry my
mission has taken longer than I anticipated. We had news this morning
that the Scharnhorst is out. British making very powerful air
attacks but bomber losses substantial. Everybody here in good spirits
but realize that the Russian business gives them only a temporary
breather. Every one here asks about you and are delighted to know
that you are in good health.

HARRY.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 29, 1941.

Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State.

I note in a number of dispatches during the past week or ten days that Japanese troop or plane withdrawals are reported from several sectors on the Chinese front.

I think we should relay these reports to Gauss and the Military Attaché in Chungking for the information of the Chinese Government, with the suggestion that one or two powerful attacks on weakened Japanese positions might do real good at this time. Possibly you have done this already.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference your memorandum of July 29, 1941 in regard to reports of withdrawals of Japanese troops and planes from certain occupied places in China.

The messages to which you refer were repeated to the Embassy at Chungking via naval radio by the sending offices. We have brought these reports orally to the attention of the Chinese Ambassador here and are today conveying to Ambassador Gauss by telegraph the suggestion that he and the Naval and Military Attachés inform appropriate Chinese officials at Chungking of the reports in question.

SUMNER WELLES.

Lusk box

TK

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

Tokyo

Dated July 30, 1941

Rec'd 7:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1131, July 30, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Your 436, July 29, 3 p.m., is greatly appreciated.

The eventual way out of the present situation would appear to lie in the third provision of the Franco-Japanese protocol of July 29 to the effect that the validity of the stipulations of the agreement shall cease when the situation motivating their adoption no longer exists. The President's proposal, if accepted and carried through, would effectively remove the alleged threat to the security of Indochina set forth in the preamble of the protocol as the fundamental purpose of the agreement. If Japan should reject the proposal or should avoid giving positive authorization to the President to proceed to carry out the proposal, Japan's good faith would be brought into question, the honesty of her announced purpose and incentives would come before the tribunal of public opinion,

-2- 1131, July 30, 10 p.m., from Tokyo.

opinion, and her position before the world and in the light of history would become doubly unenviable.

This, of course, assumes that the President's proposal will eventually and inevitably be made known to the public, a point which might discreetly but helpfully be conveyed to Admiral Nomura in case the reply of the Japanese Government should be unduly delayed or should prove to be of a negative or evasive character. No progress can be made toward the adjustment of international relations without mutual confidence, and were the Japanese Government to withhold confidence in the helpful efforts of the President to find a way out of the impasse and in such eventual international assurances with regard to the security of Indochina as the President might be in a position to present, such an attitude on the part of Japan would oblige the United States completely to discount any expressed desire on the part of Japan for a restoration of good relations with the United States.

I know of no other way of possibly preventing the Japanese forces from "digging in" in Indochina than to bring the foregoing thoughts through Admiral Nomura squarely to the attention of the Japanese Government.

KLP

GREW

1905, Executive
Order
1905

Transmitted a copy of proposed Executive Order entitled "Establishing
Reserve for Executive Res. Area." The proposed order was generated by the Secretary
of the Navy July 28, with the concurrence of the Acting Secretary of State July 28
and forwarded for the consideration of the Attorney General by Assistant Director,
Bureau of the Budget July 28. - - The Executive Order was signed by the President
August 14, 1905.

see 12

17

1000, Honolulu
Acting Secretary of the Navy
7-24-41

Handwritten signature

Transferred by previous Executive order entitled "Transferring the United States Coast Guard to the District of Hawaii, Territory of Hawaii, together with the Administration, Personnel, and Equipment, to the Service and Jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Navy". The proposed order was prepared by the Acting Secretary of the Navy and forwarded for the consideration of the Attorney General by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy of the Budget under date of Jan. 8, 1941. The Executive Order was signed by the President 8-16-41. -- Attached is copy of letter dated 7-22 from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Navy requesting that he is willing to have the Hawaii District of the Coast Guard remain as a part of the Navy "during the present unlimited emergency". Letter was answered by the President 7-24-41.

See 22-4

np

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
August 19, 1941

Wrote to the President transmitting a revised draft of a proposed executive order entitled "Suspension of Eight-Hour law as to maintenance and repairs required by the War Department in the construction of public works in the Department of War for the national defense." Proposed order, presented by the War Dept. on July 22, 1941, and forwarded for consideration of Attorney General by the War Dept. on August 1, 1941, and approved by Attorney General on August 12, 1941. The proposed order, as approved by the Attorney General, has approval of Attorney General as to form and language. — Mr. McNulty wrote to the Secretary of War on August 12, 1941, advising that the President signed the Executive order on August 20, 1941.

WES - 1714

400 Hawaii

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Handwritten signature or initials

Request to the Department requesting authority to acquire four four Coast Guard
cutters to be converted into small patrol vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District.
Since that patrol vessels now available in the 14th are not adequate for that area,
before the transfer of the four from the 14th to the Bureau of Naval Operations
the Department will appropriate money by the Bureau of the Budget in direct
cost the allocation from that appropriation for 'district craft and small boats' not
to amount above \$1,000,000 but this allocation is entirely eligible for items
of that priority. Also that authority for above is granted even though it will result
in some allocation in excess of \$1,000,000 - says if this is approved, funds can be
made available by allocation from items of somewhat lesser priority. - - See also
copy of letter 10/14/41 7, 10, 11

See 70 Administration, Navy

22

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

August 16, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Secretary:

The present Japanese Foreign Minister is evidently of the impression, which earlier Japanese reports from Washington undertook to give, that the initiative in regard to conversations came from the American Government.

Apparently the Japanese Foreign Minister has been holding back as regards new conversations while awaiting (since August 7) a report by Nomura on the subject of "rumors of Hull's resignation and of the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan".

In the Imperial conference of July 2, the Japanese Government apparently decided to adhere to its "new order" policy "regardless of how the world situation may change"; to "take measures with a view to advancing southward"; to increase its pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek "from various points in the south"; to continue diplomatic negotiations; to carry out previous decisions regarding French Indochina and Thailand; to use "every means available" in order "to prevent the United States from joining the war"; to act in accordance with the Three Power Pact, but deciding for itself "when and how force will be employed".

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

100-30

C.F.
S

August 23, 1942

Dear Mr. [Name]

Your letter of July thirty-first has just reached me and I wish to assure you that you continue to have my full confidence. In these critical times we are all under a strain. I realize that you are faced with difficult and delicate problems and I rely upon your judgment, tact and diplomacy to work them.

I would enjoy an opportunity to talk things over with you, but as conditions are now it would be unwise for you to leave your post even for a few weeks.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
[Name]
[Title]
[Address]
Washington, D.C.

Original sent to [Name] for delivery
8/25/42
[Signature]


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter from the High Commissioner, dated July 31, 1941, which you sent me with your memorandum of August 21, has been read with interest and I appreciate the opportunity of seeing it. I enclose a suggested draft for your reply to Dr. Bayre.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State at the time. The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a prominent loop at the beginning.

X 20

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER

MANILA

July 31, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I wish so much that I had your mind and your desire about my remaining in Manila. The absence of any reply from you to my letter of April twenty-third makes me wonder whether I still retain your confidence. I feel sure that you know that without your full confidence and support there is little point in my staying on; without your encouragement keeping the job here, difficult and delicate at best, becomes well nigh impossible. My only reason for being here is service to my country and to you; and, if you feel that under present war conditions a different type of man should be serving in this post, I should be grateful to you for giving me some other worthwhile assignment or relieving me of the command here. I do not want to remain here merely on sufferance.

Perhaps you would like to talk over personally with me these and other matters. The situation in Manila and the Far East bristles with problems of extreme delicacy which cannot be discussed by letter. If you so desire, I could fly to Washington and back and be absent from my post for only a few weeks.

I should deeply appreciate a word of guidance from you.

The situation here keeps changing with kaleidoscopic rapidity. During the present week Japan, as you know, has been advancing its force into Indo-China. That will upset the present balance and the threat of further advance towards very real war to Singapore, to Thailand, to the Netherlands East Indies, to the Philippines. Stiffening resistance must be the answer.

The Commonwealth Government holds its elections next November. These include the election of a President and Vice President and would be of extreme importance, - except that the result is a foregone conclusion. Everyone

knows

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -

knows that Quezon will be elected President and Osmena Vice President. No other candidate for those offices has the ghost of a chance. Quezon holds everything in the Commonwealth within his grasp. But I believe there is no question of his loyalty to the United States and his genuine desire to cooperate with the United States in defense activities. I think you can count on this. His health is not yet entirely restored. He tells me that the doctors promise that he will be fit again in November. He has made rather a remarkable recovery from a bad attack of tuberculosis.

Almost the only organized political opposition in Luzon comes from the Socialists headed by Pedro Abad Santos, the brother of Jose Santos, recently advanced from Minister of Justice to a Justice of the Supreme Court. The main strength of the Socialist party is in the province of Pampanga, a rice-growing district in Central Luzon. I had a long talk with Pedro Santos last week and he tells me that his party are thoroughly loyal to the United States and are opposed to effecting political changes by force.

Our office staff have been working like Trojans on export control and on "frozen assets". Each of these has come to assume large importance and to involve an infinite amount of work.

During the past months general economic and financial conditions in the Philippines have been quite satisfactory. Prices of major export commodities have improved materially over last year and foreign trade has been well maintained. Considerable apprehension, however, exists as to the future as a result of the growing scarcity of ships available for Philippine-American trade. The sugar situation here may become critical. Because of the increasing scarcity of bottoms, there is danger that the sugar crop cannot be exported from the Philippines to continental United States. If it cannot be exported it cannot be marketed, and the sugar centrals and growers here cannot finance continued sugar production. That would mean field laborers out of work, labor unrest and one of the most important of Philippine activities disrupted and threatened. What to be done? I believe the Commonwealth Government will shortly ask for a heavy loan from the United States to help finance the sugar crop. But the United States cannot carry on a program of indefinitely piling up huge surplus sugar stocks in the Philippines which probably never could be marketed. I'm studying this problem at the present moment. I suggest that the

Commonwealth


- 3 -

Commonwealth Government may not be able to swing the problem alone and that if a serious shipping shortage develops the United States will have to give serious consideration to affording financial assistance but should doubtless couple whatever assistance is given with a program of careful diversion of sugar land to rice and other crops needed in the Philippines.

Perhaps still more pressing at the moment is the problem of maintaining Philippine stocks of food supplies and other necessities. If the shortage of bottoms becomes acute we will be extremely limited in what supplies we can get from the United States. Yet there is imminent danger that what we have will be drained away by being exported to neighboring Far Eastern countries where prices of supplies may be higher. We ought to control such exports; but how? The Export Control Act apparently is not broad enough to include foodstuffs and a number of other necessary commodities. Just now I'm wrestling with this problem also. It looks as if the only thoroughly satisfactory answer will be an Act of the United States Congress amending the Export Control Act so as to give control over the export from the Philippines of foodstuffs and articles of necessity for Philippine domestic needs.

It is heartening to see how our country is responding to your leadership and we are doing our best to uphold your hands in this far outpost.

Ever sincerely yours,



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S

August 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.P.

Letter from Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Manila, 7/31/41 to the President, marked "Personal and confidential". Wishes to know the President's mind and his desire about Mr. Sayre's remaining in Manila. Original letter sent to the Secretary of State. Copy of President's memorandum and explanation of enclosure sent to the Under Secretary of State.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

6 August 1941

Materials are being accumulated and plans for a big German offensive against the Soviet or or about August 10, it is reported.

Morris reports the German people are not "cheered" by the silence which covers German losses particularly in view of the slow progress on the Eastern Front.

Precarious position of Axis forces in Libya has been confirmed by reports received by the Consul at Tunis.

A large number of Nazi Marines are in Constanta and preparations are being made to recondition various Rumanian Ships which are to be used either as troop transports or as auxiliary cruisers in the Black Sea it is reported.

The Japanese mobilized 500,000 men during the period June and July it is reported. The majority of this force is believed to have been sent to Manchuria. (Russians reported to have 500,000 in Far East.)

Troops defending Tobruk have 30 days food supply, 60 days ammunition supply and very limited water supply. The fleet is unable to continue supplying this force. [2] 40 ships sunk in the port and 5 destroyers sunk outside the port show the extent of Axis air control over Tobruk. Relief must be effected by fall or Tobruk will have to surrender it is reported.

British sources do not believe that the Russians will undertake an offensive on the Finnish Front.

Stalin's Decree that civilian population be armed has been followed effectively. Irregulars also reported cooperating with OGPU in laying waste to the country in the path of the invaders it is reported.

Two Hundred Officers of the Colombian Army have been arrested and are being held incommunicado on charge of conspiracy against the Government.

Ecuador political situation is very delicate and an imminent change of Government is possible, it is reported.

Recruiting activities for week ending 25 July, 1941.

Accepted for first enlistment.....	228
First enlistments.....	1423
Reenlistments, continuous service.....	42
Reenlistments, under broken service.....	17
Total.....	1482

While violation of the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Authority by Naval aircraft occurs at such infrequent intervals as to occasion an infinitesimal portion [3] of the total hazards to commercial operations, the importance of this problem is recognized. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has not approved the recommendations of the Navy (and Army?) to establish a permanent board to participate in planning to control violations of Civil Aeronautics Authority regulations which are caused by lack of segregation, zoning of airports, communication facilities between aircraft and aircraft to ground, and of authority of any agency—Army, Navy or commercial—to ascertain its own priority in a given area.

The Bureau of Ordnance appreciates the cooperation that is being given by the Army in furnishing machine gun ammunition. For the first half of the year, about 40% of the Navy's allotment was received and all special tasks were taken care of. At present, if necessary, the Bureau will be supplied with sufficient ammunition for any special task and up to 60% of its allotment. By September or October, the War Department will have sufficient small arms ammunition capacity available to take care of the Bureau 100%.

Typhoon damage in Guam is \$20,000 according to reported preliminary estimates.

[4] *Solicitation by Jehovah's Witnesses* in Independence, Kansas, effectively stopped by joint police and American Legion plan to send a policeman with the solicitor to open each interview by saying the canvasser represented "this organization that does not believe in saluting the American Flag, and I am just along to help prevent riots such as this organization has precipitated in other communities", Navy Domestic Intelligence reports.

Permission for news correspondents to proceed from London to Iceland has been withheld and no stories on Iceland are to be released without Navy Department approval except press stories by approved correspondents when these stories are authorized by Comtaskfor nineteen and reference to following items has been deleted: Identification of units participating, strength of force, ships involved, defenses, names of individuals, future plans or movements, amount and type of equipment.

Contract has been awarded the Naval Reserve Training School at Navy Pier, Chicago, Illinois, of \$222,000.00 by Bureau of Yards and Docks.

The Navy ration "shall" include canned, powdered, or concentrated 'fruit juices under the terms of HR4757.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

7 August, 1941

Only a very determined attitude by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies can now deter Japanese military from pushing things to extremes, the British Ambassador at Tokyo reports.

"An expected triumph over the Red Army by October and an invasion of the Persian Gulf Area and India by Spring are two events on Hitler's calendar" reports to the British indicate.

Eden reports Turkish friendship still affords huge advantages to the British and "desires" the United States to aid Britain in supplying military supplies and equipment to Turkey as promptly as possible.

MacMurray (Ankara, Turkey) reports "The opinion that there is no military threat to Turkey is shared by the British Military Officials here but they feel that it is not impossible or even unlikely that in time the situation may change abruptly."

Ships laden with Nazi soldiers reported transiting Swedish territorial waters.

Port Said (Suez Canal) now handling a great volume of [2] tonnage with speed and dispatch and ships of United States Registry and British Troop transports are not using Suez at present a reliable source reports.

Situation in Ecuador reported to be rapidly deteriorating: Anti-American sentiment is increasing; faith in Pan-Americanism is lost and Ecuadorans feel that the days of their country's life as an independent nation are numbered unless prompt action is taken by the United States.

Canary Islands Garrison increased from 12,000 to 53,050 in past three months. Because of topography, bad roads and fortifications built or to be built, an attack and seizure of the Canary Islands would be a difficult task in the face of the Garrison as reinforced it is reported.

Germans continue to evince interest in the Sabana Bay and the Sabana del Guabatico Area, Dominica, a natural air landing area 50 miles from the Bay, it is reported.

Nazi planes flying over Iceland 30 July made a detailed reconnaissance, a reliable source reports.

All future sailings of Japanese ships for United States will be postponed indefinitely, the Japanese Foreign [3] Office "admitted", it is reported.

Production of synthetic gasoline in Italy is at a minimum due to the lack of coal. Italians now using oil reserves and are having great difficulty in getting replenishments it is reported. German synthetic gasoline factories reported seriously damaged by the R. A. F. but new ones have been built are operating near Berlin.

WPA Projects in the Navy program. Emergency Relief Act for the fiscal year 1942 was approved 1 July 1941. In contrast to the 1941 act, new bill does not ear-mark a sum of money for use on Federal Agency projects of the type approved in previous years. Instead the \$5,000,000 set aside for all federal agencies will be retained by WPA and allocated to specific projects, that cannot be operated in the state program, when those projects are individually approved by the WPA. Therefore, with but few exceptions, Navy projects that are put in operation will be in state programs under the direction of the State Administrators. The new act authorizes the operation of federal construction projects in the fiscal year 1942 approved under the act of the fiscal year 1941.

[4] *Director of Personnel* reports a survey of civilian supervisory positions in the Navy Department looking toward obtaining higher grades is just being completed and a large number of new allocations have been secured.

Price of red salmon is up 10 cents a pound over last year so the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is ordering an increased amount of medium-reds which have advanced about 2 cents a pound for the same period. The demand for salmon from the Army and under lease-lend is heavy but 20% of this year's pack will be used for these purposes without undue dislocation of the civilian market.

Bureau of Ordnance reports 23,280,000 rounds of 40 mm Bofors and 57,200,000 rounds of 20 mm Oerlikon Ammunition have been ordered. The present program contemplates increasing the orders to a total of 30,480,000 40 mm and 72,200,000 20 mm all for production within the next twelve months. The steel brass, gilding metal and aluminum required presents a serious problem. This is just a start as the contemplated production of Oerlikon guns practically decided upon is 31,000 guns requiring 360,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Eire Government reported considering seeking U. S. Protection of Ireland.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

8 August 1941

Japanese Officers in civilian clothes are arriving in Thai accompanied by a flood of "tourists" a reliable source reports. Thai officials feel their nation is in serious immediate peril from Japan.

Japanese call up more retired Japanese personnel.

Several large groups of transports were observed off Kojo (Korea) heading North during the latter part of July.

Japanese ships reported to be purchasing large amounts of petroleum products in Rio de Janeiro.

The Japanese Naval Inspector's Office New York City was officially closed 7 August.

Fighting on the Eastern Front is characterized by an increased use of flame throwers and radio as a means of communication. Nightly bombing of Moscow reported "light but accurate".

Occupied Thrace has been completely stripped, even to removal of windows and doors it is reported.

All Spanish military leave in the Tangier (North Morocco) Zone was cancelled 4 August, it is reported.

[2] *Aranha* is "most indignant" over British demands concerning Ships Warrant Agreement and declares it will be necessary to close the ports of Brazil to British ships.

Evidence that operations will be undertaken against Iran no matter what answer is given to the British ultimatum (in re: tourists) is reported. However, United States Minister at Bagdad reports British for the time being at least will not move into Iran since it is intimated that their forces there are inadequate.

Greek refugees fleeing into Turkey because of "onset of famine conditions" causing Turks to feel the democracies have left Greece to her fate after serving their purposes. Some are asking what the Turkish people might expect in similar circumstances it is reported.

Threat against Egypt has been removed by Russian War and consequent change of Nazi plans a reliable source reports. Relief of Tobruk (Libya) may be possible if 300 tanks above scheduled deliveries can be attained by 15 September. Australian Troops are in Tobruk.

Crude oil is Germany's real need it is reported. That's why they want Baku (City on Caspian Sea). They are reported to have enough oil refined and in production to carry them through until next year.

[3] *Acting Secretary Bard* stated today it is hoped the strike at the Kearney, New Jersey, Shipbuilding plant can be settled at once, but if management and labor cannot arrive at a settlement, steps must be taken which will in one way or another put this huge shipbuilding plant back into production at the earliest possible moment.

The Judge Advocate General is being asked to secure legislation to enable Navy personnel to use taxis on Official business between the Navy and other Governmental Departments.

25 Officers and 72 Enlisted men have been ordered to a course of RADAR instruction in Canada, beginning 16 August, 1941.

Deliveries of propellers are not satisfactory to meet the needs of airplane production. At the present time, a quantity of completed fighting airplanes are awaiting propeller deliveries. The Navy has on contract 100 training airplanes which are to be equipped with wooden propellers. In addition, the Navy contemplated securing 100 additional wooden propellers from the Army, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

The Bureau of Ordnance is making special efforts to con- [4] serve aluminum and other critical raw materials without interfering with the military efficiency of the product.

The manufacture of torpedoes is being delayed by inability to obtain required quantities of steel as soon as needed. Practically all needed steel is under contract with various firms, and deliveries can only be improved by obtaining higher priority, which has been requested. Requisitions were originally made and proposals advertised for this steel late in 1940 in the usual form. Owing to the fact that most quantities required were small, no bids were received under then existing conditions. When necessity for the material was explained to various companies, bids were finally obtained, the Steel Section of OPM being particularly helpful in this matter, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

A meeting of a select committee to investigate air accidents, headed by Mr. Nichols of the Office of Production Management, held on 7 August, was attended by Army, Navy, OPM, CAA, and Commerce Officials, for a discussion of measures to be taken to insure the general health and prospects of the commercial air carriers of the United States. The subject will be gone into in greater detail later.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

11 August, 1941

The Nazi time-table for defeating the Russian Army and occupying European Russia has been upset by stubborn Russian resistance. The new time-table of the German Army calls for breaking Russian resistance in the area the Germans expect to occupy during the coming winter, this includes territory west of the Volga River, it is reported.

Considerable uneasiness is reported among the German people. Attempts are being made to direct public opinion to the West by an attack on the United States in the Press.

Hitler and his henchmen greatly apprehend a British attack on their unprotected Norwegian flank and Western rear because they are unable at the present time to withdraw either material or men from the Eastern Front, it is reported.

German high command is reported proposing to resume offensive operation in North Africa during the month of September, if the British don't attack before then.

Combined Nazi and Spanish drive on Gibraltar "and else- [2] where" is reported temporarily abandoned because of the situation on the Eastern Front.

Clashes between German and Italian forces in Russia are reported.

Germans are said to be pleased with the 5 August Decree by Weygand to deal directly with Admiral Darlan since they suspect the motives of Weygand.

Nazi Activities in Brazil are being intensified. "Something is brewing" in the Southern part of Brazil and it is believed Argentina is connected with, it, it is reported.

Germans are taking active steps to prevent Dakar from falling into the hands of the United States. Measures are *under consideration* to forestall an Anglo-United States attempt to get Portuguese Bases it is reported.

The Japanese do not expect the Thais to resist occupation it is reported. It is reported Burma will be attacked by combined French and Japanese forces when enough Japanese forces arrive in Indo-China.

Japanese ships are reported to have orders to avoid United States ports and to paint out their flags.

Wholesale Price Index for all Commodities for the week ending 2 August, 1941,—89.2.

Naval strength of:	Germany	Italy	France	Total
Old battleships.....	2		1	3
Battleships.....	2	5	1	8
Heavy cruisers.....	4	4	4	12
Light cruisers.....	4	12	10	26
Destroyers.....	56	97	49	202
Submarines.....	150	76	59	285
Aircraft carriers.....	1		1	2

Approximately 100,000 man days were lost last week in strikes affecting Naval Defense contracts. 6 cases affecting 2810 workers were settled. 28 cases are still open and 16 strikes are pending in which Navy production may be involved. Conferences on the Kearney strike were held over the week end—no change has been reported. An early settlement is hoped for.

AA preference ratings are being given material and machinery necessary for RADAR manufacture.

Typical substitution and conservation of materials which may be necessary include: (1) 10% reduction in chlorine for bleaching paper; (2) palmetto fibre for palmyra fibre used in deck scrubbers; (3) paint cans of terne instead of tin plate; (4) various substitutes for corrosion resisting steel; (5) fibre stock tags instead of zinc.

Research is under way on plane-to-plane gun-fire. The problem is to secure effective fire control in order to take advantage of the full-range of the guns carried. [4] Complete coordination and cooperation is being secured from all Government, British and Private Agencies, it is reported.

The obvious logical uses for lighter-than-air ships are in the detection of—and attack on—mines and submarines, and in the escort, when desirable, of convoys through the coastal shipping lanes. Steps are being taken to determine the value of under-water photography from airships; this would appear to hold potentialities at least under some conditions. Another important project now underway is the development of sweeping equipment to be towed by airships for the destruction of magnetic mines. Corresponding equipment to be used against acoustic mines is also in the picture. This equipment tows on the surface and is energized from the airship. It has been necessary to start from scratch in the design and construction of this equipment but the project is considered to have good prospects for successful achievement.

The average number of Naval Military personnel on the rolls during June 1941 and the payments to retired and reserve personnel are estimated to have been as follows:

	Number	Cost
Personnel, regular—active.....	218,904	\$18,649,680
Personnel, regular—retired.....	17,581	2,520,263
Personnel, reserve—all categories.....	51,807	6,846,131
Total.....	288,292	28,016,074

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

12 August, 1941

Communist Party in the United States reported split with a militant group, believing Russia will be defeated, wanting to "headquarter" the party in United States or South America.

Leahy reports Marshall Petain as saying "that Europe would suffer from famine and plague was already in evidence" and that the United States "was quick to criticize but slow to act."

Leahy reports that the French do not believe Japan will attack Russia.

Reports of big Japanese troop concentrations on Siberian front coincide with a statement by Japanese military quarters that Japan expects a "decisive turn" in Russo-German war within the next two weeks.

There is no clear evidence that the Russians intend to weaken their Far Eastern Forces by transfer of troops to the West, it is reported from Harbin (Manchuria).

Between 18 and 24 Nazi submarines are reported to have recently reached Japan.

Underwater objects dangerous to navigation probably [2] mines have been placed in the Bako Harbor (Pescadores) area, Japan.

Japanese Naval vessels reported at Cape St. Jacques, Saigon (Cochin-China) "or in the river between" are: 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 1 aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats and 9 small minelayers or sweepers.

Japanesc aircraft factories in the Tokyo-Nagoya areas now working 24 hours per day, seven days a week, estimated total of 500 per month plane production.

Nazis Circles are reported losing faith in ultimate victory.

Finland will be rewarded by Germans with strips of Sweden and Norway, it is reported.

100 light armored scouting cars and about 2,000 Nazi "tourists" are reported near or in Algiers.

The Vatican "apparently believes" that the tension between Ecuador and Peru is only temporarily relaxed and that hostilities "must" be expected to be resumed unless outside economic or military pressure is employed in order to enforce peace.

British reported to have taken 10 or 12 Finnish ships (totaling about 30,000 tons) detained in British ports.

[3] *Advanced progress* is reported on a research project involving the use of properly colored lights on bridges and exposed gun-mounts which do not create "light-blindness" and which are not discernible from a distance.

In addition to contracts awarded for the Fiscal Year 1941, amounting to \$2,196,969,630.45, Letters of Intent have been issued to a total of \$950,026,300.00 These letters of Intent ultimately will be superseded by contracts it is reported by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

The raw material situation continues to become more critical and it may be that the problem may be more serious than has been the case with machine tools. The Office of Production Management is following the problem very closely and has been of considerable assistance to the Bureau of Ordnance in making distribution to more important contractors, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

A survey of airplane plants covering the segregation of magnesium and aluminum scrap, is reported under way.

A special mission has been sent to London to study for the Navy and Maritime Commission, all matters relating to navigation, storage and distribution of petroleum products in the United Kingdom.

Modern influence mines and degaussing are new. At one [4] time during World War II until countermeasures were perfected, mines were accounting for more shipping losses than submarines or aircraft. Constant application to countermeasures is necessary to deal with existing types and new types as they appear. Studies now are under way on offensive and defensive operations including (1) various ship influences that can be used to fire a mine (2) surveying technique (3) mine recovery (4) degaussing (5) mine, firing mechanism. A proving ground (Magic Carpet) will be completed shortly. Survey ranges, deperming stations and wiping and flashing stations are in operation. Temporary degaussing now is giving way to permanent degaussing under instructions from the Bureaus of Ordnance and Ships and while the major studies of degaussing are expected to be completed by the end of this year, "degaussing will be with us always".

A Coordinator and Supervisor for all duplicating in the Navy Department is under consideration. Savings in cost and amount of space are expected.

Admiral Towers reports as far as the Navy is concerned there is no shortage of high octane gasoline.

800,000 men are estimated to be in the Turkish Army.

August 28, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

S

Mr. Secretary:

In connection with your proposed call upon the President to discuss with him the proposal of the Japanese Government which the Japanese Ambassador desires to present to him on August 28 in regard to a meeting of the heads of the American and Japanese Governments for the purpose of endeavoring to reach a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area, observations are offered as follows:

It seems apparent from the character of the document which the Japanese Ambassador proposes to hand to the President, a copy of which he handed you last night, and various other indications that the Japanese Government will adopt a strategy designed to put through an agreement couched in general terms which will leave the application of those terms wide open. The Japanese will probably argue that the situation calls for speedy action on the ground that only in this way can there be averted the danger of control of the Japanese Government passing into the hands of the extremists, which would result in the opportunity being lost for a peaceful adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan. (Our Embassy has reported that the internal situation in Japan is serious and there
may

-2-

may be a sound basis for this argument.) The Japanese will probably also argue that for this reason it is essential that points of agreement be confined to broad questions leaving specific details to be dealt with subsequently.

It will be recalled that these are the very tactics which the Japanese Government has employed in connection with the proposals for an understanding which were presented to our Government last spring. It will be recalled too that our deliberate careful study of their proposals revealed inconsistencies between their professions of acceptance of the principles of respect for China's territorial integrity and of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations on the one hand and their reluctance on the other hand to agree to withdrawing troops from north China and Inner Mongolia and to relinquish in practice special economic principles which they have asserted in China.

Should we accede to Japan's desire to conclude an agreement first covering only broad principles, there is a danger that we shall not have in fact reached a meeting of minds on what is implied in the actual application of those principles to concrete cases.

We have consistently informed the Japanese that, in
the

-3-

the light of the many evidences which have come to your attention that the Japanese Government is pursuing a course diametrically opposed to the spirit underlying the conversations which you have held with the Japanese Ambassador we must await some clear indication of the Japanese Government's intention to pursue peaceful courses before we could profitably continue to pursue our conversations. It is thought that the President may wish to reemphasize to the Japanese Ambassador that our views in this respect remain unchanged. He may wish to recall to the Ambassador that in addition we found during the course of our conversations difficulties arising from (1) the disposition of the Japanese Government to stress its alignment with the Axis; (2) the intention of the Japanese Government to retain troops in Chinese territory for defense against communistic activities; and (3) lack of adequate clarification of the application to Japan's proposed program of economic cooperation with China of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. The President may wish to suggest that these points would need to be satisfactorily disposed of as a condition precedent to a general peaceful settlement.

The President would then go on to offer you suggestions that in the light of all developments which have taken

(10)

-4-

place, it would be helpful at this time if the Japanese Government could give some practical evidence of its intention to readjust its position and to pursue courses of peace; the giving of such practical evidence would not only contribute toward convincing the American people and the world at large of the earnestness of the Japanese Government's ^{declared} intentions, but would also serve, it is believed, to make easier the task of bringing about reconciliation between Japan and China, in accordance with Japan's earnestly professed desire. He might say that as the Japanese Government is in a far better position to know than is the Government of the United States what Japan is prepared to do by way of giving practical evidence of its intentions, this Government hesitates to suggest concrete measures which the Japanese Government might take.

The President might then in conclusion say that he is glad to learn from the Ambassador of the Japanese Government's desire to pursue peaceful courses; that he will be glad to give careful study to the paper which the Japanese Ambassador has given him; and that with regard to the Japanese Government's proposal for a meeting between himself and Prince Konoé, while the President will be glad to try

to try

-5-

to try and arrange such a meeting, he feels that precedent to the taking place of such a meeting there should be a meeting of minds between the two Governments on fundamental principles, as it would be most unfortunate from the point of view of both Governments if when such a meeting takes place there should ensue a failure to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Ballantine
FE:Ballantine:MHP

Admiral Richardson lunched with President Roosevelt on July 8, 1940 at one o'clock.

Admiral Richardson had an appointment with President Roosevelt on July 11, 1940 at twelve o'clock noon.

Admiral Richardson and Gov. Leahy lunched with President Roosevelt on October 8, 1940 at one o'clock.

SECRETMemo for The President:

The Commanding Officer of the 4th Regiment of U.S. Marines believes that Japan will soon act toward the removal of French and British forces from Shanghai basing their action on an enforcement of neutrality. They are planning on seizing the French and British areas and specifically plan to prevent any extension of our sector.

The CinCAF suggests that a complete revision of the Settlement defense plan is necessary between the Japanese and Americans and possibly the Italians. He does not believe that we can entrust the safety of our Nationals, in the present British and French concessions to the Japanese protection, for several reasons: i.e.

- (1) the Japanese Commander at Shanghai has submitted a comprehensive plan to Tokyo for entering the French and British Settlements, taking over the defense areas by the Japanese Army and Navy and disarming the French and British troops, if not evacuated.
- (2) A similar plan has been proposed for the French Settlement at Hankow.
- (3) These Japanese plans are to be executed under the guise of neutrality enforcement and the Japanese then plan on proposing a revised defense plan.
- (4) The Japanese are engaged in extensive hostilities on two fronts which might require the withdrawal of their forces at any time; thereby leaving the Settlements unprotected.

In view of these reasons and to effect true neutrality the CinCAF intends to propose that the United States take over the defense of all evacuated sectors, with possibly a certain amount of small adjustments on departures from the proposed. The CinCAF has talked this matter over with the American Consul General.

This information is highly secret.

W. P. Smith

MEV This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Tokyo
Dated December 8, 1941.
Rec'd 6:23 a. m., 10th

SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington.*
1910, December 8, 1 p. m.

Confidential

Embassy's 1906 December 8, 1 a. m.

One. The Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock this morning asked me to call on him at his official residence.

Two. He handed me a 13 page Memorandum, dated today, which he said had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present to you this morning (evening of December 7th Washington time). He said that he had already been in touch with the Emperor who desired that the aforesaid Memorandum be regarded as his reply to the President's message.

Three. The Foreign Minister thereupon made to me the following oral statement:

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President. He has graciously let known his [2] wishes to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter's message:

Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore desired that the President will kindly refer to this reply.

Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact".

GREW.

HPD

TRB This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 12:17 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.

1384. September 4, 9 p. m. (Section One). Strictly Confidential for the Secretary and Under-Secretary only.

One. The Foreign Minister asked me to call this afternoon and in a long conversation he emphasized the desire of the Prime Minister and himself to make every effort to bring about the proposed early meeting between the representative heads of the two governments and to make that meeting successful because if it should fail in achieving its fundamental object he feared that further efforts would be futile. With these ends in view the Japanese Government is prepared to place its cards face up on the table and provisionally to enter into certain commitments as well as provisionally to specify certain reciprocal commitments which it would expect on the part of the United States, these points to serve as a basis for the proposed discussions [2] between the President and the Prime Minister. The Minister said that he had cabled these points this afternoon to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington but he asked me also to cable them to my Government because he feared the risk of inaccurate reporting through possible misunderstandings in the English language.

Two. The Minister pointed out the readiness of the Japanese Government to concur in the points already tentatively.

GREW

ALC

TRB This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

Tokyo.
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 1:45 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.

1384, September 4, 9 p. m., (Section Two).

agreed upon in the preliminary informal conversations which have taken place in Washington and furthermore that points C, D, and E below provide solution for three of the principal matters left unsolved in those conversations. He particularly emphasized the importance of point C because it envisages an interpretation of article three of the Tri-Partite Pact other than the interpretation placed upon that article by Mr. Matsuoka. Admiral Toyoda spoke of this point several times in our conversation indicating the importance that he attaches to it.

Three. While the Minister gave me the Japanese points in writing he urged me to cable them in our most secret code and I have therefore paraphrased them without altering the sense, as follows.

Four. The Japanese Government undertakes the [2] following provisional commitments:

(A) Readiness to express concurrence in such matters as were already tentatively agreed upon in the informal preliminary conversations in Washington; no (repeat no) military advance will be made by Japan from French Indochina against any areas adjoining Indochina and no military action will be undertaken by Japan against any regions lying north of Japan without justifiable reasons.

GREW.

RR

NWN This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.

1384, September 4, 9 p. m. (Section three).

C. The attitude of both the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe will be determined by concepts of self-defense and protection and in the event that the United States should come to participate in that war, Japan will independently (repeat independently) determine the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and its implementation of the pact by virtue of that independent interpretation.

D. It will be Japan's endeavor to bring Sino-Japanese relations to a normal and general rehabilitation, and once this rehabilitation is realized, Japan is prepared to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with such agreements as may be reached between China and Japan.

E. So long as the economic activities of the United States in China are carried out on [2] an equitable basis, such activities will not be restricted.

F. Activities by Japan in the region of the Southwestern Pacific will be pursued only by peaceful means and the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce will be reserved; furthermore the production and procurement by the United States of such natural resources as it may need in that region will be accorded Japanese cooperation;

GREW

LMS

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 10:35 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.
1384, September 4, 9 p. m. (Section Four).

(G) Measures will be taken by Japan such as may become necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and Japan, and on the basis of reciprocity Japan is prepared, as soon as a settlement is reached, to discontinue immediately application to the United States of the regulations applying to the control of transactions by foreigners.

The American Government provisionally undertakes that:

(A) In response to Japan's commitment set forth in point (D) above, no actions or measures will be taken by the United States which would prejudice Japan's efforts to settle the China affair; (the Minister said that this point referred to American aid to Chiang Kai-Shek);

(B) Japan's commitment set forth in point (F) above will be reciprocated by the United States;

[2] (C) Any military measures by the United States in the area of the southwestern Pacific or the Far East will be suspended;

(D) As soon as a settlement is reached between the two countries, Japan's commitment set forth in point (D) above will immediately be reciprocated by the United States both by discontinuing application to Japan of the so-called freezing order and by withdrawing the prohibition against the use of the Panama Canal by Japanese ships.

GREW.

KLP

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 9:25 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

RUSH.
1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Five. After examining briefly the foregoing points, I expressed to the Minister the personal opinion that some of the points as set forth would appear to be open to very wide interpretation, to which he replied that the proposed commitments would of course be subject to discussion at the forthcoming conference. I gather that they have been put forward by the Japanese Government at this time chiefly as a gauge of Japan's good faith in seeking a general settlement. The Minister suggested that the reciprocal commitments as finally adopted should be formulated in a secret agreement and that after the meeting of the representative heads of the two governments, a press release couched in general terms should be issued after mutual agreement. I pointed out the difficulty if not the impossibility under our democratic system of withholding from the [2] American public such concrete results as the proposed conference might achieve but the subject was not pursued.

Six. In this connection, it seems to me that the specifications and stipulations which must be agreed upon with regard to each one of the points making up the provisional agreement put forward by the Japanese Government before any report of a concrete character could be laid before the American public could not be formulated in detail within the necessarily brief time available for the proposed conference of heads of governments. It occurs to me

GREW.

HTM

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941.
Rec'd 10:50 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

RUSH.

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

That the problem of publicity might be met for the time being, at the termination of the conference, by an announcement that the Japanese Government had expressed concurrence with the principles of policy governing relations between nations which have been enunciated by the Secretary of State and that a broad plan of adjustment of Pacific problems which would give effect to those principles of policy, was in process of formulation. The suggested announcement might further refer to the efforts of both Governments to contribute toward the establishment of a world of freedom (as put forward by the President) and conclude with an expression of gratification that progress toward such an end had been achieved without sacrifice by either nation of its just and legitimate aims and aspirations.

Seven. The Minister said he understood that [2] Admiral Nomura had seen the President again yesterday but that the Ambassador's report of the conversation had not yet been received. I replied that I also was without information of that conversation.

Eight. The difference in the tone and substance of the Foreign Minister's statement to me as conveyed by Mr. Terasaki on August 29, as reported in my 1347, August 29, 9 p.m., and his statement today, is manifest and is significant of the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to reach a general settlement with our country. (END OF MESSAGE).

GREW.

KLP

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, September 9, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

The following extract from a personal letter from General MacArthur to me may be of interest to you:

"The Philippine Army units that have been called are now (August 30) mobilizing in a most satisfactory manner and the whole program is progressing by leaps and bounds. President Roosevelt's proclamation had a most momentous effect throughout the Far East. Locally it changed a feeling of defeatism to the highest state of morale I have ever seen. It was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm by all classes. You, Secretary Stimson, and the President may congratulate yourselves on the excellent timing of the action.

"I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the formation of this command. With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid."

By commercial vessels from San Francisco on August 26th and September 8th, the following personnel and matériel have been shipped to Manila.

One antiaircraft regiment

One tank battalion (less one company) with 50 tanks

Fifty latest model P-forty pursuit planes, along with ammunition, and some other items of matériel.

The departure of the Flying Fortress squadron from Hawaii was delayed because of the run-way at Wake Island. It is now en route and arrived at New Britain this morning. It should be in Manila tomorrow, or the next day.

GENERAL MACARTHUR,
Chief of Staff.

1984

September 26, 1941.

Private

My dear President Quezon:

I am, indeed, sorry to hear from Frank Sayre that you have had another slight setback in your complete recovery. I have been greatly concerned by your illness and I do hope that you are taking care of yourself and that you will soon regain your old-time vigor.

I cannot, of course, say so officially, but I send you my very good wishes for success in the election in November. Frank Sayre tells me that there seems to be little question that you and Mr. Osmeña will be returned by a large vote.

May I also tell you how happy I am in the reports of the success of the defense preparations. I wish I could tell you at length of the increased belief that the Philippines can be adequately defended. You in the Philippines have a great majority among the people and we here are beginning increasingly unified in our policy and determination.

With my sincere regards to you and to Mrs. Quezon,

Faithfully yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Manuel L. Quezon,
President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
Manila, P. I.

1000 Philippines

September 28, 1941.

Dear Frank:-

Many thanks for yours of September
fifteenth. I am enclosing a copy of a letter
I have just sent to President Quason.

Things here are definitely better
insofar as public opinion goes.

As ever yours,

FDR

xPP7206

Honorable Frank B. Bayre,
The United States High Commissioner,
Manila,
P. I.

(Enclosure)

1000 Philippines High Commissioner

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILAVia airmail

September 15, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your letter of August twenty-third. To know that I have your "full confidence" in these critical times means everything to me and enables us to go forward under full steam to carry out your policies in this far part of the world.

Your speech of September eleventh stirred our souls. I pray that our country may be united 100% behind you. No other course seems to me possible. America cannot surrender to lawless German aggression on the high seas in 1941 any more than in 1917. My profound admiration goes out to you as the leader who has forced American public opinion to face this issue and to face it before it is too late.

In this part of the world I believe our policy of firmness and fairness is bearing fruit. From all I can learn Japan's march Southward is halted at least for the present; and I believe that if an open break with us and with England can be avoided she will ultimately hang herself. Her ill-chosen policies are placing her in a more and more impossible position. Indeed the danger is that she has left herself no face-saving way out.

Here in the Philippines all at present is going well. General MacArthur is progressively incorporating Filipino troops into the American Army. President Quezon and other Commonwealth officials are loyally cooperating. I think there is no question as to the sincere loyalty of almost all elements of the Filipino people to the American flag. The realization is being forced home to them every day that without the protection of America they have no chance either of independence or autonomy.

President Quezon has had another setback in his long and slow recovery. He has to limit himself strictly in

his

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

x 144-A
Radio Address of 9/11/41 "S"

- 2 -

his activities and has lost the vigor and fire that goes with robust health. I fear that he may never recover them.

August twenty-eighth was the deadline for nominations of candidates for the election on November eleventh of President, Vice President, 24 Senators and 98 Representatives. The election of Mr. Quezon as President and of Mr. Osmena as Vice President are foregone conclusions. To all intents and purposes there is only a single political party here and unless Mr. Quezon's health should fail his election will be almost undisputed. The list of 24 Senators to be elected under the new Constitutional amendments was virtually made up by Mr. Quezon himself, with the aid of his principal associates, before the convention met. The 500 delegates meeting in convention approved the list without a dissenting voice. The result will be a further strengthening of Mr. Quezon's political power.

During the past two months our office has been working hard on export control and foreign funds control. Each of these has been functioning smoothly and well and we have received full cooperation from the Commonwealth Government officials. Through them we have been enabled to build up effective economic armament in this part of the world.

With continuing admiration, believe me,

Ever sincerely yours,



400
Hawaii

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

I wholeheartedly agree that
the request for a six months'
food reserve for the Hawaiian
Islands should be disapproved.
Under existing military, naval
and economic conditions such a
reserve is unnecessary.

F. D. R.

x119

Memorandum for the President from the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
9/18/41, in re submission to the Budget
Bureau by the OPACS, a proposal that
\$3,400,000 be allocated by the President
to that agency, from the "Emergency Fund for
the President", for the purchase and maintenance
(on a revolving basis) in the Island of
Oahu, T.H., of a six months' reserve
(Over)

SEPT. 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the President :

There has been submitted to this office by the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, Office for Emergency Management, a proposal that \$3,400,000 be allocated by you to that agency, from the "Emergency Fund for the President", for the purchase and maintenance (on a revolving basis) in the Island of Oahu, T. H., of a six months' reserve (approximately 35,000 tons) of basic foodstuffs and feedstuffs for the civilian population, poultry, and livestock of that island. In brief, this proposal is based (1) upon the fact that the Island of Oahu, under existing conditions, imports approximately sixty percentum of all its food requirements, and (2) the fear that conditions may arise in the Pacific during the present emergency which would cut off or seriously curtail such imports. While losses through deterioration is to be expected, it is the contention that the bulk of the capital investment would be recovered at the end of the emergency.

The question at issue has been investigated by this office and a conference held with representatives of the agencies concerned, as a result of which the following facts and opinions have been obtained:

1. A representative of the War Department (Colonel Russell, War Plans Division, General Staff) advises that, while that Department would not be opposed to the carrying out of the proposal in question, since it might relieve the Army of the possible necessity of aiding in the feeding of citizens of the Island of Oahu, that the Department would not assign a very high priority to such a proposal, nor, if such funds were applicable, divert any part of its National Defense funds thereto. He was of the opinion that the probability of a situation arising which would seriously interrupt the flow of necessary food supplies from the West Coast of the Continental United States to the Island of Oahu was remote.

2. A representative of the Navy Department (Captain Lowe, Office of Chief of Naval Operations) expressed the view that his Department did not look upon the building up of a six months' food reserve in the Island of Oahu as an emergency matter and had no fear that the importation of the necessary food supplies for that island would be cut off or curtailed by enemy action.

[2] 3. A representative of the State Department (Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations) was of the opinion that action on the part of the United States Government in building up a reserve food supply in Hawaii would have a bad political effect, and give the impression that this Government was uneasy regarding the security of Hawaii and the further impression that it had in contemplation some offensive move, which might create a war situation in the Pacific; that creation of either or both of these impressions would be to our disadvantage; that he did not believe Hawaii was in any danger; that we are not contemplating a movement which would bring that region in danger; and that even if a war situation developed in the Pacific it would be a long time, if ever, before the line of communication between our coast and Hawaii would be cut.

4. As previously indicated, the proposal of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply for the creation of a food reserve in the Island of Oahu, is deemed by that agency to be a necessary precautionary measure, which should be undertaken at this time by the Federal Government. It is stated that this proposal is considered by the Governor of Hawaii and his Emergency Committee as the best and only sure method of preventing unnecessary hardships to the civilian population in that Territory.

5. This question of a reserve food supply in Hawaii was submitted to you in May 1941, by Mr. Wayne Cox, Liaison Officer, Office for Production Management, and you advised him that he might speak to the Secretaries of War and Navy about it, but that your own feeling was that it would be a mistake to build up a food reserve in Hawaii at the present time, especially because it would, in all probability, be possible to send food to Hawaii.

6. In the fall of 1939 there was a shipping strike on the Pacific Coast. Being forewarned, the importers of the Territory of Hawaii took steps to increase the volume of imports of foodstuffs. As an indication that the importers of Hawaii are presently looking ahead, because of existing world conditions, statistics of the Department of Commerce show that for a five months' period, January-May, 1941, Hawaiian imports of only 8 basic food commodities for civilian consumption were increased over a similar period of 1940 by 8,130 tons.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

1. A review of import statistics would indicate that the merchants of Hawaii are capable of building up a substantial reserve of basic food supplies. Cooperation of the Governor and his Emergency Committee might reasonably be expected to insure the creation of a reasonable reserve.

[3] 2. It would appear, from views expressed by representatives of the War, Navy, and State Departments, that it would not be a difficult task to provide adequate food supplies for the civilian population and our armed forces in Hawaii in the event of an emergency in the Pacific.

3. In the opinion of the representative of the State Department the creation of a food reserve in Hawaii at this time by the Federal Government, under existing conditions in the Pacific, would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.

4. If conditions should so change as to make it necessary for the Federal Government to provide for the food requirements of the civilian population of Hawaii, it is believed that, with funds immediately available from the "Emergency Fund for the President", no difficulty should be experienced. It does not appear that existing conditions warrant such action at this time.

5. It is recommended that the request of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies for an allotment of \$3,400,000 from the "Emergency Fund for the President", for the purpose hereinbefore outlined, be disapproved, at least for the time being.

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director.

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

HYDE PARK, N. Y., *September 28, 1941.*

Confidential

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

I wholly agree with your pencilled note—to recite the more liberal original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and re-emphasize my hope for a meeting.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My suggestion
on Jap-situation -
for you to read letter.
CH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

When the Jap. Prime Minister
requested a meeting with you,
he indicated a fairly basic
program in generalities, but
left upon such questions as
getting troops out of China,
Tripartite pact, non-discrimi-
nation in trade in Pacific.

We indicated desire for
meeting, but suggested

2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

first an agreement in principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success of the Conference.

Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic questions, and would continue to urge the meeting at no means.

My suggestion is to recall their more liberal attitude when they first sought the

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3

meeting with you, with their
much narrowed position now,
and earnestly ask if they can-
not go back to their orig-
inal liberal attitude
so we can start discussions
again or agreement in
principle before the meeting
and ~~then~~ emphasize your
desire for a meeting

C.F.
Nav

October 14, 1941.

x480
x480
Hawick

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of September 22, and particularly with reference to the 4-engine bombers, may I say that I am in complete agreement about the necessity for the 4-engine bombers in the Philippine Islands and Hawaii and I realize that all of our production of the two new types of bomber would be pretty well tied up for this purpose through February.

I think, however, that the total distribution of these new bombers between February 1942 and July 1942, as concerns our own needs and the British, is not a proper strategic distribution. It seems to me that after February more of these planes than have now been allocated should go to the British.

I believe it is more important strategically to have the British flying these planes in combat than it is to strengthen our Newfoundland unit with 4-engine bombers.

I wish you would examine again with particular reference to the 4-engine bomber - and I refer now exclusively to the two new types of bomber with superchargers - as to whether or not there can not be a distribution which would give 100 to 150 more of these 4-engine bombers to the British after February next but prior to July 1 than you now recommend.

I think it is important to make this decision at as early a date as possible because of the necessity of equipping them with Sperry equipment.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) G. Douglas I. Bennett

The Honorable
The Secretary of War. x25

HLR/jmb
10/13/41

x4193
x249 official
48

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

There is attached a suggested letter to Secretary Stimson.

There will be a minimum of 675 of these new 4-engine bombers made prior to July 1 and the schedule provides for the British to receive only about 124 of these.

You can readily see that we could handle the Philippine and Hawaii business, as well as other important strategic centers, and still give the British 100 to 150 more than is now planned. I think the Philippines require 101 more planes and, as I recall, Hawaii about 50.

The Army plans to use the balance in Panama, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, et cetera.

I have no doubt that these big planes are needed in all of these places but it is simply a question of relative importance.

Very sincerely yours,



HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.*x b. F. Lend Lease*
x 775

SECRETWAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1941

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your letter of September 18 an estimate has been made to indicate the total number of American built aircraft produced between October 1, 1941 and July 1, 1942 which, in my opinion, could be given up for export to other nations without too dangerously reducing the defensive strength of our vital outposts and task forces. That estimate is presented in the form of a table, and is attached as Tab A. It is based upon minimum allocations to the Army and Navy to fulfill their most urgent needs.

It will be seen from this table that the exports granted in each class except that of four-engine bombers, as well as in the total of all classes, far exceeds the rule of thumb of 50 percent mentioned in your letter. After most careful consideration, I have concluded that I can not approve of the application of that rule to the four-engine bomber class on which we have already taken such heavy deferments. The following table shows these deferments, including the further contributions which we feel we can make now.

To go further would, in my opinion, impose a risk upon the defense of our vital outposts which would be excessive.

<u>Normal Re-</u> <u>quirements</u>	<u>Reduced Allotment</u> <u>Agreed to 9/10/41</u>	<u>Status After Exports</u> <u>Now Contemplated</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
4	2	2	Philippine Islands
3	2	2	Hawaii
2	1	1	Panama
1	1	1	Newfoundland
2	1	1	Alaska
2	1	1	Iceland-Greenland
1	0	0	Puerto Rico
5	1	1	U. S.
6	2	1	South America
1	0	0	Mexico
2	0	0	ABC-1 (England)
<u>30 Groups</u>	<u>11 Groups</u>	<u>10 Groups</u>	

SECRET


SECRET

No airplanes are available for training of four-engine pilots, for reserve, for ABC-1, or for Puerto Rico, under the proposed Army allotment.

I invite your particular attention to Tab B and Tab C which indicate, respectively, the basis for the Army's requirements and the comparison of production with requirements.

The majority of all bombers, heavy and medium, available for export, cannot be equipped with Sperry bomb sights or automatic flight control equipment. There are on order, for the Army, less than one hundred and fifty sets of this equipment. Bombardment airplanes in addition to this number must be delivered without bomb sights and automatic flight equipment unless the Norden equipment, which is standard on our planes, is released for export.

Respectfully yours,



Secretary of War

SECRET

ESTIMATED TOTAL AIRPLANE PRODUCTION, ARMY AND NAVY ALLOCATIONS, AND AIRPLANES FOR EXPORT
(October, 1941 through June, 1942)

MONTH	1941										1942										TOTAL										
	OCT		NOV		DEC		JAN		FEB		MAR		APR		MAY		JUN		JUL			AUG		SEPT		OCT		NOV		DEC	
	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION		AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION	AMT	PRO-PORTION
ARMY - 4 Engines	28	3	25	44	18	32	49	33	36	377	70	37	100	85	25	318	100	18	136	307	19	137	99	18	101	42	29	610	291	219	
NAVY - Patrol & Recon	38	3	25	44	13	32	60	33	36	377	70	37	100	86	25	318	100	18	130	307	19	137	103	18	104	65	19	826	397	629	
TOTAL	66	6	50	88	31	64	109	66	72	754	140	74	200	171	50	636	200	36	266	684	38	274	202	119	205	154	48	1436	698	1248	
ARMY - 8 Engines	28	6	29	27	4	23	71	47	26	34	22	13	36	25	11	28	28	-	52	26	26	60	20	70	30	40	607	200	205		
NAVY - Patrol & Recon	29	55	40	80	36	44	154	77	79	178	65	113	66	96	180	54	132	213	340	235	133	371	182	349	209	166	2225	1077	1148		
TOTAL	57	81	69	160	40	88	225	124	103	212	87	126	102	127	191	82	264	326	374	270	269	442	282	419	305	272	2832	1277	2493		
ARMY	279	24	225	270	3	269	311	2	309	324	9	315	275	32	263	313	41	273	308	75	233	308	308	254	350	227	2761	398	2363		
NAVY	27	27	10	60	29	31	87	25	62	110	20	90	124	34	90	139	40	90	150	54	96	146	76	90	232	111	1280	420	647		
TOTAL	306	51	235	330	32	300	408	27	371	434	29	405	409	66	353	452	81	363	458	129	329	454	384	344	482	361	3970	818	3152		
ARMY	446	149	342	728	209	359	675	284	421	800	305	653	844	353	494	1077	386	643	654	305	521	771	336	640	429	411	1777	2624	4379		
NAVY	96	95	27	60	10	20	75	40	35	61	10	25	60	10	20	61	43	20	81	54	20	67	27	70	53	20	611	124	227		
TOTAL	542	244	369	788	219	379	750	324	456	861	315	708	904	463	714	1138	429	663	735	359	541	838	363	710	482	431	2388	3528	4606		
ARMY	629	628	608	1105	254	611	1320	419	681	1375	427	948	1459	531	922	1754	618	1160	1334	624	878	1541	705	644	1609	816	293	11,466	1668	7698	
NAVY	116	76	76	148	74	71	276	125	121	210	69	127	211	110	121	245	135	110	206	164	147	345	175	139	270	148	2209	1170	1040		
TOTAL	745	699	684	1253	328	682	1596	544	802	1585	516	1075	1670	641	1043	2000	753	1270	1540	788	1025	1886	880	783	1877	964	3143	2838	1708		
ARMY	38	35	-	40	40	-	54	54	-	115	66	79	132	38	36	248	43	395	65	43	23	49	43	5	44	34	10	713	384	333	
NAVY	40	54	6	71	65	6	75	60	4	95	35	-	130	130	-	155	155	-	195	145	-	190	240	-	133	137	-	1073	2013	10	
TOTAL	78	89	6	111	105	6	129	114	10	210	101	79	262	168	36	303	198	105	230	200	23	198	193	5	176	164	10	1786	1407	133	
ARMY	27	27	-	19	19	-	20	11	2	24	20	4	24	30	4	71	20	4	24	20	4	24	20	4	24	30	4	177	151	28	
NAVY	27	27	-	19	19	-	20	11	2	24	20	4	24	30	4	71	20	4	24	20	4	24	20	4	24	30	4	177	151	28	
TOTAL	54	54	-	38	38	-	40	22	4	48	40	8	48	60	8	142	40	8	48	40	8	48	40	8	48	60	8	354	302	56	

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRBORNE
AND AIR FORCE

Requirements for heavy bombers are most critical. An immediate requirement of 11 groups (748 airplanes) exists. After the completion of war production, the heavy bombers allotted to the Army cannot be ready until, and only then, will only provide 597 airplanes. Taken together with the current October 1st will make possible activation of the following units:

136	(1 Group)	for the Philippine Islands
64	(1 Group)	Newfoundland
64	(1 Group)	Ireland or Greenland
64	(1 Group)	Panama
136	(2 Groups)	Alaska
64	(1 Group)	Alaska
64	(1 Group)	United States
64	(1 Group)	British Guiana and Brazil
136	(10 Groups)	with a small reserve of 17 airplanes to provide for normal attrition.

The need for long range land based bombers in the critical North Atlantic theater is imperative due to the fact that water based patrol planes may not be able to operate in that area in the winter.

The two groups in the Philippines is the smallest force that can have any real influence in that theatre. A larger force is needed if Japanese aggression in the Far East is to be retarded.

Attention is invited to the fact that, in the above allotment, no heavy bombers have been provided for ABC 1 although in the Joint Staff Conversations it was specifically agreed to have available three full groups with reserves (255 airplanes) for employment in England.

The other requirements have been reduced to a single group at such vital points as Panama, Alaska, and the South American theater.

This allotment does not meet the minimum requirements of the Army.

TABLE C

COMPARISON OF PRODUCTION, EXPORT, REQUIREMENTS
OF
COMBAT TYPE AIRCRAFT
October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942

Types	Total Production Schedule 19/1/41 to 7/1/42	Recom- mended for Ex- port	Balance Retained by Army & Navy	Army & Navy Re- quire- ments	Defi- ciencies in Army & Navy Require- ments	Army & Navy Im- mediate Require- ments	Deficiencies in Army & Navy Immediate Requirements
(A) Heavy Bomber	810	219	591	2550 (2)	2160	748 (3)	358
(N) Patrol Bomber	6	0	6	6	0	6	0
(A) Medium Bomber	1214	939	275	85 (2)	0	1360 (3)	485
(N) Patrol Bomber 2 Eng.	497	205	292	262	0	202	0
(A) Light & Dive Bomber	2765	2367	398	837	439	770 (3)	372
(N) Torpedo Bomber	118	0	118	118	0	118	0
(N) Dive Bomber	1069	647	422	420	0	420	0
(A) Pursuit	7177	4373	2804	6662 (2)	3858	3510 (3)	706
(N) Fighter	642	217	424	424	0	424	0
(A) Observation	711	517	194	2043	1649	1635 (3)	1241
(N) Scout	1021	18	1003	1013	0	1013	0
Totals	16547	9392	7245	114360	8106	10206	3162
Army Requirements	-	-	-	12177	8106	8023	3162
Army on hand 10/1/41	-	-	-	-	2220	-	2220
Net Army Deficiency	-	-	-	-	5886	-	912

- Notes (1) No allowances have been made for attrition.
 (2) Includes ABC 1 commitments of:
 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
 1 Medium Bomb Group plus 1 Squadron
 3 Pursuit Groups plus 1 Squadron
 (3) Do not include ABC 1 commitments or Depot Reserve
 (A) Army
 (N) Navy

TAB D

BASIS OF COMPUTATION OF ARMY
AND NAVY REQUIREMENTS

Strategic Defense in Asia
Hemisphere Defense
Provision of Initial Units for ABC 1

Column A

ARMY - REQUIREMENTS

Heavy Bombers	Groups	Airplanes with reserves
Hemisphere Defense	23	1955
U.S. Possessions in Asia	4	340
ABC 1 (England)	3	255
	<u>30</u>	<u>2550</u>
 Medium Bombers		
ABC 1	1 + 1 squadron	85
 Pursuit		
Hemisphere Defense	36	5850
Strategic Defense in Asia	2	325
ABC 1	3 + 1 squadron	487
	<u>41 + 1 squadron</u>	<u>6662</u>

NAVY

Same as shown in Tab A

Column B

ARMY IMMEDIATE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Heavy Bombers	Groups	Airplanes
Hemisphere Defense	9	612
U.S. Possessions in Asia	2	136
ABC 1 (England)		0
		<u>748</u>
 Medium Bombers		
Hemisphere Defense	20	1960
 Pursuit		
Hemisphere Defense	27	3510
U.S. Possessions in Asia	4	424
		<u>3934</u>

This immediate minimum requirement does not provide for our commitments under ABC 1, nor does it provide for any reserves.

NOVEMBER 1941
 Thurs

NO.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
217	Gen. C. Marshall	2.17
218	Adm. Harold E. Stark	2.18
219	Gen. Henry Haffins	2.19
220		2.20
221	Marshall Field	2.21
222		2.22
223		2.23
224		2.24
225		2.25
226		2.26
227		2.27
228		2.28
229		2.29
230		2.30
231	Gen. Chief Justice	2.31
232	Justice Jackson	2.32
233	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.33
234	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.34
235	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.35
236	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.36
237	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.37
238	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.38
239	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.39
240	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.40
241	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.41
242	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.42
243	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.43
244	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.44
245	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.45
246	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.46
247	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.47
248	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.48
249	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.49
250	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	2.50

REVENUES	
AMOUNT	DESCRIPTION
1.00	
1.10	
1.20	
1.30	
1.40	
1.50	
1.60	
1.70	
1.80	
1.90	
2.00	
2.10	
2.20	
2.30	
2.40	
2.50	
2.60	
2.70	
2.80	
2.90	
3.00	
3.10	
3.20	
3.30	
3.40	
3.50	
3.60	
3.70	
3.80	
3.90	
4.00	
4.10	
4.20	
4.30	
4.40	
4.50	
4.60	
4.70	
4.80	
4.90	
5.00	
5.10	
5.20	
5.30	
5.40	
5.50	
5.60	
5.70	
5.80	
5.90	
6.00	
6.10	
6.20	
6.30	
6.40	
6.50	
6.60	
6.70	
6.80	
6.90	
7.00	
7.10	
7.20	
7.30	
7.40	
7.50	
7.60	
7.70	
7.80	
7.90	
8.00	
8.10	
8.20	
8.30	
8.40	
8.50	
8.60	
8.70	
8.80	
8.90	
9.00	
9.10	
9.20	
9.30	
9.40	
9.50	
9.60	
9.70	
9.80	
9.90	
10.00	

NOVEMBER 2

8:00	0.00
8:10	0.05
8:20	0.10
8:30	0.15
8:40	0.20
8:50	0.25
9:00	0.30
9:10	0.35
9:20	0.40
9:30	0.45
9:40	0.50
9:50	0.55
10:00	0.60
10:10	0.65
10:20	0.70
10:30	0.75
10:40	0.80
10:50	0.85
11:00	0.90
11:10	0.95
11:20	1.00
11:30	1.05
11:40	1.10
11:50	1.15
12:00	1.20
12:10	1.25
12:20	1.30
12:30	1.35
12:40	1.40
12:50	1.45
1:00	1.50
1:10	1.55
1:20	1.60
1:30	1.65
1:40	1.70
1:50	1.75
2:00	1.80
2:10	1.85
2:20	1.90
2:30	1.95
2:40	2.00
2:50	2.05
3:00	2.10

The Atlantic Ambassador
Dr. T. C. Smith

Mr. Kay Allen Dr. Jones
Mr. Duffin Sambo Lator

Mr. J. H. H. H. H.

Mr. Chas. Ed. S. S.

Mr. Wm. Price
Mr. Arthur Wall

(Wash) Sambo Harris

NOVEMBER 27

TAVES

APPROXIMATE	APPROXIMATE
8.00	8.15
8.15	8.30
8.30	8.45
8.45	9.00
9.00	9.15
9.15	9.30
9.30	9.45
9.45	10.00
10.00	10.15
10.15	10.30
10.30	10.45
10.45	11.00
11.00	11.15
11.15	11.30
11.30	11.45
11.45	12.00
12.00	12.15
12.15	12.30
12.30	12.45
12.45	1.00
1.00	1.15
1.15	1.30
1.30	1.45
1.45	2.00
2.00	

Secy. H. H. [unclear]
 Secy. H. H. [unclear]
 Amb. [unclear]
 [unclear]

Govr. Matthew M. Neely
 Adm. Ernest J. King

Houston Thompson
 Dr. Wayne Lyman Morse
 Prof. Thos. Reed
 Prof. James Amos Conright
 James Henry Mills

Secy. of Agriculture
 Amb. Laurence A. Steinhart

Hon. John Mack
 (Lunch) Wayne Coy
 Cong. Fritz G. Lanham

Don Nelson

NOVEMBER

TIME	APPOINTMENT	TIME	APPOINTMENT
1.30		4.30	Lo. for Wagon Spgs
2.30		4.45	
3.00		5.00	
3.15		5.15	
3.30		5.30	
3.45		5.45	
4.00		6.00	
4.15		6.15	
4.30		6.30	
4.45		6.45	
5.00		7.00	
5.15		7.15	
5.30		7.30	
5.45		7.45	
6.00		8.00	
6.15		8.15	
6.30			
6.45			
7.00			
7.15			
7.30			
7.45			
8.00			
8.15			

10.00 Press
 10.45
 11.00 Hon. Paul McNutt 5.15
 11.15 (Pictures - Bill of Rights) 5.30
 11.30 Gov. Chas. Harwood 5.45
 11.45 Hon. Harold D. Smith 6.00
 12.00 Secy. of State 6.15
 12.15 Secy. of War 6.30
 12.30 Secy. of the Navy 6.45
 12.45 Gen. Marshall 7.00
 1.00 Admiral Stark 7.15

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

20 October 1941

Ships in the North Atlantic are beginning to suffer the inevitable minor damage that operations in very severe weather brings. So far the trouble has been limited to minor items such as loss of bolts, damage to deck storage lockers and minor cracks in nonstrength structure. Steps are being taken to avoid overloading ships which are to operate in that area during the winter months. Winter North Atlantic is tough seagoing. It is the worst area—based on the International Load Line Convention, it is reported.

Individual and personal attention is being given to requests from friends and relatives of men who may or may not have been aboard the KEARNY, it is reported.

Quite a few calls are being received from Congressmen on the number of armed Merchant Ships sunk in World War I. The Library of Congress also has called a number of times for this information, it is reported.

Newspapers are pressing for information about "Naval Control" of ship sailings from the West Coast, reports that all leaves have been canceled by the Navy and Army and for permission for reporters to board the KEARNY.

[2] Scheduled deliveries reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
Coastal Minesweeper—AGRESSOR.....	Greenport Basin & Construction Co.....	10/20/41
Coastal Minesweeper—STALWART.....	Snow Shipyards Incorporated.....	10/20/41
Coastal Minesweeper—ENERGY.....	W. A. Robinson, Incorporated.....	10/24/41
Coastal Minesweeper—CARACARA.....	Bristol Yacht Building Company.....	10/25/41
Submarine Tender—FULTON.....	Navy Yard, Mare Island.....	10/25/41
Aircraft Carrier—HORNET.....	Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co.....	10/20/41
Destroyer—BRISTOL.....	Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.....	10/21/41
Submarine Chaser.....	Defoc Boat and Motor Works.....	10/20/41
Submarine Chaser.....	Westergard Boat Works, Incorporated.....	10/20/41
Submarine Chaser.....	Defoc Boat and Motor Works.....	10/23/41

Re-enlistment, under continuous service, for the year is running 76.67 per cent to 18 October, 1941; for the month of October, 1941, to 18 October, it is 74.62 per cent, the Bureau of Navigation reports.

Winter quarters being prepared for German Armies in N. W. Russia, indicating High Command reckons possibility of no great advance in that area but Ukraine and Caucasus armies are to fight on, it is reported.

General Rommel again preparing Axis offensive in Libya. Scheduled for end of October, it is reported.

5 submarines belonging to the Finns are reported still [3] at Helsinki in need of repair. Presumably, it is impossible to obtain spare parts from Germany.

Russian Naval losses suffered from June 22 to 6 October in Baltic Sea reported:

	Sunk or severely damaged	Damaged
Battleships.....	2	-----
Cruisers.....	1	3
Flotilla Leaders.....	-----	5
Submarines.....	4	27
Torpedo Boats.....	6	6
Gunboats and Guard Boats.....	13	31
Destroyers.....	16	16
Minesweepers.....	39	3
Motor Torpedo boats.....	27	7
Transports (ships).....	151	96
Barges.....	13	9
Transport (boats).....	23	-----
Tugs.....	9	3
Sailing vessels.....	22	-----
V. M. Boats.....	22	-----

In addition 16 destroyers, 7 motor torpedo boats, 3 mine sweepers, 3 tugs, 2 transports (ships), 31 gunboats and guard boats and 6 torpedo boats are reported foundered. 34 guard boats and gun boats and 28 motor boats and small guard boats are reported lost on the Svir and Lake Ladoga. Likewise 15 barges, 14 tugs and 28 transports of which 21 were motor boats also have been sunk. 73 different Russian ships have been seized by the Finns "in the archipelago" and in ports along the coast of Finland.

[4] *Nazi military chieftains* "quite confident" campaign against Soviets "is finished" and that they will at an early date devote full attention to invading the British Isles, it is reported.

Chinese reportedly expect Japan to launch an assault upon Siberia in the near future. Unconfirmed reports, indicate U. S. S. R. has reduced its Far Eastern forces to a substantial extent, the air arm is included in this reduction.

Thailand, apprehensive "to the point of conviction", that an invasion is planned by Japan in the near future, is reported earnestly requesting twenty-four airplanes of the United States. This invasion may be launched, in 15 days, it was reported 15 October.

Eight ships reported sunk by a submarine attack on a convoy night of 17-18 October. Germans claim ten ships and two destroyers.

SS WARRIOR (United States 7,551 tons) reported overdue Capetown from Trinidad since 2 October. Believed Master may have proceeded direct without call at Capetown: if so, will have disobeyed routing instructions from Port Director Commandant Third Naval District. Ship is en route Rangoon, cargo China defense supplies.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 9, 1941.

Memorandum for Miss Tully:

In the light of what has happened in the last day or two this letter may be filed. It is not important for the President to take any further action on this matter at this time.

H. L. H.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 21, 1941.

Strictly personal and Confidential.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 14th in which you raise the question of the "proper strategic distribution" of our new four-engine bombers. In order to answer as carefully as possible the questions you raise, I have consulted the Chief of Staff, the head of the Air Forces and the head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. I have also been assisted in forming my views by the conferences which I recently had with these gentlemen and their subordinates in which we have gone over these same problems of strategy for the purpose of answering your inquiry of last July as to the means necessary to bring this war to a successful conclusion. All of these labors have had a direct bearing upon the problem raised in your present letter. I hope that you will discuss this question fully with your military advisers before you make up your own mind upon this question. But pending such a conference I shall try to give you a brief epitome of my own views in answer to your letter of October 14th. I do not think that they vary in any substantial particular from those of the gentlemen with whom I have consulted.

1. Essentially, this question of the distribution of these planes is really not a static but a dynamic question. It is not to be solved by taking a map and computing how many planes shall be allocated to certain geographical positions. These new four-engine bombers now coming off the assembly line should constitute a great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to the respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy of defense it is important that such power should be applied.

These planes themselves are not individually a finished element of such power. They must be manned with crews, trained first in individual operation and then in group operation, before they become the vital elements of this pool of power. The process of commissioning a plane is not unlike the process of commissioning a battleship, and you know how long that takes. The melancholy list of casualties which have recently occurred to our planes in the hands of British pilots is a reminder of the danger of trying to shorten this time and to use such planes with hastily trained crews.

[2] Again, the panorama of the theatres of action for our defense is constantly and rapidly changing. The relative importance of the different theatres of action varies greatly at different moments. This precludes static allocations or conceptions. The number of our planes at strategic points must be susceptible of rapid reenforcement and change. The ability thus to throw great massed power upon a given place at a given time is one of the essential elements of an effective use of air power. Germany in her use of air power has shown thus far supreme skill in her ability to mass her air force at different places at different times. The fate of the war conceivably may hang upon the length of time within which we can throw an overpowering force of these planes into a given theatre.

The center of all of these operations is the United States. There the planes are manufactured. There their combat crews are trained. There their group formations are organized and tactically instructed. From that as a center it should be possible in times of opportunity or necessity to send these trained combat units out as reserves to such theatres of action as need them. At present you will remember from my letter of September 22nd that the minimum number of ten groups of these planes, to which we have been reduced by the exigencies of the demands of outside nations, does not permit the retention of any such pool as I have described above within the continental United States. Nor does it provide the absolute essential of enough equipment in the shape of four-engine bombers to train the large number of combat pilots and crews which will be needed to maintain our air forces in the various theatres of defense of the United States. This in itself shows the fundamental error of a static conception and the results which will follow from a merely geographic allotment of the planes.

What is happening today in the Pacific exemplifies the importance of the foregoing principles. A strategic opportunity of the utmost importance has suddenly arisen in the southwestern Pacific. Our whole strategic possibilities of the past twenty years have been revolutionized by the events in the world in the past six months. From being impotent to influence events in that area, we suddenly find ourselves vested with the possibility of great effective power. Indeed we hardly yet realize our opportunities in that respect. We are rushing planes and other preparations to the Philippines from a base in the United States which has not yet in existence the number of the planes necessary for our immediate minimum requirements in that southwestern Pacific theatre. This is a result of our deferments to the British of last year. From nowhere but the United States can come the needed planes, the crews, the equipment, and the training. Yet even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the Japanese, bids fair to stop Japan's march to the south and secure the safety of Singapore, with all the revolutionary consequences of such action. As you well know, however, the final success of the operation lies on the knees of the gods and we cannot tell what explosion may momentarily come from Japan. If we had the reserve necessary in the United States, we should not be in this present period of uncertainty.

Simultaneously with this southwestern Pacific opportunity, another such chance is opening in the northwestern Pacific. Vladivostok is one of three gateways to Russia. The Archangel gate may be closed at any moment. The Persian Gulf gate is insignificant in capacity. The propinquity of Alaska to Siberia and the Kamchatka Peninsula and the facilities which we believe (although we have not yet had opportunity for testing them) exist in that neighborhood, present us with the opportunity for another use of these bombers supplementary to the one I have just described in the south. That locality can possibly form the base of a northern pincer movement of American influence and power, this time not only to protect against aggression of Japan but to preserve the defensive power of Russia in Europe. Its operation would fit into and supplement the operation from the south by permitting a circular sweep of these bombers which would greatly increase their safety by permitting those in the south, after passing over Japan and stopping at Vladivostok, to proceed to safety in the north in a way similar to the sweeps which Germany is now employing through the North Atlantic from Norway to France. The power of such a completed north and south operation can hardly be over-estimated. The control over the Western Pacific which it would open could hardly fail to have immense powers of warning to Japan as well as of assurance to Russia. It might well remove Japan from the Axis powers. But it will require the existence of an adequate force of these bombers—even greater I believe than the minimum requirements stated in my letter to you of September 22nd. At present under the system of allocation we are planning, but one group for Alaska. That I believe would be quite inadequate. And my feeling is strongly reenforced by information which I have just received from General

DeWitt who is responsible for the Alaska station. Today there are not more than two four-engine bombers in the whole of Alaska.

2. I have dwelt thus far on the Pacific front of our national peril because that is the one in which the threatened danger from Japan and the counter opportunity for us to take the initiative has first ripened. Our northeastern front in the northern Atlantic is, however, the main theatre of the present war. There we are already in actual naval combat with Germany. The four-engine bombers which we have proposed to place in Newfoundland are not designed to repose idly in the hangars of that outpost during the present emergency. They are to form the reserve component of a team of such four-engine bombers of which the advance unit is to be in Iceland, only seven hours away by air. This takes on an added importance with the approach of the coming winter during which [4] time the long range flying boats of the Navy now engaged in the North Atlantic and based on Iceland may be restricted by ice conditions in the harbors where they ordinarily land. In other words, we contemplate the possibility of sweeping operations by these long range bombing planes and have planned to place them in these separated bases to facilitate that purpose as well as to protect against air attack on either base. Our past deferments to Great Britain of the B-24 bombers have contributed to the delay in the establishment of these two bases. Six of these four-engine bombers have just been sent to Newfoundland. None is yet at Iceland.

The daily increasing peril of the northeastern Atlantic is evidenced only too clearly by the recent incident of the Kearny. As you know from our talk the other day when General Embick was present, I am much concerned that steps should be taken as promptly as possible to secure the defense of our principal bastion in the northeast, namely the British Islands. That safety will not be secured by a comparatively insignificant trickle of planes, unequipped, unmanned, and unorganized for battle formation. The situation requires far more radical treatment than that. It requires treatment which will make safe beyond peradventure, a favorable decision of the battle of the Atlantic as well as the defense against invasion of the British Isles. I have already stated my views to you on that subject and I shall not repeat them here, except to say that I think the time is coming rapidly when these radical steps should be taken. Otherwise I fear lest some morning we be caught napping by a surprise German attack. All that is germane for me to say in respect to my present letter is that I believe, in the light of this situation and of Britain's safety alone, that it is better for her to have in the world a potent, well-armed, friendly American air force than a few additional planes.

Quite apart from that, there remains the question of the possible impairment of the defensive power of our own country which it is always our first duty to secure. Giving full tribute to the enormous service which has been rendered and will continue to be rendered to our own defense by our furnishing weapons to hard-pressed nations already fighting in a cause common to us all, I believe that the moment has now come when we should give our primary attention to the *prompt* development of a well-armed, well-rounded, and well-trained American air force. And I have, after using the most careful consideration and study, reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to divert further production from the Army air forces until such time as the minimum requirements stated in my letter of September 22nd are fully completed.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 25, 1941.

Cable to Sayre

(To go through Interior Dept.)

State Department feels Manila such focal point at this time it is preferable postpone proposed visit. Also that when you make the trip you go to visit Gauss instead of as guest. Sumner suggests we ask Gauss to make brief visit to you for consultation in order to establish closer liaison in defensive preparations.

Furthermore I think you should be at Manila on account problems export and freezing controls in addition to general Far East activities.

F. D. R.

The original of this message sent to the Secretary of the Interior.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and general developments relating to the Far East, it is believed that Manila has at this time special significance as a focal point. It is therefore suggested that it would be preferable that Mr. Sayre postpone his proposed visit to Chungking. It is suggested further that when he makes a trip to Chungking he go to visit Ambassador Gauss rather than go as the guest of General Chiang Kai-shek.

In the meanwhile, might it not be well for me to suggest to Ambassador Gauss that he make a brief visit to Manila for purposes of consultation with Mr. Sayre? Such a visit at this time would have, it seems to me, two advantages: (1) Such a visit would be generally interpreted as directed toward establishing closer liaison between American defensive preparations in the Philippine Islands and this country's interest in [2] China's defensive activities, and (2) Mr. Gauss has been going through a specially trying period at Chungking and would doubtless be considerably benefited by a brief change.

As you know, we now have a number of important problems relating to the Philippine Islands connected with our export and freezing controls. Also, there is the constant problem relating to coordination of our activities in the Far East and the activities of the British and the Dutch in that area. In reference to these problems the presence of Mr. Sayre at Manila seems advisable and, in view of their importance, there does not seem to be available a suitable replacement for Mr. Sayre at this particular juncture.

A proposed radio message to Mr. Sayre is attached for your consideration.

C. H.

Enclosure:

Proposed radio
message to
Mr. Sayre.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 22, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

For recommendation this afternoon or evening, if possible.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President, dated October 8, 1941, from United States High Commissioner Sayre, asking permission to accept invitation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to visit China sometime in December, if approved by the President.

OCTOBER 22, 1941.

Radio message from the President to Mr. Sayre.

Referring to your personal and confidential letter of October 8.

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and of developments in general in and relating to the Far East, I believe that Manila has at this time unusual significance as a focal point and your work there is especially important. I therefore believe that it would be inadvisable for you to be absent at this time. I am considering suggesting that Ambassador Gauss make a visit to you.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILAVia airmail

October 5, 1941.

Personal and confidential

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a letter from Mr. Owen Lattimore in Chungking dated September 21, 1941, saying:

"Now that the really bad bombing season in Chungking is over, and visitors need not feel that most of their time is likely to be spent in dugouts, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek would like very much to have you and Mrs. Sayre come to China for a visit.

"Before sending a formal invitation, the Generalissimo has asked me to find out what time would suit you best. *** If I may add a word for myself, I should like to say how eagerly I hope that you will be able to come. Your visit would have the very greatest constructive value in Chinese-American relations."

Such a visit would have so direct a bearing upon Chinese-American relations that I do not feel that I ought to act in the matter without the advice of yourself and perhaps the State Department. I, myself, believe that such a visit would be useful in marking still closer cordiality and cooperation between China and the United States and might have a very wholesome and happy effect. On the other hand, you may feel that the international situation in the Pacific is so tense that you do not want me to leave Manila even for a short visit. What is your desire? If you approve of my going, would it be preferable to accept the invitation of the Generalissimo and go as his guest, or to go perhaps as the guest of Ambassador Gauss on a private visit to him? I shall greatly appreciate a radio from you letting me know what answer you would like me to give to the invitation of the Generalissimo.

If

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -

If I go, the timing might be of some importance from the international standpoint. I should suggest the month of December unless you prefer some different time.

Such a visit would mean my being away from Manila presumably about two weeks. In this event, do you desire the appointment of an Acting High Commissioner? If so, I should suggest the appointment of Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, my Financial Adviser, or, if he is here by that time, Mr. Stewart McDonald, about whom I have written you and who, I hope, will be appointed as my Legal Adviser.

Everything is going smoothly here and the ship is sailing on even keel. Manila is becoming a crossroads in this part of the world and we have a continual stream of important visitors with whom I am glad to have the chance of making contacts. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Air Marshal in command of the British Forces in the Far East, was here over Sunday and day before yesterday Sir Earle Page, Minister in the Australian Cabinet, stopped over on his way from Australia via the United States to London. Each of them came to dine with me and I much enjoyed the chance of talking with them. This afternoon Mr. Merle Cochran, Special Assistant in the Treasury Department, arrives by plane on his way to China and in a few more days I expect to see Henry Grady, representative of the Federal Loan Agency, who is now in Hong Kong bound back for America.

With warmest wishes, believe me,

Ever sincerely yours,



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[Illegible body text, likely a memorandum or letter]

[Illegible footer text]

1984

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1944

My dear President General

Secretary Tolson has furnished me as a copy of
the message that you sent to the United States
Senate on October 28, and I send you to that end
I appreciate your attitude. The loyal support of the
Filipino people, under your able leadership, has been a
source of pride and satisfaction to all of us
in the United States.

23+60

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

2400 Philippines

Mr. Frank L. Bunker
President of the Philippines

Copy of the letter sent to the President
1944

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE MEMBERS

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO

ADVISE.

F.B.I.

Re: Mr. Tolson's letter from the Sec. of the Interior, 10/23/41, attaching copy of a telegram received by Commissioner Glavin from President Wilson on Oct. 22nd, re the fall of the President, upon the signing of the Treaty and the fall of the League of Nations, stating that they are ready to follow his experience of consequences, and volunteering to act, as head of the Dept. which is in charge of Foreign Affairs, that they are at all times.

10/23/41
10/23/41
357A



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1901

My dear Mr. President:

For your information, I append hereto a copy of a radiogram received by Commissioner Mitzaldia from President Quesada on October 22.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Harold I. Phillips".

Secretary of the Interior.

K. b

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

Translation of Coded Radiogram Rec'd Oct. 28

Commissioner Elizalde
Washington, D. C.

Upon the arrival of Secretary Ickes, please inform him that on the occasion of the sinking of the Kearny, and the fall of the Kenoye Cabinet, and considering these events ominous, I wrote to the President a letter telling him that we are ready to follow him regardless of the consequences. Please reiterate to Secretary Ickes, as the head of the Department which is in charge of Philippine Affairs, that in these critical moments, I want him to feel that we are at his command.

Q U E Z O N

x 6-8

OCTOBER 31, 1941

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I was deeply moved by your letter of September 26, 1941, and all I can say is that, if elected, you can continue to depend upon my loyalty and support, both officially and personally.

Your information that there is a growing confidence that the Philippines can be adequately defended is particularly gratifying and encouraging. As I have assured you in my last letter, we, on our part, are doing everything within our resources to meet whatever situation may arise, especially after the news of the bombing of the "Kearny" and the fall of the Konoye Cabinet. From time to time, I shall take the liberty of writing you as to the progress that we are making here.

After that slight setback, I am regaining very rapidly my old health and strength.

Mrs. Quezon joins me in sending you and Mrs. Roosevelt highest regards and best wishes.

Devotedly yours,

(Sgd) MANUEL L. QUEZON.

MLQ/sc

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, November 1, 1941.

Via airmail

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you for your letter of September twenty-sixth enclosing a copy of the letter you wrote to President Quezon. I am so glad you wrote to President Quezon as you did. It flattered him greatly to receive your warm expressions of good will and he was as pleased as a child with what you said. I know that your note served a genuinely useful purpose in deepening his sense of loyalty to the United States and to yourself.

Out here on the firing line I feel distressed that you are being so hamstrung and impeded by a divided Congress and by refractory labor groups. The Neutrality Law should have been repealed weeks and months ago and the United States should today be forging armaments at a pace which would make the outcome of the war clear to everyone. As long as Germany pursues her civilization-wrecking policy a fight to the death between her and the United States is as inevitable as the rising of the sun, for Americans will not take the defeat of their most precious heritages lying down. This being true, the sooner America can whole-heartedly devote one hundred percent of her energies to the supreme effort necessary to crush Naziism, the sooner the present wrecking of civilization can be stopped. The way you have led the American people step by step to understand and realize this fact has been one of the outstanding achievements of democracy during this time.

We feel much more reassured out here that Americans back home under your leadership have come to realize the importance of building up a strong Philippine defense. How greatly our defenses here have been strengthened Japan also knows; and that is the surest way of avoiding trouble in the Far East.

I have been building up a fine staff of workers in the High Commissioner's office. They are an outstanding group; and as the work has rapidly increased with export control functions, foreign funds control, priority problems and a [2] host of additional duties due to war conditions, they have jumped into the breach gallantly and have carried on with great ability and loyalty. I am hoping that my new Legal Adviser, Stewart McDonald, whom you appointed two weeks ago, will arrive by the end of this month.

Ever sincerely yours,

FRANK.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, November 1, 1941.

Via airmail
Major General EDWIN M. WATSON,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL WATSON: Will you be kind enough to give the enclosed letter to the President personally? I shall appreciate your kindness.

Ever sincerely yours,

FRANCIS B. SAYRE.

Enclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

3 November 1941

Combined Japanese Fleet reported now in Kuresaeki area, near Yokohama according to fairly reliable information. Same source reports elaborate plans joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand complete. Invasion will follow lines of German Blitzkrieg in Belgium and Holland. 250 transport planes said assembled Taiwan (Formosa, Japan) Hainan (China) ready to begin move when ordered. Forces in Indo-China being strengthened to estimate total 100,000.

Japanese repatriation ship for Lisbon has been postponed. This ship will, however, leave Yokohama direct from Singapore on November 7 to bring back about 300 Japanese subjects in Malaya. It is expected to sail from Singapore on November 17 and to arrive in Manila about November 21, on its way to Japan.

Severest Gas Attack of China War reported occurred in Ichang fighting October 8, 9 and 10 in which total of 340 gas shells were fired into the city. About 1,350 gas casualties, of whom 750 died, are reported. (Unconfirmed as to use of gas.)

[2] *Soviet Army and Navy Officers believe that the Russians will undertake intensive training behind the Ural Mountains throughout the winter, meanwhile holding Moscow and the Donets Basin at whatever cost. On the whole the morale of the Russian people is first rate and no despair is being shown as to Russia's position, it is reported by an observer recently arrived at Kiubyshev after a tour to Archangel and back.*

Seven unidentified units Red Baltic Fleet reported broke through the minefields in the Gulf of Finland and are now either operating in the Eastern Baltic or heading for Sweden to intern.

Germans reported to have warned Spanish Government that any ship sent to the United Kingdom will be torpedoed.

British Empire GUILLEMOT (INDEPENDENT) on Government Service attacked and sunk by torpedo plane on October 24 off Bona Algeria. A convoy was attacked thrice by planes off Southwold last night (November 1-October 31) when Greek NICOLAUS PIANGOS bombed, abandoned and wrecked and BRITISH FORTUNE sank, it is reported from London.

Australian Naval Board reports the shuttle service [3] by air between Thursday Island and Port Moresby has been established for Torres Strait pilots.

House flag of American Scantic Line reported washed ashore Pernambuco and fourth raft of similar type lately come ashore Pedras Point, South of Cabed-ello.

Senator Truman is reported pleased with the arrangements made by the Navy Clearing Office in connection with the activities of The Senate Committee to Investigate Contracts under the National Defense Program.

Rear Admiral Lyster, Royal Navy, Fifth Sea Lord, has made arrangement to return to England. As a result of his visit to this country the Bureau of Aeronautics has a more complete and up-to-date amount of information regarding the British naval aviation requirements for aircraft and for British pilot training in this country, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

The Bureau of the Budget held hearings on October 30 on the subject of early approval of the accelerated naval program of the production of 2020 airplanes, the most important items of which were recently set up in the regular 1943 estimate, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

5 strike cases affecting Naval Defense Contracts were [4] settled during the week ending November 1. 13 strike cases affecting Naval Defense Con-

tracts were still open and 9 strikes were continuing on which information relative to Naval Defense Contracts was not yet available as of November 1.

Pennants have been awarded to the following stations for outstanding performances in Public Works Construction Program during July, August and September. This is the 2nd quarterly award by Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Group 1—Over \$600,000 monthly expenditures:

First—Naval Fuel Depot, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Second—Roosevelt Base, Terminal Island, Calif.

Third—Naval Air Station, Bermuda.

Group 2—From \$300,000 to \$600,000 monthly expenditures:

First—Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Fla.

Second—Floating Drydock ARD-2, 12th Naval Dist.

Third—Destroyer Base, San Diego, Calif.

Group 3—Less than \$300,000 monthly expenditures:

First—Naval Air Station, Cavite, P. I.

Second—Naval Air Station, Cape May, N. J.

Third—Naval Ammunition Depot, Fallbrook, Calif.

As of 28 October 247 reconditioned 3"/50 caliber low-angle broadside guns and mounts and 150 4"/50 caliber low-angle guns and mounts were transferred to the British, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

4 November 1941

Thailand's reaction to Japanese attack reported would depend on the assistance received from the United States and Great Britain. Thailand would have to have air support the moment invasion began; delay would be fatal. This air assistance should protect Bangkok (Siam) and Thai air bases and provide for bombing of Japanese communications. Thais then would employ their own air force until it no longer existed, is the reported opinion of Thai Intelligence Officer. If help was not immediately forthcoming and Japanese bombed cities and troops, he thought Thai leaders would capitulate although this action would be dangerous in view of anti-Japanese attitude of the army. Thai Government would hope to be set up again by the Democratic powers after the war.

Japanese invasion of China from Indo-China reported now a possibility. It would be most difficult in view of Japan's existing military over-extension. One to three months would be required to make the necessary concentrations of five to ten divisions. Successful Japanese expedition would be a serious blow to China's [2] power and will to resist.

Losses to date in Russian campaign estimated by ONI and MID as follows: German (1) Personnel, 800,000 to 1,000,000 killed, wounded or missing; (2) Material, 25% to 30%; Russian (1) Personnel, over 1,000,000 prisoners. Killed and wounded unknown but probably proportionately heavy; (2) Material, up to 80% of equipment on hand at start of campaign. *German relative strength vis-a-vis the Russians* is growing constantly. Since Germans have or are about to capture 75% of Russia's war industries, this trend will be accelerated in next six months unless Russian losses are made good by outside assistance.

Russian Black Sea Fleet reported to have left Sevastopol for Novorossisk (N. E. Shore of Black Sea). Fleet consisted of one old battleship, three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, two destroyer leaders, twenty-one destroyers, six old destroyers and thirty-eight submarines.

About 20,000 Russian soldiers reported to have gone through Kuibyshev from Siberia prior to October 20. These men were in good spirits but Soviet reserve outfits being activated have low morale. Spirit of the civilians in the Saratov region (E. Soviet Russia) is very low, much lower than that of the civilians east of there, it [3] is reported.

British figures for October show 103 enemy ships sunk or damaged in the Mediterranean. 25% of Axis convoys estimated to have been sunk. Press Association figures show about four hundred Axis ships sunk or damaged in Mediterranean in past four months.

Troops numbering 700,000 "judged" now in active service in Turkish Army. Twenty regiments reported not equipped with machine guns, either heavy or light, it is reported from a reliable source.

HM ships HMS DEVONSHIRE, HMS COLOMBO and HMS CARTIAGE reported to have intercepted November 3, 450 miles south of Durban French convoy of five ships believed totaling 39,000 tons which left Tamatave (Madagascar) October 24 for France.

U-Boat situation November 3 report includes: (1) four or five in area 300 miles south or southeast Cape Race (Newfoundland) (2) one off Freetown (W. Africa) or southeast Cape Verde Islands (3) one south of St. Helena, (Island, South Atlantic Ocean).

A new Ordnance Plant is to be opened in Macon, Georgia on November 15. This plant will manufacture shell fuses. It is one of the six plants now being established in the [4] current expansion program of the Bureau of Ordnance. Admiral Blandy, Representative Vincent and representatives of the Naval Gun Factory, Washington Navy Yard, will open the plant, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

During an inspection trip which Admiral Moreell made to Norfolk, Virginia; November 2, to confer with the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, and the Commanding General, Fortress Monroe, with regard to taking over the Chamberlin Hotel, for the use of members of service families, it was brought out that it is a not infrequent occurrence for service families to spend the night sitting in chairs in the hotel lobbies of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia. One of the hotels is reported to be making a practice of renting chairs at 25¢ per night, the Bureau of Yards and Docks reports.

Scheduled Keel Layings reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
Ocean-Going Tug APACHE.....	Charleston Shipbuilding and Drydock Company...	11/8/41
Destroyer CONWAY.....	Bath Iron Works Corp. Bath, Maine.....	11/5/41

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State:

To prepare a very nice personal letter for my signature.

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, 10/18/41, to the President, a copy of which has been retained for our files. In re defense of the Philippines.

OCTOBER 18, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Today's press reports seem to point strongly to the possibility of actual involvement of the United States in the war on account of the torpedoing of the destroyer "Kearny". On the other hand, the course of recent events in Japan is far from encouraging to those who would hope that there may not be armed conflict between the United States and Japan. Should this unfortunate situation arise, it is but natural to expect that the Philippines will be the scene of such a conflict. I am, therefore, hastening to reiterate to you what on former occasions I have asserted, namely, that our government and people are absolutely and wholeheartedly for you and your policies, and that we are casting our lot with America no matter what sacrifices such determination may entail.

Mr. President, since at a time such as this it is of the utmost importance that the Government of the Philippines should have complete understanding and cooperation with the military and naval authorities of the United States, I believe you will be pleased to know that General MacArthur and I are in perfect accord, and that the government and people of the Philippines are placing at his disposal everything that he needs to accomplish the great task of defending the Philippines. I could almost say as much regarding my relations with Admiral Hart, although, owing to the nature of the Navy's work, our connections are not so close and our contacts so frequent as those I have with General MacArthur.

Mr. President, it is, of course, a dreadful thing to contemplate the horrors of war, but there is this consideration in which I almost find cause for rejoicing that such an awful situation should arise before the severance of the political ties now existing between the United States and the Philippines; and that is, because the Filipino people are thereby afforded the opportunity to prove in supreme efforts and sacrifices not only our deep appreciation of the great things

which America has contributed in the upbuilding of this new nation of ours, but also the fact that the democratic ideals of the United States have become our sacred heritage, and that to preserve such a precious gift we are willing to pay the price in blood and treasure.

[2] With assurances of my deepest respect and highest regard, I beg to remain

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) MANUEL L. QUEZON.

President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
The White House, Washington D. C.

MLQ/sc

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1941.

Strictly confidential

Memorandum for the President

Herewith, as requested, the draft of a suggested reply to the message from the British Prime Minister in regard to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal.

C. H.

Enclosure:

Draft of a suggested reply to the British Prime Minister.

"SC"
NOVEMBER 7, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
London.

Your 5257, November 5, 5 p. m.

Personal and strictly confidential from the President to the former naval person.

QUOTE We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunning have advanced to a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend-lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be prepared to send pilots and some planes to China.

We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind along the lines we are [2] talking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an opposite effect.

This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study and effort.

I shall probably not repeat not make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close official circle what I have said above. UNQUOTE.

FE:JWB:HES FE PA/H

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

For preparation of a personal reply to Francis Sayre for my signature.

F. D. R.

Note from Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Manila, 10/20/41, to the President, enclosing copies of his letter to Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, dated 9/30/41, with its enclosures (Marron reports), together with a copy of General MacArthur's reply to Mr. Sayre of 10/10/41, dealing with the organizing and stimulating of effective civilian defense preparation in the Philippines.

Letter by Reginald D. Hall

Reception - 1-41

November 15, 1941

My dear President Quezon:

It is with much pleasure and gratification that I have read your letter of October 18, 1941, assuring me of the wholehearted loyalty and support of the Philippine Government and people in whatever the immediate future may hold in store for the Philippines and the United States.

In times such as these it is particularly gratifying to learn of the cordial manner in which you, General MacArthur and Admiral Hart are collaborating in making preparations for the defense of the Philippines.

It is my earnest hope that the contingency for which preparations are being made will never arise. However, in the light of recent history

-2-

it would be worse than criminal not to be fully prepared for all eventualities, and I wish you to know that your expressions of loyalty and support and the manifestations of cooperation shown by your government and people are highly gratifying and helpful to me and to the American people in these times of uncertainty and danger.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Manuel L. Quezon,
President of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines,
Manila, Philippine Islands.

MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA

THE WHITE HOUSE
October 18, 1941

Nov 6 9 06 AM '41

*acked
11/15/41*

My dear Mr. President:

RECEIVED

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- 2 -

With assurances of my deepest respect and
highest regard, I beg to remain

Faithfully yours,

Manuel L. Quezon

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with the request contained in the memorandum which you attached to the enclosed letter, dated October 18, 1941, from the Honorable Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines assuring you of the loyalty and support of the Commonwealth, I am enclosing a suggested reply to President Quezon.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

Enclosures:

1. From the Honorable Manuel L. Quezon, October 18, 1941.
2. Suggested reply to President Quezon.

The President,

The White House.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the call which Mr. ^{Sakuro}Kurusu is to make upon you in company with the Japanese Ambassador on November 17, Mr. Kurusu may regard this first call as purely ceremonial and may not wish to initiate any discussion. Should the occasion appear opportune, however, you may wish to offer comments along lines as follows:

(1) We cannot afford to make light of the tremendous seriousness of the present world situation confronting us. I want to repeat and to emphasize what I said to Admiral Nomura on November 10. The entire world has been placed in a precarious position as a result of the havoc which has been wrought by the forces of aggression. Our common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world come back to ways of peace. It is the purpose of this Government to do its best in the spirit of fair play to contribute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and order in the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these objectives it is essential that emphasis be laid upon giving practical effect to a sound philosophy of human welfare.

-2-

welfare. We have often and quite recently made clear publicly what we have in mind in this regard.

(2) We are fully aware that it may require time for Japan to turn to courses of peace. The American people and Government, especially the President and the Secretary of State, have been very patient. We are ready and willing to continue to be patient, to endeavor to work out a broad-gauge peaceful settlement, and to afford every practicable opportunity to Japan to turn to courses of peace.

(3) It is tremendously important that no statesman and no country miscalculate the attitude and the position of the American people and Government. The American people and Government are fully alive to the sinister menace which all peace-loving countries are facing from Hitlerism and courses of aggression. This country has been slow in arousing itself to the dangers of Hitlerism. Today we are fully aware of those dangers and are thoroughly aroused. Our national effort is primarily and in ever-increasing measure being devoted toward defeat of Hitlerism. We are determined to protect and preserve our national security against Hitlerism.

(4) A victorious Hitler would constitute a menace to all other nations, including Japan. Our opposition to courses of aggression and to the program of Hitlerism stands firm. We are entirely convinced that Hitlerism

will

-3-

will be defeated.

(5) We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek.

In view of the general character of these suggested comments no need is perceived of giving the Ambassador a written record of what you say to him.

November 17, 1941

400
Hawaii

Dear Dave:

The President has asked me to thank you for your telegram of November thirteenth sent from Honolulu. He greatly appreciates your action in giving him the benefit of your observations in the Hawaiian Islands and is particularly pleased with your report that the staffs of the Army and the Navy in Hawaii are so "well-informed and keenly alive to the latest developments in communications." The President was also glad to learn that the Army and Navy authorities maintain such a friendly basis of relationship with the civilian population of the Islands.

The President is greatly reassured to know that the picture as you find it in Hawaii is one that inspires confidence. He heartily reciprocates your personal regards.

Very sincerely yours,

STEPHEN EARLE
Secretary to the President

x PP73872
x 1314
Mr. David Barnoff,
44 East 71st Street,
New York, N. Y.

wcl-22

November 17, 1941

400

Hawaii

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Very sincerely yours,

STEPHEN EARLE
Secretary to the President

xPP73872
x131#
Mr. David Sarnoff,
44 East 71st Street,
New York, N. Y.

wd

36 Misc.

TELEGRAM

32-24 114-804

The White House
Washington


*Stearns
In the field*

Indep. 11/13/41

HONOLULU, NOVEMBER 15, 1941

TO THE PRESIDENT

REFERRING TO THE LATE LEADERSHIP COOPERATION I AM PLEASED TO
 REPORT THAT THROUGH THE COURTESY OF GENERAL SHERTZ AND
 ADMIRAL BURNELL AND SLOAN HERE I HAVE BEEN AFFORDED EVERY
 FACILITY FOR INSPECTING THEIR COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND
 OPERATIONS AS WELL AS VISUAL AND IS FURNISHED WITH THEM AND
 THEIR STAFF AND OPERATIONS OFFICERS AND ANGLETON AT COMMAN-
 DING IN THE PACIFIC. AS A RESULT OF MY OBSERVATIONS I AM
 HAPPY TO REPORT TO YOU THAT THE MESS AND THE STAFF OF THE ARMY
 AND NAVY HERE ARE WELL INFORMED AND HEAVY AS TO THE LATEST
 DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS AND TO THEIR GENERAL PROFICIENCY.
 I HAVE OBSERVED THROUGH AN OFFICER BURNELL AND OTHERS AT COMMAN-
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Handwritten:
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11/21/41

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have read the attached communication to you from Colonel Donovan and return it with thanks.

C.H.

Handwritten:
eH

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.
To read and return for my files.

F. D. R.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The following is the substance of statements made by Dr. Hans Thomsen on Thursday afternoon, November 6, to Mr. Malcolm R. Lovell:

If Japan goes to war with the United States, Germany will immediately follow suit. The United States has no effective way to wage war in the Pacific. It could not denude the Atlantic to place full fleet power in the Pacific.

If Tokio and Yokohama should be bombed, the Japanese would [2] surely bomb Manila.

When Russia collapses, the Japanese will occupy northern Sakhalin. This will alleviate the oil situation in Japan, as the oil supply in Sakhalin is substantial and can be more fully developed.

Japan is trying to gain time with the United States. In a way this effort works both ways, for the United States seems to be trying to gain time with Japan. In the last analysis, Japan knows that unless the United States agrees to some reasonable terms in the Far East, Japan must face the threat of [3] strangulation, now or later. Should Japan wait until later to prevent this strangulation by the United States, she will be less able to free herself than now, for Germany is now occupying the major attention of both the British Empire and the United States. If Japan waits, it will be comparatively easy for the United States to strangle Japan. Japan is therefore forced to strike now, whether she wishes to or not.

If the United States breaks diplomatic relations with Germany, most, if not all, of the South American countries will do the same.

[4] The new United States Charge d'Affaires is going to Berlin by boat, via Lisbon. Evidently the United States is in no hurry to get him to Berlin. This probably means that no immediate diplomatic rupture is planned. It is, of course, always possible that a diplomatic break may be postponed indefinitely. Japan and China so continued for two full years. Of course there is always the possibility that my government may tire of the undeclared war, and may itself break diplomatic relations. I think this is improbable, however.

I was amused at Stalin's [5] radio address. We have definitely taken prisoner, over 3,000,000 Russian soldiers, and these men are now actually working for Germany, building roads, winter barracks, for our soldiers, and other constructive work. We are sure that at least an equal number of Russian soldiers have been killed.

I am very tired. I need a vacation very much. For three years I have had no rest. I wish we two and our wives could go to Florida for a month to sit on the beach in the sunshine.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN.



SECRET

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 24 November 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As I told you yesterday, we are constantly studying the situation in the Atlantic with a view to reduction of sinkings. We have certain thoughts now involving possible radical rerouting which to carry through would require our merchant ships going all the way into British ports, as well as our naval escort vessels. Involved in this would be the use of United States ports for the assembly of convoys, and the use of mixed escorts consisting of United States destroyers and Canadian corvettes. If this scheme were adopted, United States and Canadian escorts would be refuelled each trip in the United Kingdom, and British escort groups would probably have to come into United States ports for refuelling.

Of course we will put nothing of this sort into effect without your approval in principle.

BETTY.

P. S. The movement you spoke about for 10 December is shaping up and should be ready to sail on time. Here's hoping we can get it through before any open break with Japan.

Regarding escort from the Philippines to Hongkong, the matter is under study and I will give you a report later but my initial reaction is that it would too greatly complicate Tommy's Hart's problem, some of which I mentioned to you yesterday.

HRS.

CHUNGKING, November 25, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "Modus Vivendi" now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

25 November, 1941

General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of Polish forces in Russia, is reported to have expressed doubt of Moscow's ability to hold out and Russian officials in general are reported for the first time indicating worry over the situation.

Supplies for Russia are reported to have moved over a new Iran trucking route linking Persian Gulf port of Bushire with Tehran. A fleet of 250 trucks is available at Bushire. Other trucks, including some 15-tonners capable of carrying tanks, are expected soon from America.

Several U-boats are continuing their movement Westward. Operations close off American ports may be expected. Submarines have reappeared off the Cape Verde Islands and there are indications that operations are to be extended to the Southward as far as the Cape of Good Hope. The total number of U-boats at sea is gradually rising (27). There have been no attacks in the Western Atlantic for about three weeks.

A large part of German Naval Personnel now enroute to Italy wearing civilian clothing, it is rumored in Berlin.

[4] It is indicated that Axis forces in Libya are running dangerously short of airplane fuel, according to British reports.

The following estimate represents consensus of all British Intelligence services as to Japan on the basis of all information available up to November 18. The estimate concludes that: (1) In the event of failure of her last attempt to get America to come to a general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind as to whether she should chance the war which would likely follow further aggressive action on her part (2) Japan will probably not attack Siberia at present; she will wait until Soviet strength is decreased (3) Japan will continue the war with China except in the event of a general agreement with the United States (4) Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south indicates that she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road (5) From the Japanese viewpoint her best move, the one with least chance of bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Securing bases in Siam would also pave the way for later movement against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thailand is indicated by her recent movements.

Five Japanese motor vessels, formerly merchantmen, armed with 10 to 16 anti-aircraft guns each arrived Shanghai to-day. Those with a lesser number of guns have mountings in place for 6 additional machine guns. Average seven 3" dual purpose, remainder are automatic which appear about 50 caliber. It concluded that the large number of anti-aircraft guns mounted on Japanese merchantmen taken over by the Navy makes of them virtual anti-aircraft ships and that this arming can have been made only with the air opposition of such powers as the United States and Britain in mind. Arrangements have been made to supply the SS. PRESIDENT MONROE with the necessary armament to make her the first United States Merchant Ship to be armed if present plans are put into effect. The President Monroe is owned by the Bethlehem Steel Atlantic Works and is loaned to the Maritime Commission, the Bureau of Ordnance reports.

The British are reported pleased with the expeditious repair of the HMS INDOMITABLE, which was placed in commission twelve hours in advance of the scheduled completion time. Officers of the Bureau of Ships and [4] the Norfolk Navy Yard met the vessel to determine the extent of damage and expedite repair. Knowing of the anxiety of the British to have the ship in action, the Yard was able to proceed upon word of the grounding, with the fabrication of a section of the bow, due to the presence of the sister ship the HMS FORMIDABLE in the Yard. This coupled with the availability of the dock being used by the HMS FORMIDABLE expedited clearance in a few days.

Repairs for the ODENWALD are expected to be completed November 26. The ODENWALD is in the custody of the United States District Court of Puerto Rico and the Marshall. Investigation shows the ODENWALD was launched in Germany in 1923 over the name ODENWALD. About 1935 her name was changed to ASSUAN and in 1938 it was changed back to ODENWALD the Office of the Judge Advocate General reports.

Scheduled Completions reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
1 Coastal Minesweeper: INDUSTRY.....	F. L. Fulton.....	11/25/41
2 Destroyers:		
ELLYSON.....	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.....	11/27/41
EMMONS.....	Bath Iron Works.....	11/26/41

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

26 November, 1941

Approximately 24,000 troops sailed from Woosung from the 15th to 23rd with large quantity military equipment, including 184 landing boats plus others on 5 vessels, (accurate check could not be obtained). A number of outgoing trucks were observed newly camouflaged, predominantly green which is unusual in this area. Shipping at Shanghai now normal. Along coast either north or south, to date no large movements seen, it is reported by the Naval Attache at Shanghai. Although the destination of the 24,000 troops is not given, the green camouflaged trucks indicate a southern destination. The presence of the landing boats also indicate a destination from which an attack may be planned on United States, British or Netherlands territory, ONI states.

British islands western Pacific being photographed by Japanese planes, particularly the Gilberts. Observer is sending a detailed report. Joint photography is being proposed by British of all Japanese Mandates, French Indo-China coastline and Japanese occupied China and mutual exchange of this information by the United States, Dutch and British aviation.

[2] British Air Ministry reports 108 Japanese fighters recently transferred to Mandated Islands of which 18 are at Truk and 6 at Saipan. A new type of fighter is reported now in complement of KAGA (Japanese aircraft carrier, 26,900 tons), HIRYU (Japanese aircraft carrier 10,050 tons) and SORYU (Japanese aircraft carrier, 10,050 tons).

At Latitude 24° South, Longitude 111° East Naval ratings from German raider rescued. The R. A. N. SIDNEY (Light Cruiser) was in that area but no communications from her, it is reported by Naval Attache at Melbourne.

Russian Ambassador to England, Ivan Maisky emphasized at a luncheon meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Association in London that no naval or air operations will defeat the Germans, for, being a land power, they can only be beaten on land by an armed force that is capable of destroying the German army, MID reports. Maisky also asserted that the Russian losses, including killed, wounded and missing, number 1,750,000 (press states 2,120,000). Russian industry has been uprooted to such an extent that $\frac{2}{3}$ of it is now inoperative.

Unconfirmed reports from a Naval Observer state it is suspected that German submarines are now operating in [3] the Capetown area.

Turkey is reported to have forbidden her ships to go from Istanbul to Bulgarian Black Sea ports on account of "repeated torpedoings by Soviet submarines".

The RAF has been in control of the air from the start of the Libya campaign, MID reports from Cairo. The Observer's personal opinion is that the major portion of the Axis forces (consisting of some 35,000 Germans and 60,000 Italians) will be destroyed or captured.

Status of Naval Aircraft, 31 October, 1941, as reported by the Bureau of Aeronautics:

Naval Aircraft on hand	Combat	Training	Utility	Total
(Service, obsolete, obsolescent and experimental).....	2,734	2,184	273	5,191
Naval Aircraft on Order and undelivered.....	5,385	224	626	6,235

¹ Of this number, 238 are assigned to the Marine Corps.

The KITTY HAWK, one of the ex-Sea Trains now being converted into an air-plane transport has been fitted out, the Bureau of Ships reports. The second ex-Sea Train, the HAMMONDSPORT is being completed at Teaching and Lang. It will go to the Yard to be fitted out next week. This is a two-week's job the Bureau of Ships reports.

[4] The "America First" Committee ran a large "ad" in the Roanoke Times recently which might have been equivalent to an anti-recruiting measure. Upon study, the Office of the Judge Advocate General decided that no action could be taken with respect to this "ad".

A filing system has been started in the Office of the Co-ordinator of Research that will protect the Government and save it millions of dollars in subsequent patent claims, the Office of the Judge Advocate General reports.

Scheduled Keel Layings reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
4 Destroyers:		
Jenkins.....	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.....	11/27/41
LaVallette.....	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.....	11/27/41
Howorth.....	N. Y. Puget Sound.....	11/24/41
Killen.....	N. Y. Puget Sound.....	11/24/41
1 Submarine Chaser.....	Peterson Boat Works.....	11/25/41

Scheduled Launchings reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
1 Destroyer: Woodworth.....	Bethlehem Steel Company, San Francisco.	11/29/41
1 Submarine Chaser.....	Defoe Boat & Motor Works.....	11/27/41

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 26, 1941.

Personal and confidential

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending herewith

1. Another memo about the Japanese movement to the south from Shanghai. This is highly abbreviated from the verbal information given me but it will give you the substance.

2. The British estimate as to Japanese intentions of which I spoke to you and of which you asked me to send you a copy.

Will you kindly return this last paper when you have read it?

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

... of the following points:

(1) It has been very well appreciated that during the course of these very important conversations... continued to exist as... to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the central spirit of the negotiations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japan's leaders has naturally created an atmosphere here in this country... which has added greatly to the difficulty of making substantial satisfactory progress in the negotiation.

(2) We have been very patient in our dealing with the... Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan's courses of

of

We believe that the only way to bring about a
 settlement of the present situation is by the
 peaceful means of the Conference of the Pacific
 in 1921. The danger of world war in this Pacific
 area because of such a settlement and the big issues
 at stake in the world today have caused us to
 outline that this country would accept any
 substantial relaxation in the economic restrictions
 unless Japan gives this country some clear manifesta-
 tion of peaceful intent. If there occurs, we can then
 take some steps of a concrete character designed to
 improve the general situation.

(3) We remain convinced that Japan's own best
 interests will not be served by following militaristic
 and courses of aggression, and that Japan's own best
 interests lie along the course which we have out-
 lined in the current conversations. If, however,
 Japan should unfortunately decide to follow militaristic
 and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond
 any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate
 loser.

SECRET

C.R. 0748.

FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER SAYRE PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY
APPRECIATED.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT QUEZON TO INFORM
YOU THAT YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO THE LAST MAN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE, WILL STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.

SECRET

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE.....

88 FILE.....

*Returned
Contracts noted
JHR*



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1941.

My dear Mr. McIntyre:

I have read Assistant Attorney General Littell's letter to you in which he suggests Judge Stainback of the United States District Court to succeed Governor Poindexter in Hawaii. I don't share Littell's volunteered enthusiasm about Judge Stainback, but I admit that the difficulty in obtaining the right kind of a man for Governor of Hawaii, if we have to restrict ourselves to a resident democrat, is a major one. Governor Poindexter has never been anything to cheer about, but at least he has been unobjectionable and, on the whole, during normal times, satisfactory. However, quite regardless of his health, we do need a strong man there now, and where to find the right man I do not know. The President, on one occasion, suggested that we might ask Congress to amend the fundamental law so as to permit the appointment of a mainlander, but this did not seem politic at the time, and I don't know that it would now, although there would probably be less objection now than in normal times.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Parker

Secretary of the Interior.

x6

Mr. Marvin O. McIntyre,
Secretary to The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1911

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may want to take the time
to read Foxman's letter. It is interesting,
even though it is not entirely disinterested.

M. B. M.

Department of Justice

Washington

HOWMAN M. LITTELL
Assistant Attorney General

21st and Mathera,
West Vancouver, B.C.,
November 14, 1941.

Mr. Marvin O. McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mac:

While concluding a period of convalescence with friends in British Columbia, information reached me that Governor Poindexter in Honolulu has unfortunately failed to recover from his operation while in Washington, D.C., a few months ago, and that his resignation is expected before the expiration of his term next March. This recalls my visit to Honolulu last August in connection with the heavy volume of condemnation work there for national defense purposes, and particularly certain impressions of the Federal Government's representation in various official posts in the Islands, and I am constrained to make certain observations to the President through you if you consider it worth while to pass them on to him.

Appointments in peace time to the "Paradise of the Pacific" are one thing, but with the Islands becoming a focal point of communications, supplies, and naval operations, in the increasing tensions of the Pacific, there must be able and fearless men in command, capable of making decisions and getting things done. I gained impressions of weakness on all sides. Governor Poindexter, who is well advanced in years to begin with, has been weakened by ill health which is reflected all the way down through the executive branch of the government, just as any other organization always reflects the weakness of its appointed leader. The Admiral in command at Naval Headquarters was a fine and widely experienced old gentleman past sixty, who, in command of one of the most exciting naval ports under the American flag, goes to bed at 8:30 P.M., because, as he told me, he "could not stay awake after that". The General in command for the Army was also past sixty, an estimable man of great experience, whose attacking powers seemed to me well illustrated by his recommendation to the Secretary of War, who in turn wrote to the Attorney General, that the Department of Justice do not prosecute Japanese in the Islands for failure to register under the Alien Registration Act, because this would interfere with a propaganda campaign of Americanization and friendship for the Japanese being conducted by the consular general. Men of wide experience with the

I am a native of Hawaii, and I have lived in the Hawaiian Islands for many years. I have seen the progress of the Islands from the time of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1894 to the present day. I have seen the Islands go from a monarchy to a republic, and I have seen the Islands go from a republic to a republic.

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...and, I believe the Commission that should have the
benefit of all factors, and would receive the full force of the
right course of the government under whatever conditions are
likely to be met in the Japanese events of the Pacific.

It may be that the President was hurried up in mind as
to the matter of the attack, but it is hard to see how it
can be that the attack was little noticed and that the
responsibility would be his. I have observed closely from
the beginning, without loss of time in getting acquainted and
learning the way about the world, this situation as to whether
it would be of interest to him. I trust this letter will
either be destroyed or kept in your files after it has served my
purpose, and that it is right now.

I have had to go to the West Coast about December 4th or
5th, and will be back here in San Francisco in Seattle, and
return to Washington where I shall be on duty again December 25th
1941.

With personal regards,

Sincerely yours,


Thomas W. Mitchell,
Assistant Attorney General.

ENCLOSURE

November 25, 1941

Handwritten: H. H. ...

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY EGAN x 6

This is the letter about which I spoke to you on the phone this morning. I am sending it over just for your information.

Please return it so that I can acknowledge.

H. H. ...
Secretary to the President

Enclosure

Let to MEM 11/14/41 from Asst. U. S. Norman ...
from 21st and Mathers, West Vancouver, B. C. ...
M. Deindeck U. S. District Court Judge, Territory of Hawaii
would be good man for app. as covered of Russell in event
Poindexter resigns before expiration of his term next ...
Memo for the President 11/2/41 "You may want to take the time to
read Norman's letter. It is interesting, and though it is
entirely disinterested." MEM

HONORABLE MARVIN H. MCINTYRE,
Secretary to the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, December 18, 1941.

DEAR MAC: My letter of November 14 to you from Vancouver, B. C., referred to three gentlemen in primary positions of command for the Federal Government at Honolulu—Governor Poindexter, Admiral Bloch, in command at Pearl Harbor, and General Short, in command for the United States Army of the Hawaiian Department.

Enclosed is an editorial in regard to the Governor, published on December 4 in the Star Bulletin and, in my opinion, correctly representing the general attitude in Honolulu. This was three days before the Japanese attack, and I am afraid the sentiment may have precipitated to more bitter levels since then.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

By Messenger

NORMAN M. LITTELL,
Assistant Attorney General.

DELAY AT THE TOP

DEC. 4, 1941.

Inaction on the Oahu food storage project, like inaction on the new M-Day law, is directly traceable to lethargy at Iolani palace.

In the face of a war emergency that has already arrived in Hawaii, urgent steps for full preparedness are intolerably slow and hesitating.

The territorial administration, to put it plainly, is keeping pace in defense preparation neither with the aggressive speed of the federal branches of government nor with the ready and willing spirit and energy of the civilian community.

* * * * *

Governor Poindexter has been, it is true, in the hospital for two weeks for a period of rest. There is no occasion or desire to impose upon him any unnecessary physical demands. But the governor has ample authority and scope to delegate some or nearly all of the immediately pressing duties of preparedness to others.

He can, for instance, give full authority to the emergency food commission to go ahead full speed on the Oahu food storage depot.

He can order the M-Day committee to move into action with something like real speed and scope on its own important lines of preparation.

He can instruct them to step up or step out—and the community will back him to the limit.

* * * * *

The delays daily revealed in civilian preparation for what at any terrible moment may become actual war in the Pacific are due to no lack of readiness to serve by the civilians of Hawaii.

At every call, Honolulu and other communities have responded.

Everywhere there is the keen desire, by men and women of every race who make up this American territory, to do whatever is necessary and requested of them individually and collectively.

This has been the spirit and this has been the determination for many months.

It has been concretely demonstrated by such organizations as the mayor's disaster council, the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, by the emergency food commission itself, and by many others.

It has been proved by the willingness and enthusiasm with which thousands of Hawaii's young men have met the call to active duty in the army, the navy or the marine corps.

It has been expressed in the proud bearing of the parents of those sons sent into service—the pride that comes with the realization that these youths of the islands are relied on to help in island defense.

* * * * *

Yes, the civilian community has responded promptly and loyally to the many and varied demands and requests made upon it—and properly made—in the name of national service.

* * * * *

The delays which it is a painful necessity to record are attributable to lack of aggressive leadership by the territorial administration at this critical time.

There seems slight realization that the necessary steps for preparedness MUST be taken quickly and decisively.

There seems scant realization that war on the Pacific is daily coming nearer

to a fact, and that many things which will have to be done in the event of war are not yet done or even well started.

* * * * *

Immediately the two most important tasks before the administration are action on the Oahu food storage reserve, and action on the M-Day law.

If these require night-and-day work—and we believe they do—then let the governor insist on night-and-day work and he will find no lack of support for such a policy.

Nor is there lack of competent citizens to do the big job ahead, and if he will call on them in the name of patriotic service, and give them authority to act on their own judgment and experience, he will not fail to find plenty of able helpers.

In reply refer to initials and No. HRS/Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 28 November 1941.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Just to follow up on the Madagascar scare. The British have called up and told us to disregard their message, that they had completely discredited it.

I won't bother you with anything else and hope that it is possible you can free your mind of most everything here. We will be on the job.

We are doing everything possible towards strengthening and making ready the bases in the Pacific, and I believe you will approve of the measures we are taking without much, if any, change.

Was glad you found such general concurrence with the paper Marshall and I sent to you. One of the holes we had plugged with the message I read you for Hart and Kimmel. The other with regard to specifically defining an area we will work on in connection with the messages you requested be prepared.

Am enclosing copy of a letter from Jim Newton who is from Denver, a great friend of Justice Douglas, and a member of a very well known family. You can guess he is quite a character and an independent thinker himself. I thought it might be of a little interest and you probably would not get a chance to read it except on a vacation.

I hope you have a fine vacation and that you can see it through.

All good wishes. Sincerely,

BETTY.

JAMES Q. NEWTON,
Denver, November 24, 1941.

DEAR HAROLD: Bill Douglas' dinner and your luncheon were a real treat to your country cousin. I do feel very often, as I told you, that my world is drifting away from me, but when I have a chance to talk to both of you and realize that after all we are thinking about the same thing, it is quite consoling to say the least.

I am more firmly convinced than ever that the middle income group is getting excited and should have leadership from the group that you and I think should be the leaders in America.

The multiplicity of government agencies and their intense desire to prove their worth and perpetuate their organizations has created a public feeling of confusion and maybe resentment against what is commonly called propaganda.

Organized minorities take advantage of that confusion and foster laws which seem to the middle group discriminatory and selfish. It is that feeling of confusion which will eventually turn our actions into a rout and some Hitler, under the guise of his protective government, will appear and be leader of the exploited middle group. It is a known fact that knowledge cannot be spoon fed and the objectives of these various so-called social advancements cannot be advanced by the propaganda methods of the various government agencies. Only resentment and confusion and a feeling of being "taken in" has been the result. The growing resentment against English propaganda should be proof enough.

It is immediately necessary for us to try and create unity in our nation and to do so it is necessary to help the people become dynamic in their action and thoughts and change their feeling of being "taken in" to their disadvantage. There is no such force as class consciousness in the United States. No person thinks any other person in the sense of class is better. All of us feel many other citizens are lower than we, but none of us believe any other person is better. But there is a class feeling based on money. We always seem to feel that the very low income group, meaning the subsidized underprivileged, and the very rich receive the good things in material life. Somehow the middle income group have lulled

themselves to sleep and it is only through a sudden change, such as [2] our present international policy that consciousness comes into that group. They have little and need little comparatively, and are docile to the extreme, but when aroused by fear are apt to be panicky and turn themselves over body and soul to any fearless leader. This group is composed of at least 60% to 70% of the able United States citizens and can be turned from their present trend of confusion and fears if we can some way, somehow restore to them their right and duty to think for themselves.

The *first* problem for them is that of physical preparedness, such as providing a place to meet and to talk to each other.

The *second* is leadership among themselves; the *third* cohesion and correlation of their groups; and the *fourth* form an organization competent to furnish their groups with honest, truthful data which they deem necessary to help their thinking and self expression.

My plan would be to divide the United States into regional districts. In each regional district, employ about three professional organizers who would appoint a general committee consisting of twelve extremely prominent citizens from the following groups: Three from religious organizations, three from public school system, three from university or higher education group and three from business.

These groups while essentially a symbol of honesty and community solidarity should be forced to become interested in filtering information which is to be presented by various specialized agencies to the community self interest groups formed under our plan.

I am never clear about explaining my objective nor my methods, but I believe that through this plan I am creating meeting places where the middle income group can express themselves when, as, and if they are seriously and mentally upset as to their government relationships and understandings.

Adult educational groups and all other university extension groups have attempted to serve education on a platter to the middle group. I am sure they do not want to be educated because our public school system has explained to almost each and every one of us that when we are through school, we are educated. A serious defect, in my opinion, in the system. The dullest man in the United States today is the Phi Beta Kappa at 21, who is the sedate citizen at 45. He never cracks a book after he leaves college because he feels he is educated and can prove it by his degree.

[3] To define what I mean by this middle income group, I am sure I mean almost all of the 'oi polloi in America. When you say middle income group you mean those individuals who presently earn their costs of living or use income derived from the investment of their savings. The people I exclude from this group are the so-called under-privileged and the so-called hereditary rich. In other words the dregs and the froth of society.

I propose that a committee be organized in each separate economic region of the United States, composed of the representatives of the church, the public school system, university system, and business. I firmly believe that President Roosevelt can get the leadership of this group through this method and I firmly believe he should make the attempt to regain the confidence of that group.

I am presenting this plan to you and Bill Douglas simply because I admire you both personally. I want you to understand that I have no ambition to be anything. Thank God, my philosophy has taught me that to try to be a somebody in the estimation of somebody else is futile and empty. I firmly believe my philosophy has told me that while there are very few values in the action of life, the one real value that counts is to have such control over yourself that you can enjoy life through the happiness of others. Maybe you think I have gone Pollyanna, but to live as I have just expressed is a thousand times harder than to stand out on the street corner and be a tub thumper and court public acclaim.


I am sending this letter to you and Bill Douglas and in case you care to suggest any future action by me to further these plans, I shall appreciate it, or in the event you think the idea should be dropped, let me know.


The costs of actually compiling the information and correlating necessary facts of the various agencies involved would be considerable but could be accomplished by the Social Security set up.

Sincerely,

JAMES Q. NEWTON.

Admiral HAROLD STARK,
Chief of U. S. Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.





THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

*Philippine
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RECEIVED
DEC 8 17 1941
December 1, 1941

Via airmail

*Philippine
Folder*
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my telegrams to you of November 29 and November 30 concerning President Quezon's address before the Philippine University of November 28, (see Enclosure No. 1), the exaggerated allegations in his speech oblige me at this time to submit to you this report on civilian emergency defense measures in the Philippine Islands and recommendations as to your clarification of the problem of responsibility for the continuance of this work.

President Quezon's chief allegations in his speech were:

1. If war were to come, the civilian population of the Philippines would be unprotected;
2. The inadequacy of preparations was due to President Quezon's being blocked in his efforts to provide for civilian defense by the President of the United States stopping him from exercising powers under the Emergency Powers Act;
3. President Roosevelt's action was due to a campaign based on ignorance and bad faith indulged in by civil liberties unions, peace-at-any-price societies, theorists, writers, liberals and American imperialists in the Philippines.

The issue presented by President Quezon's speech was the placement of responsibility for the inadequacy today of civilian defense measures in the Philippines. President Quezon gave credit to his own vision and far-sightedness for getting the National Assembly to pass the Emergency Powers Act of August 19, 1940 and he asserted that when you stopped him from exercising those powers he suffered the greatest humiliation and defeat he had received in his public life.

He

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

He said the present unpreparedness was due to his enforced inactivity during a seven-months period when his hands were tied. This period can refer only to the time prior to April 1, 1941 when by executive order he set up the Civilian Emergency Administration. (See Enclosure No. 2). As I pointed out in my telegram of November 30, 1941, during this period it was always open to him to secure such legislation as might be necessary, and also he might have proceeded under the ordinary police powers of the Commonwealth Government.

During that period I made unceasing effort to initiate and stimulate activity in civilian defense work. On September 9, 1940 General Grunert, Commanding General of the Philippine Department, in my office and at my request explained in detail to President Quezon the urgent need for joint collaboration in preparing for civilian defense. President Quezon thereupon appointed a committee including General MacArthur, then his military adviser, to represent him in conferring with General Grunert. On September 16, General Grunert presented to the committee a detailed memorandum outlining the need for civilian defense planning. After a month's study, on October 15, the committee reported that protective measures should not be prematurely practiced here but in anticipation of any emergency, the Emergency Powers Act gave to President Quezon complete control of civic functions, and that in time of emergency by converting land to food production the Philippines could be easily self-sustained. (See Enclosure No. 3). On October 16, President Quezon stated to the press that war was not imminent in the Orient and that he did not believe it was the duty of the Philippine Government to provide air-raid shelters but even if it were he was of the opinion they were not necessary.

On October 22, at my request, General Grunert submitted to me a plan for a General Planning Board; and on the next day President Quezon, General Grunert and Admiral Smeallie, then Commandant of the 16th Naval District, conferred with me and agreed to create such a Board to formulate concrete plans for civilian protection in the event of sudden emergency. On October 28, the Planning Board, with President Quezon himself in attendance, held its first meeting in my office under the chairmanship of my then liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Carewell, who is now in the United States. The Board made exhaustive surveys of resources and needs and submitted its report jointly to President Quezon and me on March 11, 1941. General Grunert stated the Board did an excellent job and that the future success or failure of this civil planning and its results appeared to depend upon what the Commonwealth government, particularly its President, could and would do in furtherance of the Board's recommendations.

President

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President Quezon agreed that the responsibility was his and he would go forward and on March 20 he joined me in issuing a press release (see Enclosure No. 4) pointing out conditions to be remedied and stating that an organization would be set up to function directly under the President of the Philippines. In accordance with this assurance President Quezon then established on April 1, 1941 the Civilian Emergency Administration by an Executive Order under the Emergency Powers Act. (See Enclosure No. 2)

It seems clear, therefore, that during the seven-months' period prior to April 1, 1941, due to the initiative of the American authorities and with the knowledge and cooperation of President Quezon, the groundwork was in fact prepared for the Civilian Emergency Administration.

After the creation of the CEA on April 1, 1941, actual progress in civilian defense preparations has been slow but continuous. It has been handicapped, however, by weaknesses in organization and administration, inadequacy of funds, vacillation in objectives, difficulties in maintaining close coordination with the military and ordinary inertia. I have consistently endeavored to stimulate the CEA by placing at its disposal all the facilities of my office and sending to its meetings my military liaison officer. On September 7, 1941 I sent Major Merron, my military liaison officer, to British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies to report on civilian defense preparations there. His excellent reports, copies of which are in Washington, disclosed glaring deficiencies here by comparison and although they caused much press comment and official efforts towards self-justification, they resulted in the acceleration in civilian defense measures for which I have constantly striven. Observations on the CEA are contained in the monthly reports by Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury, my former adviser on political affairs, who is now on duty at the State Department, and are on file in Washington.

The responsibility for the adequacy or inadequacy of the work of the CEA rests squarely upon President Quezon. The Executive Order creating it states that the directing commission of the CEA shall, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions.

President Quezon, however, has not been always consistent in recognizing his responsibility. On May 5, 1941, in an address to the National Assembly, he stated that the duty of safeguarding inhabitants, both citizens and aliens, against hunger, pestilence, lawlessness and other dangers which the nature of modern warfare entails, rests mainly with the

government

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government of the Commonwealth and that consequently he created the CEA to advise and assist the government in the adoption and execution of such measures as may be necessary to protect its civilian population in case of emergency. (See Enclosure No. 5).

In a letter to me dated April 3, 1941, he said:

"I desire to make it clear that, in my opinion, the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines is as much the primary responsibility of the Government of the United States as is the military defense of the Islands."

Four days later, he wrote to me:

"the obligation which the Government of the Commonwealth attempted to assume by the approval of the Emergency Powers Act - that of protecting the Filipino people from the ravages of war - was, after all, primarily the obligation of the United States and not of the Commonwealth."

Because of these fluctuations in his attitude and the dire need for effective civilian defense preparations, I recommend that you clarify the problem of responsibility for the continuance of this work. Responsibility might conceivably rest upon either (1) the High Commissioner's office, (2) the United States Army, or (3) the Commonwealth government. To this problem for over a year I have given intensive study.

My conclusions and recommendations follow:

It is clear that the High Commissioner's office as at present constituted lacks both the funds and the necessary personnel which would warrant its being designated to assume responsibility for civilian defense. It also lacks jurisdiction due to the domestic autonomy granted the Philippines by the Independence Act.

Throwing upon the United States military forces responsibility for the work of civilian defense is a possibility. This matter has already been brought to the attention of the Commanding General of the United States Army in the Far East and he has taken the position that civilian defense should lie with the Commonwealth. As late as November 27, 1941 when President Quezon and General MacArthur conferred with me at my request to consider the effects of

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a letter dated October 7, 1941 addressed to me by Mr. LaGuardia as United States Director of Civilian Defense, appointing me Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands, it was again agreed by the three of us that the existing Civilian Emergency Administration should continue to operate under the direct control of the President of the Commonwealth, but of course with the constant observation and advice of the United States military authorities. (See Enclosures Nos. 6 and 7). I enclose herewith a copy of Mr. LaGuardia's letter to me and of my reply, explaining the reasons why I did not feel free to accept this appointment. (See Enclosures Nos. 8 and 9).

In view of the above it seems that responsibility for the work of civilian defense should rest squarely upon the Commonwealth Government. Two fundamental reasons form the basis for my opinion: first, the disturbance which I fear a shift at this time might cause and which might be construed both here and abroad as a disruption of Filipino-American relations; second, your announced policy, as given in your letter of March 1, 1937 to my predecessor, which I have continually borne in mind, not only to avoid unnecessary interference with the large measure of autonomy in the administration of domestic affairs entrusted to the Commonwealth Government, but also to give helpful encouragement to the new government.

Very sincerely yours,

Francis B. Sayre

Enclosures:

1. Speech of Pres. Quezon, Nov. 28, 1941;
2. Executive Order by Pres. Quezon, No. 335, April 1, 1941;
3. Letter from Sec. Vargas to Gen. Grunert, Oct. 15, 1940;
4. Joint press release by H.C. and Pres. Quezon, March 20, 1941;
5. Pres. Quezon's message to National Assembly, May 5, 1941;
6. Letter from H.C. to Gen. MacArthur, Nov. 27, 1941;
7. Letter from Gen. MacArthur to H.C., Nov. 28, 1941;
8. Letter from Mayor LaGuardia to H.C., Oct. 7, 1941;
9. Reply to Mayor LaGuardia by H.C., Dec. 1, 1941.

Enclosure No. 1

SPEECH OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRESIDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES ON THE OCCASION OF THE CELEBRATION OF NATIONAL HEROES DAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

President Gonzales, Members of the Faculty, Distinguished Guests, Students of the University of the Philippines, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Every time that I witness a parade of the ROTC, my heart beats fast for I am filled with almost unbounded pride and pleasure. Today, however, as I saw you pass before me, officers and men of the ROTC of the University of the Philippines, I felt that my heart was heavy and thoughts came to my mind that perhaps some of you may soon have to give your lives in defense of your country. Should such an occasion arise, I want you, young men, to remember that there is no death more glorious and more desirable than death in defense of the fatherland.

We are gathered here this afternoon to do honor, to pay homage, to the heroes of our race. You are celebrating National Heroes Day. Should you have to give your lives in defense of your country, those coming after you will revere you in their hearts just as we are revering today those who have gone before us. That should be the thought you must bear constantly in mind in these days that you may be ready to face any danger that may confront us.

A little while ago, at the Luneta, after that mammoth parade during the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the Commonwealth, I stated, with I think justifiable pride, that it was due to my vision, to my far-sightedness and to my determination that we have today a force capable of putting up a good fight should the occasion arise. In the course of my remarks, I stated that this achievement of my administration as accomplished despite the opposition of the so-called civil liberties unions, both here and in the United States, and the peace-at-any-price societies. I might have added that that was accomplished despite the opposition of liberty-loving theorists.

I come now to tell you of something of which I am not proud. I want to confess to you the greatest defeat and humiliation that I have received in my public life. And this defeat was caused by these theorists—these “defenders of liberty”, these civil liberties unions here and in the United States.

Perhaps I might have gone to my grave without making a public statement of this secret. No one likes to speak of his defeat. But soon after I made that statement at the Luneta the so-called Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines gave out a statement denying that they have ever opposed the national defense program of my administration, but asserting with evident satisfaction that what they have opposed is the emergency powers act. And the evidence that our stand was justified is the fact that for seven months, the powers granted to the President in that act have not been exercised.

[2] It is true—unfortunately true—and I hope it may not prove to be the most tragic truth in the history of the Philippines. Today if the war were to start and bombs fall on the University campus—don't laugh they may fall—thousands or hundreds of you will be killed for you have no air raid shelters here. If there was to be war our people may find themselves starving. Certainly, if there had been war two months ago, there would have been starvation in the Philippines.

If there was to be war now, we may find ourselves to be without fuel, without gasoline,—in one word, if there were to be war now, we would find ourselves unprepared. The civilian population of the Philippines unprotected. We are just beginning to practice blackouts—we are just starting to show our people how to evacuate crowded places.

And who is responsible for this neglect? Not the President of the Philippines, not the National Assembly—but the “liberty loving” people of the Philippines, the so-called “liberty loving” people of the Philippines.

No sooner did the war in Europe break and especially after the debacle of France, I asked the National Assembly to give the President emergency powers so that he might be able to take the measures necessary for the protection of our people. At that time nobody in the Philippines thought that war may ever come to our shores. These people who know so much, who are all the time telling us what to do—they never imagined, they could not imagine—a bunch of fools that they are—they could not imagine a war between Germany and England and France will ever reach our shores. But I did. I saw it coming. I saw it because I am spending my days and nights studying what is going on in the world, because it is my duty to you to be always alert so that I may be

in a position to render to you the service that is my duty to render that you may be protected.

As soon as I sent that message to the National Assembly asking for these powers, all these young writers of the Philippines with the Civil Liberties Union and all these so-called liberals—who have never done anything in their lives to fight for freedom and liberty—all these come out and denounced me as a would-be dictator and attacked the National Assembly, denouncing its men as weak and incompetent for granting me those powers. Seven months, the Civil Liberties Union said, had to elapse before I made use of those powers. Precisely the seven months that I needed to be ready at this time. If I had been able to do what we had to do during those seven months, I would not be afraid now that something, some cataclysm may happen here in the University campus. I will be certain that these students of the University of the Philippines for whose care I am responsible—I assert that no matter what happens nothing would occur to you. But I am humiliated and grieved to say that I am in no position to give that assurance now.

[3] How did this happen? Did these writers, these liberals, this Civil Liberties Union—did they ever succeed in stopping my hand? Never. Never by themselves alone. But at this time they found powerful allies—the American imperialists in the Philippines, as represented by the *Bulletin*. Now I am calling everything by its name. These imperialists who have never accepted defeat, who still believe that they can stop the Philippines from becoming independent, who all the time have been placing obstacles in our way in the hope that and perhaps in the belief that they may defeat our cause—these people have been all the time charging the Government of the Commonwealth of being incompetent or of being a dictatorship. They are the ones who started to oppose the national defense program. And they opposed the national defense program not because they did not believe that we could make a success out of it but because they wanted to make an argument when independence was to come, to say to the United States, “Are you going to let the Philippines alone when they are absolutely defenseless?” So when I was trying to arm the country they denounced me as a would-be military dictator with the idea of stopping that program. Fortunately I had occasion to go to the United States then and I fought them right before American public opinion and I had occasion to convince the President of the United States that what we are doing here was not only the right thing to do but the essential thing to do if we were going to become independent. And I defeated them, when, however, the fight against the Emergency Powers Act in the United States came, I was tied up in the Philippines. The war was going on; I could not leave the country for something might happen while I was away. It was my duty to be here. And so the cry that came to America coming from these American imperialists and these Filipinos (what shall I say about them?) made an impression in the United States. That had the effect of creating an opinion there unfavorable to the exercise of those powers by me. It was no strange. At that time nobody in America—no, I won't say nobody because President Roosevelt knew it—but very few in America knew that the war in Europe was going to affect them seriously. And these peace-at-any-price fellows—they could not understand why if America was not getting ready then—why should the Philippines get ready. Why? There is no doubt that this Quezon is getting to be a dictator. I had to fight both ignorance and bad faith. The campaign was so effective that I received a message from no less a personage than the President of the United States himself telling me that the enactment of this law had created great concern in the United States and asking me to give a public statement to the effect that I would not use those powers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, under the Tydings-McDuffie law, the President of the United States has the right to intervene in the Philippines if in his judgment the government here established has ceased to be democratic. And the matter, as presented to the President, seems to prove this has ceased to be a democracy. It was impossible for me to argue with the President over the phone or through radio, I could not send him a telegram so I simply bowed my head in deep sorrow. I gave the President of the [4] United States the assurance that I would not exercise these powers unless his representative in the Philippines himself asked me to do it. I was so certain that the day would come when I would be asked to exercise these powers that I preferred to bide my time. But seven months had gone by. During that time I had my hands tied. I don't know how,

but the fact that the Philippines might be involved in war before I was ready to protect my people haunted me day and night, and for several months I could not go to sleep until finally I broke down with another attack of tuberculosis. I could not stand it anymore. Finally, the commanding general of the United States Army wrote me a letter asking what this government was doing for the protection of the civilian population. My answer was, "I don't know. You ask the High Commissioner." And finally I was asked by the High Commissioner himself to constitute the Civilian Emergency Administration, to which body I gave all the powers that the Emergency Powers Act gave me. This is the reason why for seven months the powers of that Act were not exercised, not because they were not necessary but because thanks to the wisdom of the far-sightedness of these liberty-loving Filipinos, in conjunction with the American imperialists, the President stopped me from exercising these powers.

I am going to say something terrible—but that is what I feel. If war breaks out soon and our people die here unprotected by the bombs, those men who have stopped me from doing what I should have done ought to be hanged—everyone of them on the lamp post. And now I am addressing you—the youth of the land—and with you I am addressing your rectors, and your professors—for you are not alone responsible; they are primarily responsible too for what you are doing or failing to do.

Under the Constitution of the Philippines, the Government of the Commonwealth has supervision and control over all schools and colleges and universities. Even before the Commonwealth was inaugurated, we had laws here that gave the government the effective control over our educational institutions.

I have been President of the Philippines for six years now. The worst criticism against me and my administration has come either from professors or from university students. If there is anybody here who dares say publicly—be he a professor, a president of a university, a rector or student—is there anyone here who dares say in my presence that because he has taken the liberty to criticize me, even in denouncing me falsely, that I have done anything against him?

Nobody can say that. And yet if we were to read what you are writing and saying almost every day in public speeches and newspapers, you seem to be living in a country where you cannot move without someone hitting you in the head; that you cannot speak your mind; that this is a dictatorship.

[5] Fortunately the Filipino people do not agree with you for they have once more elected me to this high office with still greater majority than the first time I was elected. They know that I am not a dictator. They know it is beautiful oratory to accuse somebody of dictatorship. They know that it is easy for you to get applause from the public if you are brave and attack the present government from the President down to the policeman.

That is why every time you have an oratorical contest there the speeches are full of denunciation. My goodness, I don't know my own country. I don't know my own people when I read these speeches. I do not care what you say about that. It amuses me. I have no hesitancy in saying that since the first day that democracy has come to this earth there has never been a case of the chief of state whose position is elective, that he has been elected by his people without his asking for his election. I am the only one in history. And I want you to know that I did not want to be elected. I want you to know that the only thing that at last induced me to adopt a passive attitude about my reelection is that war in Europe, that I saw that the Philippines may sooner or later be involved.

And I saw that while the immense majority of our people were living in a fool's paradise, I was one of the few who was watching what was going on and knew what was coming. That was why as one of the reasons I permitted myself to be reelected once more.

But I have no hesitancy in saying that that provision in the Constitution which limits my reelection to two more years has been my own work, for I did not want to go beyond that. Is that the dictator? I am resigning my position at my own volition. There is nobody in this country who could have defeated me if I had wanted to continue for another four years.

Now, I am speaking to you with my heart in my hand because of what I am going to tell you now. This is no time for us to be engaged in foolish debates. This is the time when your mind—the mind of everyone of you, men and women,

old and young—should be devoted to but one problem: the problem that is confronting us and which may mean a terrible destruction and unbearable hardship. Talk of freedom and liberty. You have plenty of that. What you do not have enough of is duty. As least, you do not talk of duty. You need not learn from my lips. See what has happened to France. To France. Where is France today? At the feet of the conqueror, paying 8 million dollars—16 million pesos a day for the support of the German army, five billion and a half a year of pesos.

If France had spent that money in airplanes and tanks, France would not be giving that money now to her master. The Frenchman is working day and night, when he is told to work, with or without compensation. He is working for his master, Germany. He would not be doing that now if he had not been all the time wanting more [6] hours of rest, less hours of work and more salary and more good time. Strike upon strike. In every corner of the streets in Paris, you could hear nothing but freedom, liberty, while the Germans were getting ready to take that freedom and liberty from them.

I wonder. I wonder if my countrymen desire to have the same fate that befell France. That is the work of the Fronte Popular of Blum; the work of so many parties of the opposition, that whenever they wanted to have a government they had to get together five or six opposition parties. They never had a majority party; they never had a policy, a constant policy of government that had a majority and the confidence of the people. That is the fruit of doing nothing but singing the song of liberty without remembering that liberty without order is chaos.

I think that our universities and colleges ought to, occasionally at least, tell their students that men do not live on liberty alone. There is also duty. And that the man who knows how to do his duty knows how to fight for his right. There is no man in this country—I challenge every Filipino of the 16 million Filipinos—there is no man in this country, not even a woman, there is no man in this country who loves liberty more than I do. I have fought for liberty since I was a boy, and now that I am an old man I am still fighting for the liberty of our country. No man who is willing to give his life for that liberty is going to deny that liberty.

I am an old man, even though I do not want to confess it, especially when there are girls around—but I am an old man. At least in the Philippines very few men live more than 70 years. In another six years or seven I will be 70, and before I am 70 I know I will be dead. Why should I who have been raised to the position I am occupying today by my people, only because I have been their servant in the fight for their liberty and freedom—now that I am old about to die, deprive you of that freedom? Why should I deprive you, the men of tomorrow, of the opportunity to be free when my whole life has been dedicated to the cause of liberty so that you may live free. I am about to die but I want my country to live and I want my country to live eternally and to live with the blessings of liberty. But liberty can only be a blessing if it is accompanied with order. I am about to die but I am leaving children, children that are as young if not younger than you are. I could not face those pieces of my own soul and flesh if I were not devoting every day of my life for their happiness and freedom and security; and I cannot do that for them without doing it for you. They cannot be free if the rest of you are slaves.

My friends—for you are my friends regardless of whether you like me or not—please listen to me. I am talking to you on a very solemn occasion, on a very dangerous situation. You have been reading only of the dearth and destruction in Europe. You have seen it in the movies. You do not realize that you may see [7] it right here and you are not getting ready for it. Nobody is getting ready for it. I am not telling you that war will come. It may never come. I hope it will not come. But if it should come, it will be a good thing for all of us for we will learn to suffer and we will learn to die. I know people are not worthy unless they know how to suffer and how to die. I wish these educators of ours here will start telling you to write poems or speeches speaking of your duty to lay down your lives, your duty to work and your duty to suffer. That is life.

Enclosure No. 2

Malacañan Palace

Manila

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 335

Creating a civilian emergency administration, defining its powers and duties and providing for coordination and control of civilian organizations for the protection of the civil population in extraordinary and emergency conditions.

Whereas, the Civilian Emergency Planning Board has recommended immediate adoption of measures to control and coordinate civilian participation in meeting grave emergencies; and

Whereas, it appears necessary and desirable that comprehensive rules and regulations be issued to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants;

Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred, do hereby create and constitute a Civilian Emergency Administration, which shall function through and be administered by the following officials and organizations and those that may hereafter be designated:

1. The National Emergency Commission, composed of the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman and a representative of each Executive Department as members. This Commission shall, subject to the approval of the President, formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection and welfare of the civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions. It shall have general supervision and control over the officials and organizations as authorized herein, in so far as their duties pertain to said Administration, and shall function through (1) The Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Director of Publicity and Propaganda; (3) a Food Administrator; (4) an Industrial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and Transportation Administrator; (6) a National Air Raid Warden; (7) a Director of Communications and such other officials as may be appointed by the President from time to time.

2. A Provincial Emergency Committee in each province, composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Fiscal, the District Engineer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Inspector of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, as members. This committee shall have general supervision and control over the Municipal Emergency Committees.

3. A Municipal Emergency Committee in each municipality or municipal district, composed of the Municipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal Treasurer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the Chief of Police, the Sanitary Officer, the Municipal Agricultural Inspector, and a representative of the Municipal Council, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for emergency purposes in accordance with and subject to the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the National Emergency Commission. Such local units shall consist of (1) a Volunteer Guard, (2) Air Raid Protection, (3) protection of utilities and industries, (4) food administration, (5) evacuation, (6) public welfare and morale, (7) transportation and fuel administration, (8) medical and sanitary, (9) publicity and propaganda and such other services as may be authorized from time to time.

4. A City Emergency Committee in each chartered city, composed of the City Mayor, as Chairman, and the City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the City Engineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the City Health Officer, the Chief of the Fire Department, and a representative of the Municipal Board, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for emergency purposes as prescribed for municipalities under paragraph (3) hereof.

5. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Order, the cooperation of all departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government is hereby enjoined and the whole-hearted support of the inhabitants of the Philippines earnestly requested.

Done at the City of Baguio, this 1st day of April, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the sixth.

(Sgd.) MANUEL L. QUEZON,
President of the Philippines.

By the President :

(Sgd.) JORGE B. VARGAS,
Secretary to the President.

Enclosure No. 3

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, October 15, 1940.

Confidential

DEAR GENERAL GRUNERT: The Committee appointed by His Excellency, the President, has carefully considered the statements contained in your memorandum of September 16th, presented in our recent conference, and I beg to submit the following comment and information, reference being made seriatim to subheadings of paragraph 4 thereof:

a. Additional soldiers.

The Philippine Army is prepared to mobilize immediately its twelve divisions of approximately 120,000 men. The Department Commander has complete data as to the location, equipment, and training of these troops. As for their replacement in civil pursuits, the unemployed in the islands, including those that would be thrown out of employment by the war processes, would fill the vacancies in productive fields resulting from a mobilization.

b. Food supplies.

The Commonwealth at present imports a certain amount of its food requirement. In time of emergency, however, by converting to food production some portion of the agricultural land now devoted to cash exports it could easily be self-contained. The federal forces here, as you know, are supplied largely by imports; however, they could readily be supplied from local sources in time of war. The National Rice and Corn Corporation, a Commonwealth entity, imports those cereals and could, in emergency, increase its present supply. The continued importation of food supplies is an insignificant problem compared with the importation of military supplies. All ammunition, ordnance, gasoline, aviation supplies and what might be classed as munitions of war must be imported and the channels of communication constantly kept clear. This is a naval problem, not an interior one.

c. Other essential military supplies—transportation, medical, construction materials, utilities.

All transportation in the islands would be available to the military on demand. The supply would be far in excess of military needs. Complete studies have been made as to such facilities. Repair and maintenance facilities and operating personnel are available. Such demands as the military might make could readily be accommodated by the civil population. Gasoline stocks are very limited and the supply depends upon the maintenance of sea communications.

[2] Medical installations and facilities are limited and no funds are available to do more than is now being planned by the Commonwealth in its progressive program for improving conditions within its fiscal limitations.

Construction materials exist only in limited quantities. Timber and cement are available, but steel products and appurtenances are supplied from the United States or foreign countries, largely upon individual order. The road system hardly needs discussion, as it is shown on official road maps of the Bureau of Public Works.

Utilities, now adequately manned and administered, could be insured only by a proper military defense.

d. Communications.

All communications would naturally be at the disposal of the military. The present operating agencies could continue to function under such direction and supervision as the military might impose. No preparatory instructions are necessary to accomplish these ends.

e. Labor.

The demands of the military could be more than met by civil potentialities in this regard provided the United States Government pays the prevailing wage.

The operation and administration of labor gangs engaged on military measures present problems that do not materially differ from similar operations in civil life.

f. Welfare.

This is a subject that receives the constant attention of Government. Its transition from a civil to a war-time basis will depend entirely upon the policies of the military as determined by the nature and course of military operations.

g. Publicity.

The dissemination of military propaganda is a problem that appertains not to the civil, but to the military headquarters. The usual publicity methods would continue subject to such restrictions as the military might impose. The application of such restrictions would be a simple matter in so far as civil authority is concerned.

h. Protection.

The protective features of municipalities and provinces would continue to function except as might be modified by military commanders. Any attempt to reorganize these civil agencies based not upon local civic needs but upon possible needs in time of war would be impracticable. The present organization represents a standard development which would have to await local necessity in order to be intelligently modified.

[3] Anti-sabotage measures are already in operation.

Blackouts, gas proof shelters, and all the many ramifications of a nation at war are of doubtful application to the local situation until a much more critical phase of the international situation develops. Such steps cannot be imposed without causing the gravest anxiety and concern on the part of the populace and great expense and effort on the part of Government. Such steps are not as yet current in the United States itself, and it is not believed that they should be prematurely practiced here.

The present police control of aliens in so far as is known, has proven entirely satisfactory. The efficiency of the current system unquestionably compares favorably with that of other parts of the United States.

In anticipation of any emergency the Commonwealth Government has recently enacted Commonwealth Act No. 600 authorizing its President to take the most comprehensive action with reference to complete control of its civic functions. The comprehensiveness of this law which was enacted as a measure of preparedness, exceeds anything of the kind as yet provided by the United States Government or any of its other integral parts.

Most of the data on the subject you have outlined are available from published annual reports of the different offices of the Commonwealth Government. If any further data are desired along any special line, I shall be very glad indeed to furnish such information as soon as it can be made available.

With expressions of cordial regard, I am

Sincerely yours,

JORGE B. VARGAS,
Secretary to the President.

Major General GEORGE GRUNERT,
Commanding General, U. S. Army, Philippine Department, Manila.

Enclosure No. 4

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Manila, March 20, 1941.

Press Release

The report submitted to the United States High Commissioner and the President of the Philippines by the Civillan Emergency Planning Board on March 11th contains a resume of conditions as they exist at this time, as determined by surveys conducted by the Committees on Supply, Transportation, Medicine, Communications, Welfare, and Personnel and Labor. In addition to setting forth conditions as they exist, the report of each Committee points out specific conditions that need to be remedied and contains the recommendations of the committees as to the action to be taken by the Commonwealth authorities to remedy such defective conditions. For instance, definite shortages are known to exist in certain articles of food and other supply items. The Committee on Supply has recommended that the Commonwealth authorities immediately develop and put into effect a plan to increase the production of essential foodstuffs through-

out the Philippines, and that special attention be paid to the development of self-sufficiency of food supply in each locality. It also recommended that the growing of short-time crops, and the raising of livestock and poultry to meet the requirements for meat, dairy and poultry products, be encouraged in every practicable manner. The acquisition of suitable and adequate reserve stocks of all imported items considered as essential, including fuels and foodstuffs, by the Commonwealth Government itself, or by suppliers of such items under an agreement with the Commonwealth Government, was recommended.

Concerning transportation, certain recommendations were made for the control of the operation of motor vehicles during an emergency in order that existing supplies of gasoline, lubricating oil, tires and spare parts might be conserved.

Among other recommendations made by the Board were those concerned with the establishment of adequate stocks of surgical instruments, X-ray apparatus and supplies, biological serums and apparatus for blood transfusions; the expansion of existing telephone and telegraph lines to meet emergency conditions; and the control and use of radio stations during an emergency.

During any emergency many organizations will be active in behalf of the civil population. In order to avoid duplication of effort, prevent waste and reduce expense, the work of these organizations should be controlled and coordinated by a central organization. To secure such coordination and control the Board has recommended that a Civilian Emergency Administration be created by the President of the Philippine composed of [2] one representative of each of the following Departments of the Commonwealth Government.

Department of the Interior
 Department of Public Works and Communications
 Department of Agriculture and Commerce
 Department of Health and Public Welfare
 Department of Public Instruction
 Department of Finance
 Department of National Defense.

This organization would function directly under the President of the Philippines and be charged with the duty of formulating and executing policies and plans for the organization of certain units in all the provinces and chartered cities. Functioning directly under this national body would be the Philippine Red Cross, a Director of Publicity and Propaganda, a Fuel Administrator, a Food Administrator, a National Air Raid Warden, and a Director of Communications.

Among the units that would be organized and trained under the supervision of the National CEA if this plan is adopted are those belonging to the Air Raid Protective Service and Volunteer Guard Units.

The Board has prepared a complete and comprehensive Air Raid Protective Plan which contemplates the organization of:

A Warning Service
 An Air Raid Wardens Service
 Auxiliary Fire Fighting Units
 First-Aid Units
 Rescue Units
 Demolition and Repair Units
 Decontamination Units.

This plan contains the necessary information to be given to the public as to what to do before, during and after an air raid. It contains information regarding air raid shelters and several designs of inexpensive shelters for family use. It even contains directions for making a cheap improvised type of gas mask which would afford temporary protection from poison gas.

MANUEL L. QUEZON,
President of the Philippines.

FRANCIS B. SAYRE,
*United States High Commissioner
 to the Philippine Islands.*

MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA

Baguio, May 5, 1941

Gentlemen of the National Assembly:

The trend of events seems to point strongly to the possibility of America's entry into the present world war. If such a situation should arise, it goes without saying that the Philippines would also be involved directly in the war.

While the protection of the Philippines against external aggression is primarily the responsibility of the United States, the duty of safeguarding the inhabitants of our country, both citizens and aliens, against hunger, pestilence, lawlessness and other dangers which the nature of modern warfare entails, rests mainly with the Government of the Commonwealth. Consequently, and by virtue of the powers vested in me by Commonwealth Act No. 600, I have constituted a Civilian Emergency Administration to advise and assist the government in the adoption and execution of such measures as may be necessary to protect our civilian population in case of an emergency. This Administration is functioning through the following organizations:

1. The National Emergency Commission, composed of the Honorable Teofilo Sison, Secretary of National Defense, as Chairman, and a representative of each Executive Department, as members. This Commission, subject to the approval of the President, formulates and executes plans for the protection and welfare of the civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions. It operates through (1) The Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Director of Publicity and Propaganda; (3) a Food Administrator; (4) an Industrial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and Transportation Administrator; (6) a National Air Raid Warden; and (7) a Director of Communications.

2. A Provincial Emergency Committee in each province, composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Fiscal, the District Engineer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Inspector

of

Phil Defense - Civilian

- 2 -

of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, as members. This Committee has general supervision and control over the municipal emergency committees.

3. A Municipal Emergency Committee in each municipality or municipal district, composed of the Municipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal Treasurer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the Chief of Police, the Sanitary Officer, the Municipal Agricultural Inspector, and a representative of the Municipal Council, as members. This Committee organizes local units for emergency purposes, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the National Emergency Commission.

4. A City Emergency Committee in each chartered city, composed of the City Mayor, as Chairman, and the City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the City Engineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the City Health Officer, the Chief of the Fire Department, and a representative of the Municipal Board, as members. This Committee organizes local units for emergency purposes, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the National Emergency Commission.

The Civilian Emergency Administration has been functioning for some time, and has already formulated comprehensive plans designed to effectuate the objectives of the Government in the event that our country is drawn into the conflict. Some of these plans are now in process of execution; others are being carefully studied by the Government with a view to final action.

In order to avert shortages in certain articles of food and other supply items, definite steps have been taken to increase the production of essential foodstuffs throughout the Philippines, particular attention being given to the development of self-sufficiency of food supply in each locality. The growing of short-term crops has been encouraged. Negotiations are under way for the acquisition of suitable and adequate reserve stocks of all imported items considered as essential -- including fuels, construction materials, and foodstuffs -- either by the Government itself or by the importers of such items under an agree-

ment

- 5 -

ment with the Government. In this connection, I have issued an executive order requiring all government entities to establish and maintain at least a four-month reserve supply of gasoline, lubricating oil, diesel oil, and other oil products. Public utility enterprises are being requested to take similar precautions.

To safeguard the health of the civilian population, negotiations are being made for the acquisition of an emergency reserve supply of medicines, and surgical instruments, including bacteriological serums and vaccines. These supplies will be distributed and stored throughout the country in eleven strategic locations. Artesian wells will be drilled in evacuation centers in order to insure adequate supply of drinking water.

The Civilian Emergency Administration has found that the construction of public air-raid shelters in Manila and in most other coastal cities and towns would be very expensive and impracticable on account of the low terrain. Furthermore, the supply of materials for the construction of suitable shelters is totally inadequate. For these reasons, the Commission has recommended the evacuation of children and unessential men and women from the danger areas in such cities and towns, as well as the transfer of some government offices from the City of Manila and surrounding municipalities to the provinces. There are, however, certain offices which, by the nature of their functions, must remain in Manila, and to afford protection, as far as possible, to the officers and employees whose duties require them to remain in such offices, air-raid shelters will be constructed in the buildings where those offices are located.

To enable private persons or entities to build their own air-raid shelters, plans for the construction of such shelters in privately owned concrete buildings will soon be ready for distribution. Because of the lack of sufficient supply in the local market, the National Coconut Corporation has been requested to have 1,000,000 sacks manufactured from coconut coir for use in building air-raid shelters.

Plans are being completed for the evacuation of such portions of the civilian population of Manila as may be found in danger areas which the proper authorities of the United States Army will specify in due time. These plans include the designation of places

in

- 4 -

in Manila where people will be expected to gather for their transportation to the different evacuation centers. A survey has been made of nearby towns in the provinces of Rizal and Laguna to determine their availability as evacuation centers from the standpoint of food and water supply, sanitation, construction materials, etc. A similar survey is being made for the purpose of taking care of the populations of other danger areas outside of the City of Manila, such as the cities of Cavite, Cebu, and Iloilo, and the towns of Batangas, Lingayen, and others.

In case of an emergency, our electrical communications are inadequate. Therefore, plans have been adopted for their improvement and for supplementing the usual facilities with mobile and portable radio sets. To carry out these plans, the amount of ₱250,000 has for the present been allotted. The sum of ₱100,000 has also been made available for immediate use by the Bureau of Posts for the purpose of maintaining 24-hour telegraphic service in all provincial capitals, for the employment of the necessary additional personnel, the training of operators, and the purchase of additional equipment and supplies.

With a view to avoiding confusion resulting from lack of organization and to provide organized emergency groups ready to function at any moment for the purpose of ministering to the needs of the population, the organization of Volunteer Guard units in all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts, is being undertaken by the provincial governors under the direction of the Chief of Constabulary. Rules and regulations for the organization and training of the Volunteer Guards and for the establishment of an Air Raid Warden Service have been issued and sent to all officials concerned. These rules and regulations, including directions for air-raid precaution, have been printed in pamphlet form for general distribution.

During great emergencies, the matter of police protection for the civil population assumes a vital importance. It is the primary duty of the Government to provide adequate police protection in such cases. The present strength of the Philippine Constabulary, while adequate in normal times, is insufficient to meet

emergency

- 5 -

emergency conditions. It is, therefore, necessary to provide the force with additional personnel in order to enable it to cope with the situation when an emergency occurs.

The execution of the plans and the effectuation of the objectives I have mentioned require the expenditure of considerable sums of money. I, therefore, recommend that the amount of ₱10,000,000 be appropriated for such purposes. I also recommend that the life of Commonwealth Act No. 600, commonly known as the Emergency Powers Act, be extended to the date of adjournment of the first regular session of the Congress of the Philippines, with such modifications and under such conditions as the National Assembly may deem proper to provide,

Respectfully,

(SGD) MANUEL L. QUEZON
President of the Philippines

The National Assembly
Manila

Enclosure No. 6

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,

Commanding U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, 1 Calle Victoria, Manila.

MY DEAR GENERAL MACARTHUR: In accordance with our conversation of this morning, I am enclosing a copy of a letter of October 7, 1941 from Mayor LaGuardia, the United States Director of Civilian Defense, in which he says:

'Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint you Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands.'

As I told you this morning, there must be some mistake, since I have had neither recent conversation nor correspondence with Mayor LaGuardia. It is apparent that he has not taken into consideration special circumstances obtaining in the Philippine Islands and the progress already achieved in emergency defense measures under the primary responsibility of the Commonwealth Government in conjunction with the advice and cooperation of the military authorities.

I shall appreciate having your views as to what reply should be made to Washington. So that Mayor LaGuardia and President Roosevelt may obtain a clear understanding of the situation here, I should appreciate your setting forth in [2] your letter the present status of civilian defense and plans for future activities.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

CAB:

FBS: abn

Enclosure No. 7

[copy compared rap]

HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., November 28, 1941.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

DEAR MR. HIGH COMMISSIONER: I have received your cordial note of November 27th and I concur fully with your thought that the communication from Mr. LaGuardia was sent through mistake. The executive power in the Philippine Islands for peacetime execution of measures involving extraordinary controls of the civil population are vested in the Commonwealth Government. With the Tydings-McDuffie Act as a basis it enacted emergency laws placing such authority in the hands of its Chief Executive. Accordingly local measures for civilian defense were initiated several months ago after coordinated discussion between the High Commissioner, the President of the Commonwealth, and the military authorities. A Civilian Emergency Administration for this purpose was constituted operating under the direct control of the President of the Commonwealth. This agency, while a responsibility of the Commonwealth Government, functions with the constant advice and observation of both the High Commissioner's office and the military authorities. It has operated successfully within the natural limitations imposed by local conditions. It would be most unfortunate if any attempt were made to change the present arrangement. The cooperation and complete understanding which now exists between all agencies involved should not be disturbed especially at this critical time.

Most sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Enclosure No. 8

[copy compared rap]

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE,
Washington, D. C., October 7, 1941.

Hon. FRANCIS B. SAYRE,
*United States High Commissioner,
Manila, Philippine Islands.*

MY DEAR COMMISSIONER: Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint you Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands.

Instructional material has been sent to you, and you will receive from time to time such additional information as it becomes available. If there is any assistance this office can render you at any time, we will be only too glad to do so.

As Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands, it is understood that you will serve without remuneration.

Sincerely yours,

F. H. LAGUARDIA,
U. S. Director of Civilian Defense.

Enclosure No. 9

Via airmail

December 1, 1941.

The Honorable F. H. LAGUARDIA,
*United States Director of Civilian Defense,
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. LAGUARDIA: I have your letter of October 7, 1941, sent by ordinary mail and not received here until late in November, informing me that you have appointed me Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands. Inasmuch as I have had no previous conversations with you with regard to this matter as stated in your letter, I wonder whether the letter could have been sent possibly

under some misapprehension. As you know, the executive power in the Philippine Islands with certain exceptions has been placed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act in the hands of the President of the Commonwealth Government. Acting in accordance with that power, nearly eight months ago he set up the Civilian Emergency Administration, of which he is the directing head. In view of the delicacy of the existing international situation and of the political and jurisdictional complexities of the local situation, the problem of civilian defense in the Philippines has now been referred to President Roosevelt and it would be most unfortunate at this time to disturb the present arrangement without his specific instructions. I therefore do not feel free to accept the appointment tendered in your letter unless directed otherwise by the President, to whom I am today sending a full report on the situation.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS B. SAYRE.

FBS: abn

CONFIDENTIAL.

BULLETIN

3 December 1941

Note: Heavy Japanese troop movements from Central China continue, probably to the South. ONI reports and a Naval Observer in Shanghai reports from November 26 to November 29, 14,000 Japanese troops plus others (accurate check not available), arrived there by rail. Equipment with arrivals included field artillery and tanks.

Vichy officials stated, December 1, that the French Government in case of war in the Far East would take all means in its power to defend Indo-China against any aggression, regardless of whence it comes. Should a Japanese attack on Thailand occur, the French Government would "examine the situation and determine its position in accordance with a realistic policy," it is reported from Vichy.

Through November 1, Germans killed and missing in Russian campaign are estimated to total 2,250,000, MID reports from Bern. Note: This figure considered excessive although Germans recently admitted 2,125,000 killed, wounded and missing.

[2] *SS NISHMAHA (United States) picked up November 27, 72 men on rafts from the British cruiser DUNEDIN (4,850 tons), torpedoed and sunk on the 24th. Five died and buried informally. Proceeding Trinidad from S. E. ONI reports.*

To date, the RAF has avoided night missions with fighters and light bombers due to the necessity that all take-offs be made during daylight, MID reports from Cairo. The reason for this is claimed to be the lack of experienced flyers, but in so doing much of the air attacks' effectiveness is lost. Most of the RAF losses during the early days of attack resulted from crashes by RAF planes landing on their own grounds. American-built aircraft are considered excellent. Adequate direct-support planes, to be used in conjunction with tank operations, are not available. RAF performance—except for the conduct of close-support missions—has been rated highly effective. The RAF transport shuttle, taking into account its lack of equipment, is considered good.

Japanese and Germans are meeting in Lima, Peru, to plan sabotage and embarrass the United States. Peru plans against, a Naval Observer, in Lima reports.

[3] *Future operation of the Federal Shipbuilding plant at Kearny, New Jersey, it reaching a showdown in view of the fact the Mediation Board is about to make its recommendations on the cases of union maintenance referred to them. It is hoped that the company and the union may reach an agreement.*

In reply to a request from the British Admiralty for nine additional converted aircraft carriers the Navy Department has asked the British to advise the locality in which the operations of such carriers would be anticipated. The thought behind this is that if the plan is to operate them in the North Atlantic it would be better for the United States to acquire them, man them, and operate them, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports.

Mr. Frederick Rentschler, Chairman of the Board, and Mr. Eugene Wilson, President of United Aircraft Corporation, conferred on the morning of December 3 with Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus L. Gates and the Chief

of the Bureau of Aeronautics Admiral Towers concerning their corporation's plan of general refinancing, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports. *Special conferences are still being held* in regard to [4] the control of allocation of steel required for National Defense, the Bureau of Ordnance reports. In this connection, it is probable that special inventories of all Ordnance plants will be required to check any possible excessive inventory being kept on hand. Efforts are being made to avoid additional questionnaires being sent to Inspectors and contractors for information that appears to the Bureau to be unnecessary or that might be obtained direct from steel producers. Reports have been furnished to the Office of Budget and Reports as to the steel requirements for 1942 to produce all classes of projectiles.

Scheduled deliveries reported by the Bureau of Ships:

Ships	Builder	Date
2 Coastal Minesweepers:		
Paramount.....	Delaware Bay S. B. Co.....	12/ 1/41
Progress.....	Anderson & Cristofani.....	11/30/41
2 submarine chasers.....	Peterson Boat Works.....	12/1/41
	do.....	12/ 5/41

Representations have been made that there is a conspiracy in Philadelphia to gouge the Navy on the purchase of land. The Judge Advocate General has an attorney looking into this matter very carefully.

CONFIDENTIAL

BULLETIN

5 December 1941

Hitler not shot, Naval Attache in Rome reports. German Embassy interpreted telephone message "Big Chief shot down" to mean Hitler. Later when interrupted communications were restored it was learned that General Von Paul; Major Bruning, Assistant Chief Luftwaffe, Rome; two colonels; two aides; two pilots and possibly others crashed and killed in Sicily en route Africa. Von Paul was to be Chief entire Axis Air Force Africa and was carrying complete plans for African campaign. Germans in Rome feared plane shot down.

Nazis have started a major offensive in the Kharkov region of the Donets river basin, 250 miles N.W. of Rostov, in order to ease pressure on retreating Germans to the South. The Russians are said to be resisting successfully, it is reported from London.

MID reports from Rome: (1) Defenses in South Italy and Sicily are to be set up under the control of the Germans from now on (2) Naples' defenses against air attack are much improved, however, industrial sections were severely damaged by recent bombing (3) The [2] central and southern portions of Italy are preparing to receive a large addition to the Luftwaffe forces already there.

Three German steamships were reported as sunk recently IN THE W. Mediterranean in the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar, MID reports from Gibraltar.

Admiralty appreciates that one raider is still in Pacific and possibly another in Indian Ocean. Supply ship also possibly at sea, the Admiralty reports.

The Saigon radio announced December 3 that Tokyo had given a pledge to Governor General DeCoux to send no more troops into French Indo-China and to refrain from using Indo-China bases for attacks on Thailand or China's Burma Road, it is reported from Vichy. (Note: "Scrap of Paper?")

Naval Attache, Singapore reports British and allied merchant ships in that area advised by Commander-in-Chief, China (1) All ships north of Hongkong "beat it South thereof" (2) Crown Colonys and all ocean going ships to Singapore and bring such shipyard equipment as possible (3) Except for Coast of Malaya and West Borneo no vessels leave Singapore north-bound without permission (4) No Dutch ships shall go North their islands without authority orders issued by the Dutch.

[3] *Naval Observer in Mexico City reports:* Japanese Minister here has applied for United States visa for self and family to cross border about December 13 to depart from United States for Japan on TATUTA MARU. Two other legation officials have also requested United States visas for families and will leave for Japan from United States. Reported Japanese Legation Mexico City has requested TATUTA MARU call at Manzanillo (Cuba) and Canal Zone after leaving United States presumably to evacuate families. Such evacuations believed indicative of Japanese officials expectation of trouble.

The Army and Navy Munitions Board has granted the Navy Department the right to assign A-1-a priorities for all of its combatant ships which will be finished in 1943, the Secretary's Office reports. The Board has been requested to grant permission to establish the same priorities for airplane carriers to be completed in 1944.


USS SALINAS (5,375 tons) torpedoed oil tanker, now at Robins Dry Dock, Brooklyn, New York, will be placed in Dry Dock December 8 for examination and repairs, the Bureau of Ships reports.

[4] *Navy is taking steps to establish a branch of the Norfolk Navy Supply Depot, in Baltimore.* Commercial terminal space will be used. This is for the purpose of serving British Repair, conversions and other USN supply needs, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts reports.

Ordnance reports progress on the delivery of guns, including ammunition supplies, for Russia under Defense Aid with Russian ships currently being armed and armament for ice-breakers delivered or waiting to be picked up

Provision is being made by Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for a special first-aid box for Naval gun crews for merchant vessels, "armed guards". These boxes will be assembled at rendezvous points for distribution to each gun crew as it goes out. Boxes will be returned, overhauled and replenished. A "Medical Compend" (M and S) giving instructions on first-aid and medical treatment is contained in each box.

The Principles of Damage Control are being applied to the Auxiliary ships of the Navy. This includes provisions for water-tight integrity, fire and gun protection, repair of battle damage. The annual damage control practice is being conducted this year in the auxiliary class, Fleet Training reports.



*Wavy, Fuller
2-41*

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16

SECRET

December 5, 1941

S-E-C-R-E-T*file*MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: O.N.I. estimates of Japanese forces in Indo-China, and adjacent areas.

25,000 men in Tonkin Province (North)
 80,000 " " Southern Indo-China
 105,000 men.....TOTAL

90 planes near Hanoi (North)
 • 160 " Southern Indo-China
 250 planes...TOTAL

NAVAL FORCES

At Camranh Bay or vicinity	1 Heavy Cruiser 1 Converted Seaplane Tender 9 Submarines 21 Transports or supply vessels.
At Saigon	2 Destroyers
Indo-China Coast	1 Light Cruiser 1 Minelayer
In the general Hainan- Formosa area	1 Heavy Cruiser 3 Light Cruisers 24 Destroyers 10 Submarines 3 Aircraft Tenders 1 Submarine Tender 1 Minelayer 27 (approx.) transports or supply vessels.

In supporting distance are:

On Hainan	50,000 men and 200 planes.
On Formosa	45,000 " " 150 " "

*Maxwell
By Direction*

The President's Appointments

Saturday, December 6, 1941

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Saturday

DECEMBER 6

APPOINTMENTS	APPOINTMENTS
8.00	2.15
8.15	2.30
8.30	2.45
8.45	3.00
9.00	3.15
9.15	3.30
9.30	3.45
9.45 AT White House	4.00
10.00 (Justice Wm. O. Douglas)	4.15
10.15	4.30
10.30	4.45
10.45	5.00
11.00	5.15
11.15 (Director Harold Smith)	5.30
11.30	5.45
11.45	6.00
12.00	6.15
12.15	6.30
12.30	6.45
12.45	7.00
1.00 (Lunch)	7.15
1.15	7.30
1.30	7.45
1.45	8.00
2.00	8.15

DECEMBER 7

Sunday

APPOINTMENTS

APPOINTMENTS

8.00		2.15	
8.15	At White House	2.30	
8.30		2.45	
8.45		3.00	Secy. Stimson
9.00		3.10	Secy. Knox Harry Hopkins
9.15		3.30	Gen. Geo. Marshall
9.30		3.45	Secy. Holt
9.45		4.00	
10.00		4.15	
10.15		4.30	
10.30		4.45	
10.45		5.00	
11.00		5.15	
11.15		5.30	
11.30		5.45	
11.45		6.00	
12.00		6.15	
12.15		6.30	
12.30	Chinese Ambassador	6.45	
12.45		7.00	The Solicitor General
1.00		7.15	
1.15		7.45	Vice President & Cabinet
1.30		7.50	Sen. Barkley Sen. Mc Nary Sen. Connally Sen. Austin
1.45		7.45	Sen. Hiram Johnson Spkr. Rayburn Cong. Cooper Cong. Markin
1.45		8.00	Cong. Bloom Cong. Eaton
2.00		8.45	Hon. Sumner Welles
		12.00	Mr. Ed. Murrow Col. Wm. Donovan

THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS—SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1941

- 12.30 P. M.—The Chinese Ambassador
 3.05 P. M.—The Secretary of War
 The Secretary of the Navy
 Mr. Harry Hopkins
 Captain John Beardall
 Secretary Marvin McIntyre
 Secretary Early
 Miss Grace Tully
 3.20 P. M.—Gen. George Marshall
 The Secretary of State
 7.00 P. M.—The Solicitor General
 8.40 P. M.—The Vice President and entire Cabinet
 9.45 P. M.—The Vice President
 Senator Alben W. Barkley
 Senator Charles McNary
 Senator Connally
 Senator Warren Austin
 Senator Hiram Johnson
 Speaker Rayburn
 Congr. Jere Cooper
 Congr. Joe Martin
 Congr. Sol Bloom
 Congr. Charles Eaton
 10.45 P. M.—Under Secretary Sumner Welles
 12.00 P. M.—Mr. Ed Murrow
 Col. William Donovan
-

Will you get me that list of people who were at the house on Sunday, December 7th? I think I will list their names in the Engagement Book, just in case the list gets lost.

*Copy of attached
list sent to
Barney 12/11*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Check Request
Mrs R*

for Sunday

Dear Grace:

Here is the list, as given me
by West, the secretary to Crim. Is
the 3.05 appointment right, or is it two
appointments, one of the secretaries and
one of the Cabinet Members?

Robey

*Main Historic
Folder*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1941

War Dept Files
file
Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report from General Short, Commanding General in Hawaii.

3:34 p.m.
E.S.T.

Japanese enemy dive bombers, estimated number - sixty, attacked Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor at 8:00 a.m. Extensive damage to at least three hangers at Wheeler Field, three at Hickam Field and two planes caught on ground. Details not yet known. Raid lasted over an hour. Unconfirmed that ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged. Marine field EWA also badly damaged. More details later.

4:13 p.m.
E.S.T.

Of the Japanese bombers, five are known to have been shot down. Enemy submarines off Oahu. Two American battleships sunk. Big fires along hangers still burning at Hickam Field. No Japanese bombers identified. Estimated from 60 to 100 dive bombers participated in attack on Oahu.

Later
Message

Battle casualties reported 10:20 a.m. December 7, 1941. Known dead, 38; wounded, 366, of which 20 to 50 may die. One B-17 plane from mainland ran into attack. Three (presumably refers to crew) injured. (Note: 13 B-17 planes took off from Hamilton Field to arrive at Honolulu between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m., E.S.T. Evidently the first plane ran into the engagement. We have no data yet regarding the other planes.)

The first survey indicates that the following planes remain undamaged: Approximately 40 pursuit planes at Wheeler Field, plus 4 A-20's, 9 B-18's, and 4 B-17's. This is the result of the preliminary survey.

No time

Enemy air attack resumed 11:00 a.m., much less intense than former attacks. Manila reports no overt acts have yet occurred there.

This was received at 6:30 P.M.

Telephoned from Colonel Phillips, Hawaii at 6:30:

There are at present about 15 to 18 A-20 airplanes aboard the Transport Meigs. Those planes were being shipped to the Philippines and I would like to take them off here. *(This was authorized - W. M.)*

We have at present 13 B-17, 9 B-18, 4 A-20 planes, 25 to 30 pursuit planes and those are P-40 and P-36's. We have lost a number on the ground. We have shot down about 11. All planes arrived but one. 9 in fine condition. One plane crashed at Bellows Field and one was

caught in the air. We have a total of 12. We now have 13 available.

4 out of commission, 2 crashed on land, one caught in the air.

We have been unable to determine how many they lost. We have turned over bombers to the Navy. *A joint operation is being started against enemy carrier.*

We have a total of 104 dead and about 200 wounded. Honolulu power plant is not out. Some sabotage but are taking care of it. Not serious. Communications all right. We have captured one plane and show down about 11.

Summary 12 noon seven December; Hickam Field known dead 80 wounded, 250; Wheeler Field known dead, 22; seriously wounded, 10; slightly wounded, 50; Bellows Field known dead, 2, wounded six.

SHORT

MARSHALL

W. H. S.

Notes taken of conversation had between Admiral Stark and Admiral Block, on phone, 1910, Sunday December 3, 1941.

"Hello, this is Admiral Stark.

This is Block. I thought I would give you the last information I had.

"We would be glad to get it.

"Here in the harbor, as nearly as I can ascertain there are six battleships out of business. Six battleships, and three of them at least, look like they are salvage jobs. They are down and partially cap sized. The Nevada has been pushed over against *ways?*

YPO (?)

"That's in addition to the six?"

No, that is one of the six.

Now I'll let you know what I know about the damages

(Here there was an interruption)

"The Nevada was hit by a torpedo and set on fire and she was pushed over on the YPO. The Oklahoma was hit by three torpedoes, apparently while at mooring and she capsized. The Tennessee was hit by torpedoes and she is partially capsized. The California was set on fire and she is burning, and we are trying to get the fire under control. The Arizona was hit by torpedoes or aerial bombs and she I understand is capsized. The West Virginia was on fire but apparently is still afloat and all right, but pretty badly damaged by fire. The Maryland, as far as I can ascertain, is OK. The Pennsylvania is OK, although two destroyers at the same dry dock were destroyed. The Floating Dry Dock was holed (?) and there is a destroyer there and we are trying to get the destroyer out.

The Colorado is not here. The Alabama has a crack under her water line and her fire rooms are flooded. We are trying to repair them.

"What did you say happened to her?"

I think a bomb hit her under the water line and cracked her and flooded her. The Raleigh was on the other side of the harbor, but I understand she had a fire and that they had to pump so much water into her that she is in bad shape.

There are two task forces at sea looking for these carriers. There are.-

"Did you say there are carriers, cruisers and destroyers?"

"Yes, there are two task forces at sea, consisting of carriers, cruisers and destroyers.

The Army bombers that are intact are gone out to look for these fellows in the positions we believe they are in. A pretty large number of patrol planes were destroyed by fire. I think they are pretty badly hit over there. The Army lost a lot of pursuit planes. I understand they lost a number over at Wheeler field. They lost one squadron, I heard. That's not as bad as it could be, since they have quite a number of pursuit planes. This morning there were twelve big bombers just came in.

The latest news from Guam: All Guam is being bombed by two squadrons of Japs. Eight casualties.

We have a man here named Curtis who is on his way to the East. I am issuing orders to hold him here. ~~I think your dispatch asked for~~

We have sent you a dispatch asking

all Naval salvage, etc.(?) to be sent out here as soon as possible. We have a lot of ships out, and we have diverted but cannot be sure whether we have sent them the right way or the wrong way. The Enterprise's position is about 300 miles out of Midway on her way to Wake. I don't know which is the least dangerous, whether to bring her back or not.

The fires in the Navy Yard are very well under control. We have had reports of parachute troops landing but I have not been able to verify those. We have sunk some submarines. One has been sunk in the harbor here. I don't know whose it was, but it was fired on by the ships in the harbor and sunk.

"A submarine sunk in our harbor?"

Yes, one was sunk in our harbor, and we believe there have been three sunk outside near here. One by airplane and two by destroyers. Several enemy aircraft were shot down. Two that I ^{saw} personally were shot down in the harbor. Some were shot down on the _____ and I understand they captured some papers from him but not yet been able to translate them.

"The submarine sunk in the harbor, is it German?"

We don't know what it is as yet.

I don't know whether there will be another raid tonight or not.

I had to hold everything in readiness so I would be ready to go.

HR "I prophesied that there might be a raid in the morning, that there might be some of them come back at daylight again in the morning?"

I don't know but if the attacks we set out to make occur, - the Lexington, and the cruisers and the destroyers if they can locate these fellows, they ought to make it pretty hot for them.

The only information I got from Kimmel. He told me that seven combatant ships, two carriers and three transports, - seven combat ships, three transports and two carriers about forty miles south of Niihau. ■ That's over by Kawai. (?)

I am expecting attacks on Wake and Midway when these fellows start back. My great problem now is about this convoy leaving California now, whether we can get those through or not.

HR "I turned them back."

I think that's the best for the time being until the situation has clarified here. It's a pretty bad mess here. Of course they came in with no warning at all. They did their job very efficiently.

"Well, we are all with you and I hope the country gets fighting mad over this. Anything we can do of course, all you have to do is tell us. I will look out for you salvage material right away."

Block The last report I had there were thirty people dead and about 400 patients. That doesn't take into account these ships down in the harbor.

I got a report the Utah had been bombed and capsized and about 100 men trapped in her.

HR "You didn't mention her before, is that in addition?"

Yes, that's the Utah. There are a lot of cruisers and destroyers that were in the harbor that have left and gone out. There is nothing much I can tell you what to do, but I know Kimmel will welcome the addition of PBV's right ~~ex~~ away.

Merwin
Those planes that went to Wake are there. The ones that went to Midway have been cancelled.

That's about all the information. I don't know how many people are listening on this line. If they are listening, I hope they will keep their mouths shut.

"I will do everything I can to help, and of course you know just how we feel about it here. You have no further knowledge of the casualties?"
No.

"We will count on getting word from you if anything further comes off? As soon as I have anything definite, I will call.

"Were there any bombings of non military objectives in Honolulu itself?

Yes sir, I understand one bomb dropped in Honolulu and killed one man. One officer told me some bombs dropped up in the hills where he lives but he didn't know what damage was done.

As far as the Oil tanks are concerned, they have not been affected. And the gas too, it is intact.

Goodbye.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*file
personnel*

THE SECRETARY

December 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Returned with many
thanks.

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PAK
EE

December 5, 1941. *S*

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Thanks

eff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Japan
Gold
1-4K
Dec. 3, 1941.

Memo. for The President:

By telephone from Secretary Morgenthau:

"At five forty-five this evening I received word that the representative of the Bank of Japan in New York is closing their office tomorrow under instructions from Japan. The representative will leave New York on December tenth for Japan."

* * *

h.m. jr/mc
7:10 P.M.

*Japan Files
1-41*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

file
MEMORANDUM:

On finding through Mr. Belin that I knew Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese Special Envoy, who was an old friend, Colonel Donovan asked me to come to Washington to get into contact with him. Colonel Donovan spoke to the Secretary of State and obtained his approval.

I called at the Japanese Embassy at eleven o'clock the morning of December 6th. Mr. Kurusu, whom I have not seen for eleven years, was very cordial and we resumed our old friendship at once.

After a few personal inquiries and some reminiscences of our days together in Peru, Mr. Kurusu launched forth into a lengthy conversation regarding his mission here, seeming to be extremely anxious to talk about it with an old friend and with someone in whom he had entire confidence. Constantly, throughout the whole hour-and-a-half conversation, Mr. Kurusu seemed very apprehensive of being overheard by members of the Embassy staff, repeatedly turning his head to see if anyone were approaching.

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Mr. Kurusu said right off: "Fred, we are in an awful mess. In the first place, I was delayed two months in coming on this mission, through an attack of conjunctivitis when I could neither read nor write. This complicated the situation because time was running out, from the point of view of restraining the military element, and it had been planned that I should have left for the United States in August or September. This had an immediate bearing on my negotiations with the Secretary of State because I found, just prior to my departure, that the Civil Government was up against it to know how to ~~analyze~~ ^{Causalist} the military effervescence so that it would do the least harm to American and English relations; that the Civil Government had decided that the least harmful alternative was to allow the military to move into Indo-China since that neither directly threatened Siberia and the United States nor Singapore and Britain."

Nevertheless, Kurusu recognized that any troop movement would be regarded with great suspicion in the United States and would, inevitably, jeopardize the success of his mission. The best he could do, however, was to be allowed three weeks' time for his negotiations to bring some concrete result with which the Civil Government would feel able to hold off the military. With this background, Kurusu said, he had had to initiate his discussions with the

Secretary of State. In the first place, he could not explain this to the Secretary, who seemed to feel suspicious at once, not only at the troop movement but of the evident desire of Kurusu to arrive at results speedily. In fact, Kurusu said that the Secretary had queried several times why he was in such a rush to get something concrete effected.

Kurusu said that he would appreciate it greatly if I, as his old friend, would explain this to the Secretary, which I, of course, promised to do.

Turning then to the general problem, Kurusu said that he felt the principal difficulties could be said, in a nut-shell, to be the State Department and the national sentimentality with regard to China on the one hand and a "lack of humor" on the part of the Japanese militarists on the other hand. The real problem, however, was "how to get the Japanese out of China!" Kurusu was extremely frank on this subject on which he dealt and to which he returned most of the time. He stated that the show was up in China, that the militarists knew this as well, or perhaps better, than anyone else and that they were all looking for a way out to save their faces.

To illustrate the present situation, Kurusu said that it was similar to that existing at the end of the Russo-Japanese War when the Japanese won the great victory of Mufkden; namely, that while Japan was the

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victor, she was exhausted and could not have gone on. This, he said, was the situation attained today; only in the present case they arrive at no victory, just the occupation of certain hotly contested localities in China. "So", he kept repeating and repeating, "we must find a way out and we believe that President Roosevelt as arbiter between ourselves and the Chinese is the best move from our point of view, as well as everyone else's."

I repeatedly asked Kurusu if he was absolutely sure of his ground in these statements, with particular reference to the remarks on the part of the militarists that the show was up in China and the conditions were extremely bad. Kurusu said he was absolutely certain of it, not only by his own observations but from conversations he had had with important military authorities just prior to his departure from Tokyo a few weeks ago. He added that the country was absolutely war-weary, had no enthusiasm for this or any other conflict, but must be restored to peaceful conditions where normal trade could be resumed. I got the distinct impression that the ^{oil} ~~whole~~ situation was especially bad. Commenting further on this particular subject, Kurusu said that, naturally, the militarists continued to bluster and roar, but that this was merely normal face-saving, particularly in the *Army* and in no way contradicted the things he had just stated, which, in brief, was that the militarists' power in Japan had definitely passed.

its high point and was definitely on the down-grade.

Likewise, Kurusu said, it was his definite opinion that pro-Axis sentiment was now on the down-grade. He, himself, and the thinking people of the country had always realized that a German victory in the West would be perhaps more dangerous for them in the East than for the United States; that Germany had no intention of assisting or even permitting Japan to retain any benefits that she might derive from her Axis victory. Furthermore, the increased number of German officers in Tokyo and the large German refugee colony had soured the situation greatly, the Japanese resenting German arrogance and manners, and were increasingly saying: "Is this the people to whom we have allied ourselves and for whom we ^{are} expected to go to war with the United States and Britain!"

At this point I said that, while I had not been in touch with the State Department for at least a year and had no knowledge of what was in their mind, I felt that the best way to approach better relations between Japan and the United States was through a definite demonstration by Japan of her change of heart with regard to the Axis and a throwing-in of her lot with the British and the Americans.

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Kurusu heartily agreed, but reminded me of the Anti-Comintern agreement and the military alliance which he, himself, had signed as Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. Kurusu said this most ruefully, adding, however, that he had resigned as Ambassador to Germany the next day.

We then discussed for sometime ways and means whereby Japan could show her change of heart with regard to the Axis and yet not have to break her treaties, which, Kurusu humourously said, would offend our Government's great interest in the maintenance and sanctity of treaties!

Among the expedients suggested by Kurusu was the use to which industry could be put to aid in supplying Britain and ourselves with war materiel which would help Japan to restore her own apparently desperate economic and industrial condition. I countered this with the thought that unless something of a strikingly pro-anti-Axis and pro-American and -British character were done, we would consider this manufacturing expedient, for which ^{we} ~~he~~ would forego our present embargo, only a ruse on the part of Japan.

This brought up the question of Confidence, which, I said quite bluntly, was perhaps the crux of the whole matter, that there was no trust in Japan here, quite understandable from our point of view, that quite possibly the Japanese might feel the same way about us, and that

the important thing to work for, therefore, was a restoration of confidence between the two countries on which the future could be built. Kurusu was emphatically in agreement with this idea. He said he had been working along exactly the same line, that he had been most disappointed at the failure of the effort to have the President and Prince Konoye meet, as such a spectacular example of Japanese change of heart, and that he was still seeking some means of effecting a meeting.

Returning again to the question of how the Japanese could withdraw from China, he mentioned the time element which would require a certain "garrisoning" of Japanese troops in China for a period of years. Apparently, ~~our~~ ^{our} Government officials had viewed this with much disfavor which he said he, of course, understood because it looked suspicious, but the United States, itself, had taken considerable time to withdraw from Nicaragua, Haiti and Cuba. These things could not be done over-night, much as it might be desired.

Speaking again of the question of confidence, I reminded him that unquestionably he labored under the same difficulty in which I remember Debuchi was in the early days of the Manchurian affair when he was making statements in the morning to the Secretary of State which the militarists would repudiate in the afternoon, that, naturally, there could be no trust or confidence in such a situation

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which, unfortunately, still ~~attended~~ ^{attended}. Kurusu appeared only too tragically aware of this truth, but asserted with considerable confidence that he believed the militarists were so much on the run and in such a difficult situation that, unless hot-heads among them upset the applecart - which might be done at any time - he felt that the better element in Japan was really on its way to control the situation.

At the end of our long conversation, I asked Kurusu to come and dine with Mr. Belin and myself that night at Mr. Belin's house. He said he would be only too delighted to do so, that he had not been out of the Embassy, practically since his arrival, and that he would be so happy to have this opportunity.

As agreed, Mr. Kurusu came to dinner at eight o'clock and we were just sitting down at the table when the telephone rang and he was called to it. He came back and immediately told us that the State Department had announced that President Roosevelt had sent a personal message to Emperor Hirohito, hoping that a peaceful solution could be found. Kurusu stated that he thought this was a very clever move on the part of the Government; that the ~~Emperor~~ ^{Emperor} could hardly say "no", nor could he say "yes", and that this would cause many headaches in Tokyo and give much food for thought.

During the course of the evening, he reiterated in the presence of Mr. Belin - whom he had never met before and who was a complete stranger to him - practically everything he had told me in the morning. He spoke with a frankness, which astonished Mr. Belin beyond measure, but with evident sincerity.

Mr. Belin, carrying the ball, followed the line taken in the morning's conversation with regard to the question of confidence and especially Kurusu's firm opinion that the jig was up in China, the military position extremely bad, and the militarists' influence, itself, on the wane. Mr. Belin stated that, in his opinion, the one step which would completely reverse things in the United States and restore confidence between the two countries would be a renouncement by Japan of the pro-Axis pact. This, Kurusu seemed to find a difficult procedure although agreeing entirely in principle.

Kurusu expressed the opinion at this juncture that he and others in Japan realized perfectly that Germany was trying to make of Japan an Italy in the Pacific, and that he hoped and prayed that they would not be successful. He had no illusions that, in the event of a German victory, the Germans would take the Netherlands East Indies for themselves and give nothing to Japan. He also repeated to Mr. Belin his Mukden analogy to describe the present exhausted military state of Japan.

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'Mr. Kurusu stayed for four hours although he had ordered his car for ten o'clock and the chauffeur sent word in that he was expected back at the Embassy.

* * * * *

In spite of what happened on Sunday, Mr. Belin and I are of the firm conviction that Kurusu knew nothing of the events which were going to take place the next day.

This feeling was confirmed by a telephone conversation which I had with Kurusu Sunday evening at the suggestion of Colonel Donovan, who believed it would be advantageous for me to try to have a talk with Kurusu. When I called Kurusu on the telephone to say that I would be glad to see him if he cared to see me, his voice sounded like that of a broken man. Calling me by my first name and expressing his deep appreciation for my having telephoned, he said that he would hate to inconvenience me because there was a big crowd in front of the Embassy and many policemen. I gave him my telephone number and said that, if at any time he wished to talk with me, he could call me as I might be here several days.

Kurusu seemed quite overwhelmed and in the deepest sort of despair, both by the tone of his voice and his expressions of keenest disappointment.

Naturally, this conversation had to be guarded as he was speaking from the Japanese Embassy.

T. L. Belin

Frederick M. Meyer

Nov. 14.

LOVETT

JUDGE PATTERSON CLD BOB SWEET LWC 9:59AM
 JUDGE PATTERSON CLD BOB LOVETT OK 12:32 PM
 LORD BEAVERBROOK LONDON CLD AVERILL HARRIMAN OK 145PM
 ADML STARK CLD GENL MARSHALL OK 350PM
 SECTY WELLES CLD A.G. OK D.A. 4:45PM

Nov. 15.

JUDGE PATTERSON CLD FORRESTAL OK 9:10AM
 THURMAN ARNOLD CLD FORRESTAL OK 10:05AM
 FORRESTAL CLD PATTERSON OK 11AM

JOHN B BLADFORD CLD GEN MARSHALL OUT LWC
 W J VINTON CLD JUDGE ROSENMAN OK 605PM

Nov. 16.

Nov. 17.

1100A SECY KNOX CLD SECY ICKES---LWC---OK1125.
 1225P SECY KNOX CLD SECY STIMSON---OK.
 210P SECY KNOX CLD SECY WAR---LWC---OKM355P.
 235P JUDGE PATTERSON CLD MR. FORRESTAL ---LWC---OK 340P
 310P AG BIDDLE CLD WELLES---OK.
 342P FORRESTAL CLD HAROLD SMITH---LWC---OK 515P
 422P SECY STIMSON CLD AG---AT HOME ILL---NM.
 445P VP CLD BRECK LONG---OK.
 515P JAMES FORRESTALL CLD JUDGE PATTERSON---OK.
 535P SUMNER WELLES CLD GEN. MARSHALL (ON MANEUVERS)---NM.
 525P PMG CLD SECY HULL---OK.

Nov. 18.

900A MRS. KNOX CLD MRS. STARK---OK.
 922A PMG CLD SECY HULL---OK.
 922A SECY ICKES CLD SECY KNOX---LWC^{N1}---OK 1002A
 1010A SECY KNOX CLD ICKES---OK.
 1010A SUMNER WELLES CLD GEN. MARSHALL---NM.
 1145A SECY KNOX CLD SECY STIMSON---OK.
 1246P MR. BLANDFORD CLD JUDGE PATTERSON---OK.
 1248P McCLOY CLD DIR. SMITH---OK.
 320P SECY HULL CLD GEN. MARSHALL---LWC---OK 436P
 505P SECY KNOX CLD SECY ICKES---OK.
 527P SECY KNOX CLD ADM. LAND---OK.
 110A WAYNE COY CLD OP---LWC.

China
May 15, 1941

Dear Lauch:

It is quite all right to go ahead and negotiate regarding the air program or any other thing that the Chinese request but I don't want to imply that I am at this time in favor of any of the proposals. Obviously that can only be finally worked out in relationship to our whole military problem and the needs of ourselves and the British. This should be taken up with General Burns and General Arnold.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Lauchlin Currie

HLH/lmb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5-14-41

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

For preparation of reply
to Currie.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


May 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Aircraft Program for China.

After spending a lot of time trying to inform myself on the general aircraft program and the various factors that have to be borne in mind, I have worked out a tentative program for the balance of this year. I don't think it will disrupt in any significant degree the Army or British programs and I believe that, though modest, it is probably as large as the Chinese can handle this year. I need not emphasize the actual importance of establishing a decent air force in China, nor the psychological importance of an early determination of a program that the Chinese can count on.

May I proceed to negotiate with the Army and the British on this tentative program with the understanding that while you are prepared to accept modifications in the plan, nevertheless you approve of the general magnitudes involved? This would serve as a basis for negotiation.



Locklin Currie

May 9, 1941.

A TENTATIVE AIRCRAFT PROGRAM FOR CHINA

The following program is designed to supply China in 1941 with 244 pursuit ships, 112 bombers, 340 trainers and 22 transport planes.

1. Pursuit Ships.

a. The British are prepared to release 144 air-cooled engine Vultee 48 C's. This force could be replaced and augmented by the release by our Army in the first six months of 1942 of their 147 air-cooled Republic P 43's as the more advanced P 47's become available.

b. In order to replace and augment the initial Chinese pursuit force of 100 liquid-cooled Curtiss P 40 now en route, the Army could release 100 P40B, as the more advanced P 40 D's and E's come into production. This release could be continued in the first half of 1942.

2. Bombers.

It is suggested that the Army release 40 of its older B 18 bombers, of which it has 258, and which, though slow, are suitable for night bombing. It is further suggested that the Army and the British release from current production 72 bombers up to the end of 1941 according to the following schedule:

- 3 each monthly from the Army and the British in May, June and July.
- 4 each monthly in August and September.
- 5 each monthly in October and November.
- 6 each in December.

A gradually increasing monthly schedule could then be provided for throughout 1942 to provide for replacements and additions.

3. Trainers.

Heavy emphasis should be placed immediately on the creation of a first-class Chinese air force. To this end it is suggested that a group of instructors under the charge of a first-class army flying school officer be sent to China. It is further suggested that 340 advanced and primary trainers be diverted from the production of 7,170 scheduled for the army this year. A tentative schedule might be as follows:

May	20
June	30
July	40
August	50
September	50
October	50
November	50
December	50

-2-

3. Transport Planes.

It is suggested that ten additional B-18's be released by the Army for this purpose and that the twelve DC3's now detailed to Army generals be released. For personal Army transport service here the two-engined Beechcraft, seating six and faster than the DC3's, would appear to be a desirable substitution for DC3's.

The attached tentative program would call for the following schedule of deliveries:

	Immed.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	1st 6 mos 1942
Small ships											
Patrols P 49C	5	7	10	15	20	22	22	23	20		-
Patrols P 40E					20	20	20	20	20		7
Patrols P 43											147
Subs											
Patrols											
P 12	40										
Water medium or light		6	6	6	8	8	10	10	12		7
Trainers											
		30	30	40	50	50	50	50	50		
Transport											
B 18	10										
DC 3			3	3	3	3					

Secret

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, 28th July, 1941.The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein two copies of the latest reports received from London on the military situation. They are dated July 25th and July 27th. Believe me, Dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX.

TELEGRAM FROM LONDON DATED JULY 25TH—DELIVERED FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY
TO THE PRESIDENT, 28TH JULY 1941

Strongly escorted convoy of six merchant ships carrying stores and reinforcements arrived at Malta after continuous high-level dive-bombing and torpedo bombing but only one ship of over 12,000 tons hit by E boat torpedo in early morning. Her speed reduced to 10 knots but her cargo suffered little damage.

2. A. M. July 23rd explosion in number 1 bay of Alexandra Dock, Hull, damage to merchant ship, sank three lighters and was attributed to mine reported on night May 3rd, May 4th.

3. *Royal Air Force*.—Daylight June 24th. Heavy air attack on Brest, medium attack on Cherbourg, light attack on La Pallice: except for latter fighters provided escort. It is claimed that Gneisenau, Prince Eugen and Scharnhorst were straddled by sticks of bombs. Smoke screen rendered observation difficult and no direct hit could be ascertained. Merchant ship 10,000 tons may have been hit too. Heavy air fighting resulted in destruction by our bombers of 22 enemy fighters, four probable, eight damaged. Our fighters destroyed 12 enemy fighters certain, 5 probable, 6 damaged. We lost 16 bombers, 7 fighters. Off Norwegian coast A. M. July 24th small merchant ship was hit by coastal command aircraft and left beached and burning. Another small ship was attacked; crew abandoned the ship thought bombs not seen to explode.

Night of July 24th–25th our aircraft attacked successfully Kiel and Emden. A. M. July 25th small force despatched five hours to attack Scharnhorst at La Pallice. Four missing.

4. *Military*—Japanese making military preparations Manchoukuo where North-east movements of troops is reported.

5. *Russian*.—Germans are trying to consolidate position along railway running south from Porkhov area. No further advance towards Leningrad reported. German pressure continues northeast of Smolensk also south of Kiev where thrust is southeastwards. German advance east of Mogilev Podolsk is said to be on fairly wide front.

TELEGRAM FROM LONDON DATED JULY 27TH—DELIVERED FROM THE BRITISH
EMBASSY TO THE PRESIDENT JULY 28TH, 1941

1. Achates mined July 25th 40 miles southeast Iceland (c) arrived in harbour.

2. British cruiser on July 25th intercepted German Erlangen 6 000 tons 480 miles south-east Montivideo. She was set on fire and flooded while endeavour was being made to save her.

3. Grisnez batteries unsuccessfully attempted to shell Channel convoy night of July 25th–July 26th.

4. Attempt to locate Scharnhorst on July 25th failed. 50 reconnaissance Brest and La Pallice also unsuccessful.

5. 0500/26 Grand Harbour Malta heavily attacked by E-boats and one-man T/Bs. St. Elmo mobile viaduct damaged by torpedo. About 10 E-boats and one-man T/Bs sunk by shore batteries and Royal Air Force fighters. 20 prisoners captured and various bodies recovered.

6. *ROYAL AIR FORCE*.—Night of July 24th–July 25th attacks on Kiel and Emden satisfactory especially in Deutsch and Krupp's shipyards. Night of July 25th–26th medium attack Hanover and Hamburg and light attack on Berlin. Nine bombers missing.

7. *MEDITERRANEAN*.—July 23rd.

An E-boat east of Pantelleria left sinking by Beaufighters which also destroyed two dive-bombers. One Beaufighter missing. Four Blenheims attacked shipping at Trapani Sicily. One merchant vessel about 7,000 tons last seen heavily on fire; another merchant vessel about 3,000 tons received two direct hits, set on fire, believed sunk. On July 25th at Malta Hurricanes shot down 5 enemy aircraft; one enemy fighter fell into cellar of demolished shop at Valetta.

8. *RUSSIA*.—German efforts are directed north-east of Smolensk and to clearing up Mogilev area. Russian formations west of armoured spearheads are still offering considerable resistance to enveloping forces.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, D. C., October 14th, 1941.

Secret.

The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein a copy of the latest report received from London on the military situation. It was dated October 12th, 1941.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX.

TELEGRAM FROM LONDON DATED OCTOBER 12TH, 1941—DELIVERED BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO THE PRESIDENT 14TH OCTOBER 1941

1. A supply convoy from the United Kingdom has arrived at Archanged.
2. Enemy aircraft attacked Faroe Islands p. m. October 11th; a Norwegian trawler was sunk and houses were machine gunned.
3. Small Greek merchant vessel in convoy was sunk by mine off Humber October 10th.
4. Small British merchant vessel was bombed and sunk off the East coast early this morning.
5. Cana 'ian Government tanker has now arrived at Iceland.
6. *TOBRUK*.—To counter enemy night operations with tanks against our forward observation posts on October 9th 15 of our Infantry tanks successfully intercepted an enemy tank formation and obliged it to withdraw. 20 German tanks took part of which many were damaged. Ours sustained only minor repairable damage and we had two casualties.
7. *ROYAL AIR FORCE*.—October 9th-10th. Revised casualties. 10 bombers missing, 4 crashed, 1 crew killed.
8. October 10th-11th. Objectives were attacked as follows: Krupps Works Essen 56 aircraft, 59 tons of high explosives, 6,640 incendiary bombs.
COLOGNE—53 aircraft, 76 tons of high explosives, 4,960 incendiary bombs.
DUNKIRK.—19 aircraft, 16 tons of high explosives, nil.
BORDEAUX—9 aircraft, 6 tons of high explosives, 1,080 incendiary bombs.
OSTEND.—16 aircraft, 27 tons of high explosives, 840 incendiary bombs.
ROTTERDAM.—7 aircraft, 10 tons of high explosives, 900 incendiary bombs.
Total—160 aircraft, 194 tons of high explosives, 14,420 incendiary bombs. Bad weather made accurate bombing impossible but many fires were started and one 4,000 pound bomb burst in the centre of Cologne.
9. October 11th. Small offensive operations were undertaken by our fighters over Northern France.
10. October 11th-12th. 39 aircraft were sent out, 27 to Emden and 12 sea mining—all returned safely.
11. *LIBYA*.—October 9th-10th. Benghazi Harbour Derna and two aerodromes were successfully attacked. October 10th, 9 Marylands attacked about 50 tanks and 200 mechanical transports east of Tobruk, scoring three direct hits.
12. *MEDITERRANEAN*.—October 10th-11th. Naval aircraft from Malta attacked an enemy convoy—two merchant vessels, of about 6,000 tons were seriously damaged and stopped.
13. *GERMAN AIR FORCE*.—October 11th-12th. One Ju. 88 collided with aircraft, both being destroyed. Another enemy bomber which landed near

Dungeness was severely damaged and the crew of 4 being captured. Bombing was somewhat heavier than recently, but scattered.

No damage of national importance and casualties small. An air-raid precaution headquarters damaged at Tenby and some damage to utility services at Great Yarmouth and Whitstable.

14. BULGARIA.—50,000 men are said to be engaged on railway construction work and 32,000 on roads. The railway between Svilengrad and Edirne (Adrianople) will not be repaired until December.

15. JAPAN.—Since July 1941 daily average Japanese merchant ships outside Japanese waters has decreased from 172 to 40 on October 6th.

16. Aircraft casualties over and from British areas. German 2 destroyed and British nil.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, D. C., December 3rd, 1941.

Secret

The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein a copy of the latest report received from London on the military situation. It was dated December 2nd, 1941.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX.

Paraphrase of a report from London on the Military situation, dated 2nd December 1941, delivered to the President from the British Embassy on 3rd December 1941.

(I) A British destroyer and a Drifter shot down two German bombers off the HUMBER yesterday. Two British cruisers and 2 destroyers on the evening of the 1st intercepted and sank one destroyer, one 8,000 ton tanker and one 6,000 ton merchant ship, all South-bound, about 80 miles N. N. W. of TRIPOLI (L). On the evening of the 1st a British cruiser intercepted in the South Atlantic, a ship of some 11,000 tons which scuttled herself when a warning shot was fired.

(II) MILITARY.

LIBYA.—30th-1st. The enemy attacked in strength with tanks and infantry and captured SIDI REZEGH. A counter-attack by our troops was unsuccessful. The 15th German armoured Division renewed the attack early on the 1st from the Southwest and captured BIR EL HAMED. Our armoured forces counter-attacked at dawn from the Southeast and by mid-day were reported in the BIR EL HAMED area where the position was confused.

In the frontier area on the morning of the 1st our troops attacked enemy positions Northwest of Libyan OMAR. This attack was stoutly resisted. Some progress has been made but the situation is obscure.

RUSSIA.—MOSCOW Sector—Heavy fighting is continuing but no appreciable change has been reported.

ROSTOV Sector—Information received establishing that the Russians hold ROSTOV but does not indicate how far to the West of the town the Germans have retreated.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS.

30th-1st. HAMBURG—122 aircraft attacked in good weather and dropped 160 tons of H. E. and 900 incendiaries. 64 tons of H. E. and 3,500 incendiaries were dropped on EMDEN. Ground haze and searchlight glare prevented definite pin-pointing but many fires were seen at both places.

1st and 1st-2nd. Bomber operations cancelled. At dusk Hudsons made several hits on two merchant vessels at KRISTIANSAND.

LIBYA.—Tomahawk fight reported yesterday was carried out by one British and one Australian Squadron. 15 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 15 damaged. We lost Tomahawks but all pilots are safe.

30th—5 Squadrons of light bombers attacked M. T. in the SIDI REZEGH-EL DUDA area. Bombers destroyed two and damaged 9 enemy aircraft on the ground at MARTUBA.

1st December—Offensive patrol of Naval Hurricanes and Tomahawks engaged 20 Ju. 88's escorted by 12 Me. 109's and some Italian G. 50's. They destroyed one Ju. 88 and 3 Italian fighters and probably destroyed two German and two Italian and damaged 3 German fighters. Two Tomahawks are missing. A reconnaissance Ju. 88 was also shot down Southeast of MADDELENA.

(IV) *G. A. F.*

1st-2nd. About 60 German aircraft operated principally off the East Coast.

(V) *AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES.*

In operations over and from the British Isles—German—3 destroyed.

(VI) The activities of the Russian Air Force over the last fortnight have been such as to indicate that they have more than 1,000 aircraft operating to the South of KURSK of which about 50% are serviceable. Recent activities in the Southern Sector have not been accompanied by appreciable falling off in operations in other sectors.

(VII) The number of Japanese aircraft now estimated in French INDO-CHINA is about 250, of which about 160 are in the South, 88 Fighters (of which at least one Squadron and probably two are of latest type), 70 Light Bombers, 83 heavy Bombers and 9 Reconnaissance.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C., December 4, 1941.

Secret.

The Honourable FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herein copies of the two latest reports received from London on the military situation.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ HALIFAX.

Paraphrase of a report from London on the Military situation, delivered to the President from the British Embassy on 4th December, 1941.

Resume of Operational Events covering period of 20th-27th November, 1941.

(I) *NAVAL.*

MEDITERRANEAN.—Light forces operated off the Libyan Coast in support of our military operations and cruisers and destroyers have been disposed to intercept reinforcements by sea.

Our shipping losses were light. No casualties from submarines or mines were reported.

Enemy minelaying by aircraft in British waters continued on most nights but the situation is well in hand, particularly as regards rapid reopening of temporarily closed ports.

(II) *MILITARY.*

LIBYA.—The armoured corps had succeeded by November 22nd in bringing the greater part of the German 15th and 21st armoured divisions to battle and during the next two days there were heavy engagements ranging over the desert in which heavy casualties were inflicted and received. The burden of fighting then passed temporarily to infantry while armoured units were withdrawn for organization. New Zealand troops supported by British infantry tanks succeeded on the 26th in finally closing the routes to west. The enemy have been making desperate attempts to break out to west with their surviving tanks and with those remnants of HALFAYA and SIDI OMAR garrisons which succeeded in withdrawing from Frontier. In General Auchinleck's opinion it is "all satisfactory and shows that our pressure is telling increasingly".

RUSSIA.—After a period lasting several weeks, when the threat to MOSCOW seemed to be diminishing, the new and expected German drive at KLIN at North and East of TULA aimed at RIAZHNSK and RAZAN from South have once more increased considerably the danger to the capital.

Every available man and vehicle is being thrown into this attack which however would be brought to a standstill if another thaw were once more to turn the roads into mud.

Northwest of ROSTOV.—Germans must still cross the River and consolidate their left flank before they can advance further South Eastwards. In CRIMEA,

SEVASTAPOL is still holding out and Germans have not yet attempted to cross at KERCH.

JAPAN.—Land forces are believed to be disposed as follows: JAPAN 7 Divisions, 1 Tank Regiment; KOREA 1 Division; SAKHALIN 2 Divisions; MANCHUKUO 26 Divisions, 7 Tank Regiments; NORTH CHINA 9 Divisions, 12 Mixed Brigades, 2 Tank Regiments. CENTRAL CHINA 6 Divisions, 7 Mixed Brigades, 1 Tank Regiment; CANTON 3 Divisions, 1 Tank Regiment; SWATOW 1 Mixed Brigade; FORMOSA 3 Divisions; HAINAN 1 Division; NORTH INDO-CHINA 1 Division; SOUTH INDO-CHINA 3 Divisions, 1 Tank Regiment. Total: 62 Divisions 20 Mixed Brigades, 13 Tank Regiments. JAPAN is in a position to invade THAILAND whenever she wishes to do so.

EAST AFRICA.—After a lull of two months during the rainy season a final British advance of 30 miles ending with capture of GONDAR has concluded the East African campaign.

YUGO-SLAVIA.—Bulgarian troops have been moving into district round and south of NISH. The Germans are employing Bulgarian Army to repress the Serbians, having probably failed to induce Bulgarians to fight for them in RUSSIA.

GREECE.—The German garrison in CRETE has been increased from 14,000 to 30,000 roughly from 1 to 2 divisions. The total of German divisions in BALKANS remains however the same—14.

TURKEY.—A system of field defence is being constructed east of the Sea of MARMORA along a line of SAKARIA River.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS.

UNITED KINGDOM AREA.—Bad weather continues. Night bombing operations were cancelled on 4 nights; on remaining 3 a total of 193 tons of high explosive and more than 13,000 incendiaries were dropped. Principal objectives—BREST, LORIENT and EMDEN.

Attacks on enemy shipping were carried out successfully; several vessels of medium tonnage were claimed hit or narrowly missed but owing to difficulty of accurate observation a near estimate of total tonnage destroyed or damaged cannot be given.

There were several enemy attacks on our shipping but otherwise German air activity was slight. 3 enemy A/C destroyed by night and 1 Ju. 88 lost its bearings and landed intact.

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN.—Axis Convoys on Libyan Sea route were attacked on several occasions: 1 Italian cruiser was hit by aircraft-torpedo. Shipping in Tripolitanian Sicilian and Italian Harbour was raided and it is estimated 14,000 tons, at sea or in harbour were sunk or damaged by our aircraft.

LIBYA.—R. A. F., R. A. A. F., S. A. A. F. and a squadron of Free French Blenheims supported effectively our attack in Western desert. Every form of military objective was attacked by night bomber and/or by fighters and light bombers by day. Armoured units mechanical transport tanks lorries and aircraft in air and on ground were especially selected for destruction. Our fighters constantly patrolled battle area by day and also by night, and on at least one occasion caused an escorted German night bombing formation to jettison its bombs. The enemy armoured raiding column provided a good opportunity for air and ground co-operation; this force harassed by our aircraft before being brought to battle by our armoured troops. Aircraft from MALTA shared in many of these operations.

(IV) *EXTRACTS*—from photographic and intelligence reports on results R. A. F. air attacks—on enemy territory in Europe.

NURNBERG.—The Aluminium Works received several direct hits causing a stoppage of work.

DONGES.—About 600 tons diesel oil were lost in our raid of 28-29 September.

LILLE Area.—A report tells of recurring spread of disorganization of industry due to our attacks on the electric power supply.

Information received up to 0700, 3 December.

(I) NAVAL.

MEDITERRANEAN.—A British destroyer torpedoed on 1st December by enemy aircraft east of TORBRUK has returned to ALEXANDRIA under her own steam.

SOUTH ATLANTIC.—Attacks on shipping. 2nd. A ship of medium tonnage outwardbound to FREETOWN was shelled by a U-boat 200 miles South of the AZORES.

A British tanker of medium tonnage was mined and sunk off the Norfolk Coast.

(II) MILITARY.

LIBYA.—Nothing to report.

RUSSIA.—Nothing additional to official communiques.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS.

2nd and night 2nd-3rd. No offensive operations were carried out by Fighter or Bomber Command. Coastal Command report promising attacks on enemy shipping off STAVANGER and on Naval Barracks NANTES. Four aircraft are missing.

LIBYA.—Night November 30-1st December. 20 tons of bombs were dropped on BENGHAZI harbour; starting fires among railway sidings and at base of Cathedral Mole. 4 engined aircraft was destroyed on BARCE aerodrome. One of our bombers is missing.

1st December. A Beaufighter damaged 12 lorries Eastbound near SIRTE and set on fire 2 road tankers. Our fighters carried out over 220 Sorties on offensive sweep and bomber escort and, in combat, destroyed 9 enemy aircraft probably destroyed 4 and damaged 4. Our losses 6 fighters (2 pilots safe).

2nd. In MISURATA-HOMS LIBYA area a Beaufighter damaged 14 Eastbound lorries and set fire to 5 road tankers.

(IV) G. A. F.

2nd-3rd. 11 hostile aircraft operating between LANDS END—BRISTOL CHANNEL—ANGLESEY of which 6 flew over-land. Our night fighters destroyed 2 enemy Bombers.

(V) Aircraft casualties in operations over and from British Isles: German, 2 destroyed; British, 4 aircraft missing.

LIBYA.—Up to three o'clock p. m. 3rd December bad weather hampered air and ground operations only noticeable enemy movement was South from EL ADEM towards EL GOBI. Our mobile columns and patrols continue to harass enemy on SOLLUM, EL ADEM and BARDIA-TOBRUK roads. A small enemy vessel entered SOLLUM Harbour morning 2nd December, but was driven out by machine gun fire from SOLLUM Barracks.